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BEAUTY IN AQUINAS AND JOYCE



JAMES JOYCE is one of the very few modern artists to quote St. Thomas Aquinas as an authority on esthetic philosophy. Many times, in the esthetic theory presented in *A Portrait of the Artist as a Young Man*, the name Aquinas recurs. The purpose of this essay is to appraise Joyce's pronouncements on the beautiful, using Thomism as a touchstone.

The existence of the beautiful, in terms of the fundamental epistemological problem of realism and idealism, has disturbed esthetic philosophers from Plato to Croce. Does beauty exist in the mind, or does it exist in nature? Is beauty a logical being, a concept; or is it a real being, an extra-mental phenomena? Or perhaps it is both a product of nature and a product of mental activity. The last of these suggests the traditional solution the Scholastics have accorded this problem of the locus of beauty. They assert beauty is both a physical and a psychical fact.

The French neo-Thomist, Maurice de Wulf, viewing esthetic

experience in the light of this objective-subjective interpretation, says the beautiful does not "... belong exclusively to things, as the Greeks thought, nor to the subject alone who reacts and enjoys, as some contemporary philosophers maintain. But it is as it were midway between object and subject, and consists in a correspondence between the two."¹ Leonard Callahan summarizes the whole Thomistic position as follows: "Beauty is not a simple but a complex notion; not an absolute, but a relative conception. In its entirety it exists neither as a physical nor as a psychical fact; it is neither wholly in the object, nor wholly in the subject, but the result of an intimate connection of both object and subject. In fine, beauty is a quality of a work of art or of an object of nature, which by reason of its adaptation to the perceptive faculties of the subject, can arouse a feeling of admiration in him who contemplates it."² This dual aspect of the beautiful is clearly indicated in the writings of St. Thomas, as will subsequently be shown.

While the unity of the esthetic experience must be insisted upon, it will be advisable to consider its two aspects separately. A choice presents itself at this point between two approaches which cannot be simultaneously presented though they are closely interwoven. Should an analysis of the ontological qualities of beauty be given at the outset, or should the psychological aspects be considered first? Since being is prior to being known, the extra-mental and ontological elements of the beautiful will be considered first, and then the perceptive and emotive characteristics will be analyzed. "Beauty is in the object according to the perfection of its being, the proportion of its parts; and in a metaphysical sense, all things which are, are beautiful."³ Hence, the three conditions assigned to it by St. Thomas: "For beauty three things are requisite. In the first place, integrity or perfection, for whatsoever things are imperfect, by that very fact are ugly; and due proportion or con-

¹ Maurice De Wulf, *Mediaeval Philosophy* (Cambridge, 1922), p. 136.

² Leonard Callahan, *A Theory of Esthetic According to the Principles of St. Thomas Aquinas*, Baltimore, 1927, p. 29.

³ Mortimer Adler, *Art and Prudence*, New York, 1937, p. 83.

sonance; and again effulgence: so bright colored objects are said to be beautiful.”⁴

The condition of integrity requires that an object of beauty have a positive fullness, completeness, and a richness of perfection. Integrity or perfection is to be understood not in a moral sense but in its primary ontological meaning, so that an object of beauty is perfect when it lacks no essential parts or elements. “The importance of this factor in arousing a sense of beauty is evidenced by everyday experience. An aspect of nature which suggests incompleteness and imperfection, such as a barren field, leaves us cold and indifferent. The same piece of land at a different season of the year, covered with rich crops, enlivened by the myriad tints of its vegetation, may provide a lively esthetic stimulus, in that it arouses the mind by its suggestion of richness, vitality, and energy.”⁵

Attempts have been made to disprove this condition of integrity, which the Thomists posit for beauty, by citing the universal approbation accorded the beauty of the Venus de Milo and several other famous fragmentary specimens of art. This objection vanishes when it is understood that *integritas* is relative to the aims of a work. The observation of Jacques Maritain, on this point, will serve to repudiate the objection.

The speculation of the Ancients concerning the nature of the beautiful must be taken in the most formal sense and their thought should not be materialized in any too narrow specification. The idea of integrity or perfection or complete execution can be realized not in one way only but in a thousand or in ten thousand different ways. The lack of a head or an arm is a considerable defect in a woman but of much less account in a statue—whatever disappointment M. Ravaissou may have felt at being unable to complete the Venos of Melos. The slightest sketch of Leonardo's or even Rodin's is nearer to perfection than the most finished Bouguereau. And if it pleases a futurist to paint a lady with only one eye, or a quarter of an eye, nobody denies him such a right: all one is entitled to require—and here is the whole problem—is that the quarter eye is all the lady needs in the given case.⁶

⁴ *Summa Theol.*, I, q. 39, a. 8.

⁵ Callahan, *op. cit.*, p. 59.

⁶ Jacques Maritain, *Art and Scholasticism*, translated by J. Scanlan, 3d edition (New York, 1946), p. 22.

Proportion or harmony is the second extra-mental feature arousing a sense of beauty; *pulchrum in debita proportione consistit*.⁷ Proportion represents the completion of order. Variety, unity, and harmony are all affiliated notions implied in this idea of order and proportion.

Wherever we seek for beauty, and especially in sensible objects whence the concept is primarily derived, we always find this unity in variety, this peculiar proportion or harmony which makes for esthetic order. In architecture we have the several parts of a building, windows, doors, columns, ornaments, etc., blended into a harmonious whole according to correct proportions. In literature the same purpose is served by the combination of different ideas, events, and circumstances, successively evolved; in music a combination of various sounds, changes in tempo, in rhythm. And so through the entire realm of art and beautiful nature—always variety, but always proportion, symmetry, and adaptation uniting disparate things and effecting a common center, a unity of action or of plan.⁸

As integrity was superficialized, and it was assumed that perfection could only be realized through material fullness, so proportion is often associated with superficial meanings: symmetry, assonance, and the like. But this is far from the truth for asymmetry or dissonance is often required for the work of art to have due proportion. And as it was with integrity, it is with proportion and harmony:

They [proportion and harmony] differ with the object and the end aimed at. Proportions good in a man are not good in a child. Figures constructed according to the Greek or the Egyptian canon are perfectly proportioned in their kind: but Roualt's yokels are also as perfectly proportioned in their kind. Integrity and proportion have no absolute significance and must be understood solely in relation to the end of the work, which is to make a form shine on the matter.⁹

This very brilliance of form,¹⁰ the essence of beauty, the *claritas*

⁷ *Summa Theol.*, I, q. 5, a. 4, ad 1um.

⁸ Callahan, *op. cit.*, p. 61.

⁹ Maritain, *op. cit.*, pp. 22-23.

¹⁰ "The word form is a technical term, signifying that which constitutes a given

pulchri of Aquinas, is the most important esthetic quality. It correlates the two conflicting viewpoints concerning the locus of beauty; it unites the ontological domain to the psychological domain. *Claritas* is a stepping stone linking beauty in the object to beauty in the subject. In view of this, it is capable of being defined in two ways: in terms of what it is in itself, or again in terms of the effects it produces.

In order to grasp this splendor of form comprehensively, it is necessary to look at the definitions arrived at by two neo-Scholastic commentators. The first emphasizes *claritas* as it inheres in a work of art or an object of nature. "By the brilliancy of the beautiful, therefore, we mean the shining forth of the form of a thing, either of a work of art or of nature, or whatever it may be, in such a manner that it is presented to the mind with all the fullness and richness of its perfection and order."¹¹ The second commentator starting his definition where the first left off emphasizes *claritas* as it is introduced into the realm of consciousness. "The *claritas pulchri* is a manner of being which attracts the attention of the intelligence, solicits its contemplative activity, brings before its gaze the order, variety, and unity of works of nature and art."¹² By these definitions it may be seen how *integritas* and *consonantia* are relative to and dependent upon *claritas*. The splendor of form stimulates sensible intuition by lighting up the integrity, perfection, proportion, and harmony of a material being.

Since there are certain crucial differences between the interpretation presented by James Joyce in his novel, *A Portrait of the Artist as a Young Man*, and a genuinely Thomistic interpretation, the foregoing standards maybe used to measure certain Joycean artistic pronouncements.¹³ Emmanuel Chapman

thing in a determined species or essence; it is the type, the abstract ideal. The scholastic conception of form should not be confused with the prevalent acceptance of the word in contemporary language." (Callahan, *op. cit.*, p. 64.)

¹¹ Callahan, *op. cit.*, p. 64.

¹² Maurice De Wulf, "Les Theories Esthetiques Propres a S. Thomas," *Revue Neo-Scholastique*, II, 341 (Oct. 1895).

¹³ James Joyce, *A Portrait of the Artist as a Young Man* (New York, 1928). All the quotations in the text will be found between pages 239-54 of the Modern Library edition.

is perhaps the sole neo-Thomistic philosopher ever to evaluate Joyce's esthetic in print. In one part of an essay on the subject of beauty and art,¹⁴ Chapman succinctly appraises Joyce's interpretation of St. Thomas' three requisites of the beautiful. Unfortunately his criticism of Joyce is brief, but it is so accurate and so penetrating that it goes right to the heart of Joyce's peculiarly deep and at the same time partially erroneous insight.

In interpreting St. Thomas' three requisites of the beautiful, Stephen Dedalus, who images so perfectly Joyce, his artificer, glimpses certain truths which he obscures and combines in the wrong way. It is not surprising that the existential meanings of the requirements of the beautiful are missed altogether. Nor is there any fundamental objection to Stephen extending the meaning of *integritas*, which he translates as wholeness, to unity: "You apprehend it as one thing. You see it as one whole. You apprehend its wholeness. That is *integritas*."

The truth is glimpsed that *consonantia* flows from the form, but Joyce does not see that it is the ontological good of a thing. . . .

Claritas, as might be expected is given the best interpretation by Joyce: "It would lead you to believe that he (St. Thomas) had in mind symbolism or idealism, the supreme quality of beauty being a light from some other world, the idea of which the matter is but the symbol. I thought he might mean that *claritas* was the artistic discovery and the representation of the divine purpose in anything or a force of generalization which would make the esthetic image a universal one, make it outshine its proper conditions. But that is literary talk, I understand it so. When you have apprehended that basket as one thing and have then analyzed it according to its form and apprehended it as a thing, you make the only synthesis which is logically and esthetically permissible. You see that it is that thing which it is and no other thing. The radiance of which he speaks is the scholastic quidditas, the whatness of a thing."¹⁵

So much from Chapman has been quoted, because he so clearly indicates Joyce's mistake both in interpreting and applying the three requisites of the beautiful posited by Aquinas. In the text of his esthetic, Joyce makes the three things needed

¹⁴ Emmanuel Chapman, "The Perennial Theme of Beauty and Art," in *Essays in Thomism*, edited by R. E. Brennan (New York, 1942), pp. 333-347.

¹⁵ *Ibid.*, pp. 340-341.

for beauty correspond to the phases of esthetic apprehension. Aquinas, on the other hand, primarily considered the qualities of universal beauty as conditions for esthetic apprehension. Joyce misunderstood Aquinas; he mistook the preparation for the process, for the process itself. For Aquinas, integrity, consonance, and clarity were primarily existential qualities, stimulating the sense of the beholder. For Joyce, integrity, consonance, and clarity exist primarily in the mind of the beholder as stages in the generation of the "concept" of beauty.

Joyce was thus confused with respect to the precise locus of the beautiful. He perceived that integrity and consonance flow from the form, but he failed to perceive that they constitute the ontological good of a thing. This is not to say that the Thomists do not recognize the fact that the objective requisites of the beautiful are ultimately introduced into the realm of consciousness. Indeed, the function of *claritas*, the foremost ontological quality of beauty, is to effect the adaptation of the object to the subject. And it is further true that a beautiful being, whether it be an object of nature or a work of art, presents within itself the concrescence of all three qualities only formally distinguished by reason. Thus, they are similar in the object and only become dissimilar and separated out when they are perceived. Despite its ultimate realization in the process of artistic apprehension, the threefold root of the beautiful is still basically the possession of the object.

It remains to evaluate Joyce's characterization of the esthetic emotion. Instead of initially citing Aquinas on the constitution of the esthetic emotion, it will expedite the whole process of criticism if several of Joyce's declarations on the subject are brought forward first this time.

Joyce forges out the following distinguishing characteristics of the esthetic emotion:

—Aquinas—said Stephen—says that is beautiful the apprehension of which pleases.—

Lynch nodded.

—I remember that—he said—*Pulchra sunt quae visa placent.*—

—He uses the word *visa*—said Stephen—to cover esthetic appre-

hension of all kinds. . . . This word, though it is vague, is clear enough to keep away good and evil, which excite desire and loathing. It means certainly a stasis and not a kinesis. How about the true? It produces also a stasis of the mind. . . . —

— . . . Truth is beheld by the intellect which is appeased by the most satisfying relations of the intelligible: beauty is beheld by the imagination which is appeased by the most satisfying relations of the sensible. . . . —

Joyce made other equally pertinent comments that might have been quoted here, but the foregoing were chosen, because they cut into the most serious failure in the field of modern esthetics. The failure referred to is the inability to explain rightly how the beautiful, differently from the true and the good, resolves contrary emotions and so brings the mind into dynamic repose.

The first step in the achievement of this purpose is the careful analysis of that classic definition of the beautiful formulated by Aquinas and quoted above by Joyce. Chapman notes that Aquinas, proceeding inductively, derived his first definition of beauty from its effects.

Broadly speaking, those things are called beautiful the vision or apprehension of which placate. Charged with implications, this saying strikes the two-inter-blending notes which will help to explain how man's cognitive and appetitive movements are brought into repose by the beautiful, differently than by the true and the good. The beautiful it says, refers essentially to vision or apprehension, and it also pertains to the nature of the beautiful that its very vision or apprehension placate appetition. Vision not only signifies the act of the sense of sight, but by reason of its worth and certainty is applied to the cognition of all the other senses, and also further to intellectual cognition.¹⁶

In this commentary, Chapman suggests that the cognition of the beautiful brings its own special kind of satisfaction. The preceding quotation from Joyce would suggest the same thing. Thus, Joyce with a creative understanding of beauty reads into Aquinas the same implication as does a philosopher with a theoretical understanding of beauty.

¹⁶ *Ibid.*, p. 343.

While Joyce perceives the need of distinguishing the beautiful from the good and the true, the distinctions he does make are not perfectly valid. With regard to the beautiful and the good, Joyce makes a distinction on the basis of motion. The good is kinetic in character exciting desire; the beautiful is static in character inducing ideal pity or ideal terror. The Thomist would object to the static emphasis, and certain Platonic overtones in this and another supplementary statement of Joyce's that "the mind is arrested and raised above desire and loathing."

Two capital texts from the *Summa Theologica* compare and contrast the kind of satisfaction brought by the good with the kind of satisfaction brought by the beautiful.

The beautiful and the good are the same as regards the subject: they have the same foundation, namely form, and the good is therefore commended as beautiful. But they differ in concept. For the good, strictly speaking, regards the appetite, that being good which all things desire; and therefore it partakes of the nature of an end, for the appetite is as it were a sort of movement to the thing. The beautiful, however, concerns the force of knowledge, for things are said to be beautiful when they give pleasure at sight. Therefore, beauty consists in proper proportion, because the sense derives pleasure from things properly proportioned, as being similar to itself, for sense also is a kind of reason like every cognitive virtue: and as knowledge comes about through assimilation, and similitude is concerned with form, the beautiful strictly pertains to the concept of a formal cause.¹⁷

The beautiful is the same thing as the good, differing only conceptually. That being good which all things desire, it is of the nature of good that the appetite is allayed by it: but it is of the nature of the beautiful that the appetite is allayed by the sight or knowledge of it . . . and so it is clear that the beautiful adds over and above the good a certain order to the force of knowledge. So let that be termed good which simply gratifies the appetite: but let that be termed beautiful the mere apprehension of which gives pleasure.¹⁸

These two texts from the *Summa* are most important, teaching that beauty is with respect to some things like the good

¹⁷ *Summa Theol.*, I, q. 5, a. 4, ad 1um.

¹⁸ *Summa Theol.*, I-II, q. 27, a. 1, ad 3um.

and with respect to others unlike the good. The beautiful is like the good in two ways. With respect to their effect on the subject, they both quiet appetite and gratify desire in the mind. Concerning their mode of being, outside the mind, the beautiful is the same thing as the good. They share the same metaphysical foundation; they both flow from the form of a thing.

While the beautiful and the good both appease movement, they achieve this effect by different means. The good placates the appetite, satisfies the subject, only by being acquired or possessed. The beautiful placates and satisfies the cognitive and appetitive powers simply by being seen, apprehended, or contemplated. In relation to the good, one is a direct participator, a consumer. In relation to the beautiful, one is a knower, a contemplator. Concerning their existence in the mind, the good is conceptually distinct from the beautiful. The primary function of the good is to satisfy appetite; the primary function of the beautiful is to illuminate cognition. But the beautiful gladdens the cognizer in order to quiet appetite. So as Aquinas pointed out, the concept of the good pertains to a purpose or end as regards the appetite, and the concept of the beautiful pertains to a standard or a means as regards the appetite.

It is clear then that while the good directly confronts the appetite, the beautiful directly confronts the faculty of knowledge. But the relationship of beauty to knowledge is more properly in the field of the beautiful and the true. So the investigation moves from the good to the true.

Joyce distinguishes the beautiful from the true largely on the basis of the appraising faculty. "... Truth is beheld by the intellect which is appeased by the most satisfying relations of the intelligible: beauty is beheld by the imagination which is appeased by the most satisfying relations of the sensible. . . ." The differences Joyce discerns here between esthetic apprehension and philosophical or scientific apprehension are further afiel from the Thomistic position than was his reference to the good.

Joyce holds truth to be the object of the intellect and beauty to be the object of the imagination. It is plain that he attributes to the imagination the terminus of the esthetic fact. This doctrine is openly in conflict with that of the Thomists, who are careful to stress the predominance of the intellectual element in the perception of the beautiful. "This act of the intelligence is the essential and formal element in esthetic perception."¹⁹ This is not to deny that the imagination plays a role in the perception of the beautiful, but it plays a minor role. The perception of the beautiful is ultimately accomplished by the mind, using the senses and the imagination as instruments. To use Maritain's words: artistic contemplation is "before all intellectual."²⁰

Artistic contemplation, therefore, in common with philosophical and scientific contemplation is before all intellectual. Common to both modes of knowing is the apprehension of the universal or the intelligible. Both are adequations of intellect and thing but with this difference: scientific and philosophical truth is abstracted; artistic beauty is intuited. In philosophic knowing, forms of whole things are abstracted and considered apart from the material things in which they are realized. In esthetic knowing, the brilliance of form which ravishes the beautiful object is apprehended in the sensible and presented by the sensible, and not separately from it.²¹ The radiance of form glittering in a beautiful thing is presented to the mind by means of the intuition begun in the senses.

Beauty also affords more satisfaction than does the true. Truth, since it is simply intellectual, satisfies the power of reason but leaves the appetitive powers unappeased. Beauty, since it is both intellectual and intuitive, satisfies man in his cognitive and appetitive powers. Truth is a good of cognition; beauty is a good of cognition and appetite. Beauty appends the qualities of joy and love to what is seen and apprehended.

FRANK L. KUNKEL

8309 Talbot St.,
Kew Gardens, N. Y.

¹⁹ Callahan, *op. cit.*, p. 40.

²⁰ Maritain, *op. cit.*, p. 125.

²¹ Maritain, *op. cit.*, p. 125.

THE MEANING OF THE "COMMON MAN"

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1. THE "SOVEREIGNTY OF THE COMMON MAN"

COMMUNISTS, philo-communists, Socialists and radicals or progressives of various shades criticize the "Liberal-Democratic" system of Western society on the ground of its being *insufficiently democratic*. To put it bluntly as they might, our democracy, too inhibited by its historic nexus with liberal constitutionalism—itsself rooted in the traditions of Christian civilization—has not advanced far enough *in its own direction*. The inference from this is, of course, that Marxist-Leninist communism must be either accepted outright, closely imitated (subject to certain concessions and mitigations), or emulated in a fashion dispensing altogether with its tyrannical and, therefore, "un-democratic" modes of procedure. The same "ideal" should be pursued, but if possible in such a manner that it would not hurt a great many people; the "dictatorship of the proletariat" should not "degenerate" into a "dictatorship over the proletariat." Better still, the dictatorship might be replaced by an immediate establishment of "substantial" or "social" democracy,—the liberal one being merely formal, juridical or political,—which would act from the outset in a mood of joyous spontaneity, and the stern and narrow grandeur of the proletariat might as well be broadened into the more humane and tolerant concept of "the common people." This is the concept we propose to examine in the pages that follow.

The Common Man, indeed, may be regarded as the "common denominator" between Communism and Liberal Democracy, and so far, envisaged on the plane of realities, as one of the chief ideological forces paralysing our resistance to Communist Imperialism. Many of us are incapable of being integrally anti-communist,—incapable, not in the formal sense only of granting everybody a "right to his own opinion" in the name of "tolerance" and abhorring the persecution of ever so pernicious

cious enemies of liberty in the name of Liberty, but in the sense of a positive and specific sympathy with the Enemy, notwithstanding all reprobation or apprehension: for in spite of everything that can be said against them, the Communists are "after all" working on behalf and in the interest of the "Common Man," nay, to no other purpose than that of ensuring a social order in which the Common Man is supreme, wherefore a certain essential solidarity cannot very well be refused to them. Democracy, in our sense, *as an actual regime, a subsistent social reality*, would naturally tend to withstand the aggression and to counter the menace of Communism its lethal Foe—which being an embodiment of subversive Totalitarianism at its height, cannot tolerate any power besides its own, nor indeed any human reality or aspect of human nature outside the grip of its power. Yet Democracy *as a "dialectical" process*, Democracy as informed and inspired by its inherent law of "evolution," no less naturally tends towards welcoming Communism as a "fulfilment" of its own transcendent aim and a "consummation" of its own meaning, or at any rate towards recognizing Communism as a rival brother labouring under imperfections of his own but yet representing the self-same triumphant march of Man in quest of his self-conceived heaven on earth.

From the point of view of Democracy's defence against the Totalitarian conqueror, then, the fetish of the "Common Man" appears as a "paralysing idea" of the first magnitude, and its philosophical destruction—apart from the purely intellectual interest which few will deny to such an enquiry—a practical task of great urgency. Moreover, even taking abstraction from the formidable threat proffered by the actual and present power of Soviet Communism, it is most important for those attached to the high values bred out and reflected by liberal-democratic civilization in its given reality to take note clearly and fearlessly of the immanent dangers, the self-stultifying tendencies, the spiritually suicidal bent of that civilization; of the dismal ambiguity implied in the overworked slogan

"Democracy." What we have in mind is not, of course, a proposal to substitute for (Western) "Democracy," along with its ideological biases, a fancy system of Conservative Constitutionalism, nor a "return" to this or that specified stage of the past, but a suggestion to *displace the spiritual stress* from the "common man" aspect of Democracy to its aspect of constitutionalism and of moral continuity with the high tradition of Antiquity, Christendom and the half-surviving Liberal cultures of yesterday. In other words, instead of emphasizing the "ideal" of "Democracy," which is a bait held out by the Enemy as well as a current emblem of our own world and of that which makes it go round, we should shift the emphasis within "Democracy" from the fabric of ideas and tendencies symbolized by the "Common Man" onto whatever the "Rule of Law" stands for—a Balanced Society, that is, and the finiteness of all human power even on the level of human relations; the plurality and the limitation of all social powers and political prerogatives; the ordering of society in deference and in reference to a Power radically beyond and above Man in his social reality, in his political dignity and in all manifestations of his "will."

We will inquire into the concept of the "Common Man" with a special regard to the problem and paradox involved in the postulate of his sovereignty. For it is only in this context that the creed centered on the "Common Man" emerges; nay, that this particular concept as distinct, notably, from that of the "plain man," arises at all. The problem is a difficult one, not only for the votaries of the creed but for its critic, too. If our adversaries are, essentially, at odds with the insoluble task of conjuring supreme strength out of supreme weakness *as such*, of identifying Naught with All and investing an artificially dehumanized man with the plenitude of Divine Reason and Power, of establishing a world of Omnipotent Slaves, we on the other hand—seeing the historic vigour of that movement and the intellectual depths implicit in its system of doctrines—cannot content ourselves with shallow polemical

interpretations denouncing the gross deceitfulness of the ruling or nascent Tyrants and the crude sophistry of their scribes and dupes. To use the weapons of exposure, satire and invective against the workers of diabolical Evil is indeed a method legitimate and necessary, but in itself plainly inadequate. Its very effectiveness presupposes a vision that measures up to the full stature of the Enemy, and a philosophical penetration of his secret.

We must, to be sure, fully allow for the fact that under the Communist dispensation men—not political suspects and pariahs, but men, that is to say, "citizens"—are enslaved more totally than would ever have seemed imaginable in previous history, and that the operation of modern "mass democracy" itself seems to imply an ominous drift towards generalized unfreedom under a specious disguise of "having a *right* to do and to get what one likes." Yet we must cast out of our minds, as a first step, all suspicion that what we are faced with is "*nothing but*" the self-seeking, ambitious enterprise of a more or less identifiable pack of crafty cheats to enslave and exploit the "immense majority" of mankind, making use to this end of the cunning pretext of "liberating" the "Common Man" from his former masters and—what in fact is implied in *their* concept of liberty—of making *him* more sovereign over the earth than any of the ousted "Sovereigns" have ever been. The agents of Subversive Totalitarianism pursue a dream which, however hideous a nightmare it truly is, they actually believe in. In a sense, they advocate and practise what they do "in good faith." So must we, too, "in good faith" and in a sort of philosophical "open-mindedness" ask ourselves—or, rather, "let the phenomenon speak"—about what is meant by the Common Man; about how he can be "common" as distinct from "man" not wholly and always "common," and yet called to a glory of sovereignty inaccessible to mere man. In other words, about a lapse into abject servitude experienced as an ascension to the fulness of freedom, and the particular nature of a self-enslavement that bears, at the

same time, the traits of an assumption of godlike self-rule and absolute rulership.

In the present study, however, we, in the main, confine ourselves to the first heading of the problem as marked out above—the concept of the Common Man—, examining his pretension to sovereignty and the reality underlying or corresponding to it as an essential implication of our primary theme only.

2. "THE COMMON MAN," A PRIVATIVE CONCEPT.

What is a common man? To all intents and purposes, the common man is one who lacks any particular distinction, and resembles more or less closely the great mass of his fellow-men. We say "any particular distinction," for obviously every person as such is somehow radically distinct from others. Democrats often affirm, anyhow, everybody's "right" to "develop his personality." But what are the particular distinctions which prevent a man from being a common one? Chiefly, they are the distinctions of rank and wealth; or to put it differently, a higher social position. Whether extraordinary talents and accomplishments on the one hand, eccentric traits and criminal propensities on the other also interfere with true commonness is not so clear. Education, eminently good inasmuch as it raises common men to a higher level, is eminently bad in so far as it is meant to reflect, to express and to accentuate social distinction—membership of a "leisure class," an "exclusive circle," a "privileged group." But neither is social superiority itself all of one kind. Power in the purely functional sense—being, for example, a dictator, a president, a minister, a general, an admiral—may not be a possible attribute of the common man, but it does not seem either to imply a strict antithesis. The same thing is true of a "self-made man's" wealth, or more generally, of a high income level owed to the recognition on the part of society of one's personal merits.

Anything "out of the common," then, that appears to be unequivocally *ordained* to the ends and concerns of Common Humanity *as such*, may claim legitimacy, or at least absolution.

Yet such a relationship is not presupposed *ab ovo*. On the contrary, the *prima facie* assumption is that all social superiority as such relates antagonistically to the Common Man, and needs special justification. Accordingly, the primary concept of the Common Man reposes on the exclusion of all such distinctions. Secondly, in view of their instrumental necessity, they may be readmitted on the condition of being kept within the limits of the accidental, and strictly debarred from any *intrinsic* pretension of superiority. By this we mean a pretension of superiority not conceived in terms of immediate usefulness for the needs of common humanity as such. For the moment, it may suffice to observe that *hereditary* prerogatives of every kind, though far from defining exhaustively what is *par excellence* antithetic to the concept of the Common Man, are particularly symbolic of that antithesis. To be common men, we must be "born equal" not only in the sense of abstract "rights" but in the sense of material "conditions" or "chances" also.

Thus the primary concept of the Common Man is essentially a privative one: the Common Man is Man stripped of all specific excellence, distinction, superiority; of all inherent pretension to be another's "better." It will be objected that this is little more than an arbitrary trick of verbalism destined to couch, from the outset, in "philosophical" terms what is simply an emotional prejudice against Equality, a rhetorical feat by one holding a brief for Privilege. One might just as well disprove the value of Health by choosing to define it in negative terms, as an "absence of illness": for, undoubtedly, conditions like smallpox, malarial fever, consumption, gout, or jaundice are more conspicuous and more "positively" perceptible than is plain good health. Yet this is shallow reasoning. For disease—like crime—, however conspicuous, is primarily an imperfection; whereas "privileges" are primarily perfections, in the opinion of their arch-enemies as well as in ours. The upholders of the Common Man despise neither power, abundance, security, pleasure, knowledge, nor even dignity, "culture," or public-mindedness. What irks them is the limited

presence, the non-universality, the unequal and "unjust" distribution, and along with that, the quantitative and even qualitative "inadequacy" of these possessions and values. Their very use of "privilege" as a term of opprobrium bears eloquent witness to our contention. Unlike, for instance, the seventeenth-century Puritans who denounced the real and imaginary "vices" of the Cavaliers, the barkers against Privilege do not attack a thing they deem intrinsically evil but blame a surplus of good as such, which they believe to be harmful to the global interests of mankind and obstructive to the broadening and heightening of these very goods. Consequently, they attack a positive, actual perfection, though with the consciousness of doing so in the name of an abstract and future greater perfection. Their *motive*, apparently, is by no means one of mere negativism; but that was not what we suggested. What we mean is merely that *the subject on whose behalf* they pretend to act is defined in terms of Privation. The "Common Man" is primarily Man in his "nakedness," Man deficient of distinctions and possessions, Man "depressed" and "disinherited."

Again, it might be objected, this is merely to blur, by using an unnecessary philosophical term, an obvious characteristic of legal or vindicative justice. Suppose I wish to recover my stolen property, and sue in court the person who has purloined it. The fact that I am at present "deprived" while he is "in possession" does not alter the justice of my cause, nor render me a mere "envious" fighter against "a perfection I lack."

Yet the analogy is doubly misleading. In the first place, it implies an immoral origin of social inequality as such: which in our opinion is manifest nonsense, but at any rate can only be maintained at the cost of a specific extension of the concept of justice, and even then only by dint of laborious constructions. Secondly—and in the present context this is the more important point—the worship of the Common Man implies, not merely as regards its objective presuppositions, mistaken or not, but even in the *intentional* sense, another element

besides the mere claim to "righting a wrong." Were it not so, the ideologists of Equality would have contented themselves with speaking in the name of those "oppressed," "disinherited," "exploited"—instead of setting themselves up, not only as advocates of "the People," but as mouthpieces of the "Common Man." The "substantialization" as it were, the creation of a specific "formality," the introduction of a preferable "type" of man that are implied herein reveal a state of consciousness unmistakably different to that of one who is bent on redressing a wrong, real or imaginary. The "Common Man" does not mean simply a victim of spoliation, nor "Privilege" simply an act of illicit appropriation (or even a set of such acts). The Common Man is by no means merely a "plaintiff." He is at the same time a hero, if not a new god. He not only abounds in "rights," he also has "powers" surpassing those of any kind of "aristocracy." It is our duty not only to protect or succour the Common Man but also to "believe in" him. In a more pregnant sense even than the doctrine of the People's Will and the mystical vocation of the Proletariat—the former being more vague and equivocal, the latter more dialectical and chiliastic—the concept of the Common Man expresses the idea of a specific and all-important "*betterness*" based on an all-round absence of perfection, comprising but transcending "poverty" in the stricter economic use of the term.

Being more "realistic," in a way, than either the abstract juridical formalism connoted by "Democracy" or the one-sided exclusive revolutionism of the Marxian vision of the *Zukunftsstaat*, the "kingdom of the Common Man" conveys a more vivid sense of the curious aspect of unreality inherent in the modern movement of Subversion taken as a whole. It evokes in a more direct and acute fashion the paradoxical problem we have chosen to discuss in these pages. Political democracy, however strictly equalitarian, has no direct bearing upon the socio-economic, cultural and traditional gradation within "the people," its "pre-political," "entitative" structure as it were. The people may well "vote into power" now one,

now another of a few established "elite groups." Nor does proletarian ascendancy imply all the indetermination of the Common Man's rule. The high industrial proletariat is distinct with a specific faculty of organized dynamism and militancy, which makes it something similar to an oligarchic "elite"; the staff of agitators and conspirators emerging from the "class struggle" provides a primary "cadre" of leadership for the established proletarian State itself. The "Common Man" conception, on the other hand—forwarding the postulate of an "identity between the rulers and the ruled" in more concrete and immediate terms—, seems to offer no such outlet. This impression will be strengthened if we consider the fact that the Common Man conception makes no appeal to such determinative principles, either, as are nationalist or racialist particularism, ancestor-worship and other "reactionary" bases for a restrictive "*We*-consciousness." On the contrary, it is universalistic, "Progressive," humanitarian, and utterly in favour of "productiveness" and "proficiency," of dispersion and dissemination, of expansion and circulation. A Subject defined in privative terms, then, is invested with a title to the "greatest possible" wealth, wisdom, validity, and perfection. How comes such to be?—and what are the prospective consequences in the field of reality?

We are reminded of David de Dinant's identification between Prime Matter and God, of Nicholas Cusanus' doctrine of God as infinite Minimum and infinite Maximum at the same time (and of God the pure Act being likewise absolute Potency), of Pantheist Individualism as present in Spinoza and in most kinds of monadological speculations, of Rousseau's "General Will" implying ultimately an identification between the citizens' private spheres of interest with the common good of the body politic, of the march of the Hegelian "Idea" from Indetermination to Totality, and of all Evolutionism bent on drawing Everything out of Nothing. If the Common Man is Man decapitated, he is also the Superman. The objection to any kind of head is precisely that the features of the face it bears cannot help being too particular, and hence *finite*—not

representative of humanity pure and simple, sheer humanity, the all-comprehensive universality of Man in the sense of *universalia in praedicando* equated to *universalia in causando*. In other words, the reason why all particular determination must be broken up is that it implies Man's *creaturely limitation*. It is neither the powerful prince, the exceptional genius, nor the millionaire—it is Naught alone that can ape the universality and omnipotence of God with an illusion of perfection, with a deceptive semblance of symmetry as it were. Only superficial critics can believe that the quasi religious impetus of Total Equalitarianism draws on no deeper forces than envy and jealousy, competitive self-assertiveness, the need to over-compensate for one's inferiorities, and the craving for material comforts. It is Sieyès's concise formula, precluding to the French revolution, that furnishes us with the key to the Common Man's concept: "What is the Third Estate? Nothing;—What ought it to be? Everything."

3. THE DIALECTICS OF EQUALITY.

In a sense, then, the "Common Man" denotes a renewal of revolutionary equalitarianism in its original meaning and mood, as distinct from mere "formal" or "bourgeois" Democracy—a mere "equality of rights"—on the one hand, from the proletarian class-struggle scheme and the rigid collectivist dogma of the Marxist conception on the other. Significantly enough, from this latter camp the ideologists of the Common Man are considerably less anxious to mark themselves off; they usually do it in a much less emphatic and more apologetic fashion. The accents are by no means evenly divided. Bourgeois democracy continues to represent—in a mitigated form, to be sure, as even the Communists are sometimes willing to admit—the principle of Evil: inequality, hierarchy, privilege, reserved advantages, exclusiveness of a sort. This is what such vituperative labels as "monopolistic capitalism" or "economic royalism" are meant to express. Communism, on the contrary, primarily stands for our own ideal. Only, it does so

in a somewhat harsh and narrow way which is apt to disagree with our pampered selves, seeing our softer nature and laxer habits. These harsher ways we may "not need," and we confidently hope to "dispense with" them while securing the very same "ends." In regard to its habitat and its field of operation, of course, the lop-sided position of Common Man equalitarianism takes on an inverse sign. Its haze exudes from "democratic" minds outside the pales of the Marxian empire, and the reality it acts upon is Democracy, not Communism. Our interview with the Common Man does not enchant us into the midst of an exegetic quarrel of Marxist soothsayers but keeps us roving over the broader and less stringently regulated paths of Democracy.

To put matters succinctly, the equalitarian doctrine can be described as consisting in the extension of *a certain marginal type of situation* between two individuals or two groups, a situation which in truth does involve strict equality as a postulate of justice, *into a general conception* of social relationships. Suppose John steals Peter's property, robs or cheats him, or in any other way secures some "illicit" advantage over him. Justice demands "restoration," which essentially implies "equalization," taking something away from him who has more, and giving it to him who has less. The validity of Peter's claim to restitution is irrespective of any intrinsic comparison between his and John's "personalities"; John has no right to keep any of his ill-gotten gains on the strength of his having superior racial characteristics, shapelier limbs, a greater wealth of knowledge, tidier habits of life, or more refined manners. The two men are presumed fundamentally "equal"—which in fact they are in regard to the natural rights of the person as such. The psychological aura of this illustrative situation even connotes the suggestion of a further-going material equality: we tend to imagine "Peter" and "John" as two small independent neighbours, preferably farmers or shopkeepers, who "originally" own roughly the same amount until John turns a rogue and amasses wealth at Peter's cost,

who becomes a pauper. "Redressing the balance" means that they both move back into an identical condition of respectable poverty or modest well-being. Again, let Peter and John be two hungry wanderers who find a moderately sized loaf of bread. It is natural that they should divide it up evenly between them. John is hardly entitled to eat, say, four fifths of the loaf because he happens to have more ancestors, better breeding, a cleaner moral record, or a keener sense of rhythm. Again, though it is fair that I should greet the Rector of our university with a deeper bow than I do its Janitor, I am equally forbidden to kill either. Similarly, whenever I have to arbitrate or in any other sense to choose or to decide between two persons in a situation involving a definite set of rules, "merits," "conditions" and "relevant viewpoints," I have to confine myself to these and must not allow any further personal considerations, alien from the "merits of the case," to trespass on my judgment. For example, I must bring myself to recognize that Peter's interpretation of an obscure Greek text is correct while John's is false, even though John is, say, more deeply religious, a more skilful chess-player, a more prepossessing person or a wittier conversationalist, or again, my own brother or one to whom I am greatly indebted. In the given context, these things do not "count." John and Peter are again "presumed equal" so as to isolate and determine the one inequality between them which we have in view here and now, the one that is the "theme of this discourse,"—*as though* they really were as equal in quality as two brand-new dollars but, through a fatal accident which has thrusting one of them into error, suddenly came to be unequal so far as the one sharply circumscribed point of controversy is concerned. Now the equalitarian mind would "analyse" the whole of life in terms of such marginal situations, "existential ultimates," definite "rights," isolable accidents and circumscribed contests, and dissolve the fabric of society into an incessant and ever-renewed succession of races under "equitable conditions" and impeccable prize-awarding decisions.

Yet in reality these types of situations are only one aspect of life, and provide only one regulative principle—among others—of social “classing,” a conveniently “evident” and “rational” one, to be sure. But “competition on equal terms” would itself be impossible unless the “competitors” facing one another in blank equality were embedded in a more stable and concrete order of social coexistence which precludes equality. They could not “run for the prize” alongside one another without their respective “virtue” deriving from other, and entirely different, phases of their lives. Above all, the mechanism presupposes the “umpire” capable of an “impartial” adjudication, and thus a further and decisive element of inequality. The “Common Man” conception, in consonance with the “radical” or “popular” brand of Democracy and with the Marxian identification between the proletariat and a virtually universal mankind, views social order in the light of “Peter despoiled by John” inasmuch also as it simply and massively equates justice as such to the self-interest of the “wronged” party as such. To be sure, the victim of a murderous assault who fights to save his life or the dispossessed one who is bent on recovering his property also “represent,” automatically and *uno ictu* as it were, the principle of justice. They do not, however, represent it *formally* as does the legislator, the judge, or the policeman, whose private interests are not themselves involved. In fact, the discharged impetus of self-regarding motives may easily drive the “wronged” person to recoup himself, if possible, “with a vengeance”—an attitude distinct from the primarily aggressive or predatory one but similarly opposed to considerations of justice.

As soon as, for the construction “victim versus wrongdoer,” we substitute the polarity between him who is “worse off” and him who is “better off” in the broadest sense of the term, the rapport with justice or “objectivity” undergoes an inversion. Whatever the historical sources and backgrounds of his intrinsic or his positional advantage, it is the more “perfect,” the more highly placed, the better educated, the more pros-

perous, the more secure person who, by and large at least, is likelier to develop the capacity of disinterested judgment. The apotheosis of the Common Man itself, in its various democratic and communistic forms, comes as little from the minds of common men as the doctrine of Utilitarianism originates from persons eager for pleasure or material profit. But the trouble with the true equalitarian is precisely that he is unable to see a fat person beside a lean one without being tempted to assume that the former must have battered on the flesh and blood of the latter. Whatever desires the Common Man may evince or manifest, whether material or more "refined," whether reasonable or absurd, whether genuine or fictitious, they are never simply a desire or pursuit. They are always a "struggle" for something that is "due" to but hitherto "withheld" from him. These desires must needs be clad in the gown of "righteous indignation." Accordingly, the one-track mind of the prophets of the Common Man is little inclined to discuss the *problem* of Equality. To restrain the high-handed John and to make him disgorge, to "vindicate" the virtuous Peter's right, to "emancipate" him and to stiffen his neck—here is a simple and evident task, indeed a "clear and distinct idea" involving no need for subtleties. Medicine and hygiene are, at bottom, a simple affair: this man, for instance, suffers from malaria, so in reference to him we equate quinine to health. Analogously, the one theme of society is the daunting of "the strong" and the strengthening of "the weak"—that is to say, the actualization of their superior force, which resides in their numbers. But in fact it is at this stage that the really interesting problems arise. In what manner will the actual bearers, the agents, wielders, administrators—of this "new strength," the actualized "power of the weak," differ from the eliminated oppressors and exploiters? What specific necessities, what structural changes does the durable "elimination" of the latter entail? What exactly is the meaning of there being none but "weak" members of society, and in what terms is their mutual equality defined?

Obviously, both the principle of Government based on universal suffrage and the principle of economic Collectivism suggest answers of a sort—however inadequate—to these questions. So does, in a somewhat more concrete sense perhaps, the concept of the Common Man itself. It is,—as, inspired by this concept, we might say,—not enough either to provide the Peters with the political means of exercising “eternal vigilance” over the machinations of the Johns, or even to institute an economic order that offers no scope for the activities of the Johns, and prevents their trespasses from being profitable to them (indeed, such a sweeping change in the economic order we might also consider too painful, and avoidable). We must above all endeavour to bring about a world consisting of Peters alone, and no Johns at all; a society so integrally fashioned for Peter’s needs and so well suited to his taste, so exclusively modelled on Peter’s lines and adjusted to his categories and ideals as to call no John into existence. The presupposition is that, whereas “aristocrats” in the widest sense of the term cannot live except by tyrannizing over common men and “skimming the cream off” the produce of their labour, a small farmer on the contrary needs no “feudal overlord” to maintain himself, and can indeed do jolly well without him, just as the vegetable realm can thrive without man’s intervention, while man cannot live without vegetables. More generally, the common men “among themselves” can procure them everything they need, including the values (problematic or inadequate) hitherto manufactured by the “upper classes,” without having to pay for the dubious services and endure the humiliating prerogatives of a breed of rapacious and disdainful spongers. This gives us a hint of the immanent *totalitarian* trend of social equalitarianism. But for the moment our concern is with the meaning of equality itself. What, beyond a mere protection of Peter against being maltreated and imposed upon by John, is implied in its postulate?

Speaking in the abstract, two mutually incompatible interpretations are usually applied to that postulate. Viewed from

a more practical angle, they somehow converge in the central aim that there shall be no "classes" in society, no "privilege," no "aristocracy," no group, that is, which leads a richer life than the rest and, in fact if not in juridical form, has a preponderant share in the government of the State. The milder variant of equalitarianism, which preserves a closer continuity with the initial demand of "justice," confines its claim to the abolition of all "*artificial*" inequality, of all falsification, deflection and warping of both "natural" equality and "natural" inequality by violence, fraud, rigid perpetuation of attained superiorities, establishment of monopolistic positions, and the like. All members of society should not be levelled down, and up, to a plane of actual, material, entitative equality—all earning the same salary, consuming the same amount of food, possessing the same wealth of information. They should be merely placed on an "equal footing" implying the same rights, the same access to the collective treasury of the community in its every aspect, the same principle of treatment: so that, every one being "recompensed according to his merits," they may all "unfold" their respective personalities including the "natural inequality" inherent in that concept. The more radical variant of equalitarianism aims, on the contrary, at *levelling* as such: everybody having the same right to "need-fulfilment" in so far as the basic human needs are concerned, "natural inequalities" should not be recognized by assigning a congruous "reward" to every "merit" but compensated for, corrected, and smoothed out so as to ensure actual equality and nip in the bud all vertical stratification—in other words, prevent from the outset all solidification of positional heights and emergence of "privileged groups."

The advocates of levelling sometimes pretend to be merely fighters for the "merit-rewarding" species of equalitarianism, "taken seriously" (for no demagogue would renounce the classic trick of assuring his audience that the things he incites them to "claim" are theirs "in justice"). Any conspicuous inequality—they may say—cannot but be the result of organized

injustice. The mere diversities of "natural talents" could never bring it about. In practice, then, insisting on equality pure and simple is tantamount to a "true" equality of consideration, of rights, and of access. The historical and sociological, as well as anthropological, fact is that all "artificial"—"positional," "social," "class"—inequalities are rooted in "natural" and "personal" ones, and are in the long run always doomed to crumble away if their nexus with such a background of natural "excellence" is severed. It may be noted, in passing, 1. that inequalities disappear to give place to new types of inequality, not to their absence, 2. that, to be sure, all natural inequalities by no means possess the same moral meaning and the same human value. There exists an elastic correspondence but by no means a close parallelism between wisdom, goodness and even bodily prowess on the one hand, success, power, wealth and prestige—or even their preservation—on the other. Moreover, the distribution of the various kinds of particular capacities and values is generally complex and overlapping. No "elite" group is the only one, or a homogeneously constituted one in any society, nor does any such group "excel" the "rest" of society in all humanly relevant values and achievements.

Anyhow, if the leveller can lean on less of a specious "self-evidence" than can the "merit"-minded or "competitive" equalitarians, it is he who has a deeper insight into social reality. He is at any rate dimly aware of the fact on whose denial the "moderate" equalitarian position rests—the *essential inseparability between "artificial" and "natural" inequalities*. Once we go beyond the wholesome and Christian principle of a *limited* equality, formal and material, as implied by Man's basic dignity and rational nature as well as by the radical transcendence of the person's ultimate value *before God* above his social, physical, intellectual and cultural, and even, in a tangible sense, moral, distinctions or shortcomings; once we fall a prey to the illusive ideal of an *absolute* "formal" equality, that is, of a neutral and homogeneous medium of

equal "rights" and "chances"—we cannot help sliding down the path that leads to the abyss of *material* equality, with its concomitants of an impoverishing, oppressing, suffocating and deadening uniformity. Nor can we escape that specific brand of *inequality*, a "new inequality" replacing the "old" ones, which goes with totalitarian "mass" government and with the "conditioning of man by man" required by man's unlimited and wholesale "self-determination."

For the truth is that "artificial" sets of conditions determine, in a varying but always a high measure, the natural qualities, dispositions and aptitudes of a given person, and inversely, the operation of "natural" distinctions "naturally"—by itself, and inevitably—tends to react upon, to shape and to modify the framework of "chances," possibilities, means of access, facilities and "advantages." There is no "natural" distinction which is not also a fruit of various "privileges," and none which is not generative of "privileges," though these may be both enhanced and counterbalanced by *other* "privileges." The concept of an incessant "competition" based upon an "equal start," joined between social blanks who at every moment come from nowhere, measure their "natural" or "purely personal" distinctions with one another, with one of the set "climbing the top," to vanish into the void a moment later and reemerge for another "just" prize contest the moment after—this concept cannot be thought out without contradiction. On the plane of reality, it must either be reduced to the sane and sober postulate of ensuring certain basic *elements* of equality and opposing certain barriers to an "*excessive*" accumulation of advantages, or expanded into the deleterious insanity of a wholesale material, levelling equalitarianism. This, too, entails some kind of contradiction—for the subversive and omnipotent levelling power itself needs a distinct supremacy over the power of "common men" as such—, but seen as a concept it reveals at any rate incomparably greater self-consistency, and much less artificial blindness to reality. In awareness of the fact that the "artificial" impact

of a concrete social order on its constituent elements cannot be eliminated, levelling equalitarianism demands a positive, wholesale, central management of that "artificial" apparatus of conditions for the promotion of entitative equality and the curbing of such "natural" variations as may tend to engender "privileges." In view of the discovery that equal and utterly similar beings alone can ever have "equal chances," it leaves behind the equality of chances to claim that of the beings themselves.

4. EQUALITY AND SIMILARITY.

The parenthetical idea of complete similarity in the last sentence needs some expansion. For it must be admitted that equality does not, in sheer logic, imply similarity or uniformity. Two citizens who have roughly the same income and the same political rights, nay, the same "standing" in the community, may at the same time exercise entirely disparate occupations: for instance, a moderately prosperous grocer and a fairly successful violinist. Moreover, even allowing for an approximative equality in the level of "education," they may typify two entirely different kinds of personality with most unlike outlooks, tastes, and modes of life. But the accident of a quantitative equality, as referred to income, power, social status, and even "culture," is one thing and the deliberate endeavour to secure a maximum of such equality throughout a given society is another. The former is largely independent of similarity; the latter is not. In order even to render possible a large-scale measurement or computation of equality, we must impose a set of common "counters" or "denominators," units of calculation as it were, which involves the postulate of largely identical standards of value or habits of valuation, and beyond that a general preference for such types of value as lend themselves easily to quantification, calculation and functional regulation. Thus equalitarianism will inevitably tend to encourage and breed a "reductionist" and "materialist" ethos; to exclude as far as possible whatever is "subtle," "immaterial," irreducibly "qualitative," from the psychic medium of society. As soon

as we recognize essentially different social "types of virtue"—"models" or "ideals" of public validity, such as the monk or the hero, the entrepreneur or the scholar, the artist or the artisan,—we have assented to Inequality. Howsoever we stress the necessity and usefulness and, in the Christian view, the fundamentally equal dignity inherent to all of them, we cannot help accepting the principle of a hierarchical order among them, placing, for instance, the musician above the shopkeeper, though any shopkeeper may in most important respects be "better" than any musician, and in general, any "social inferior" in most important respects be "better" than "his betters." Every intrinsic difference between man and man contains the seeds of a hierarchical tension and distance. In other words, it is pregnant with Inequality. And again, providing every one with an "equal amount" is most naturally, evidently and verifiably effected by providing every one with the same thing. Thus, in social reality, wholesale equality winds up in mass similarity—which, in view of its being a product of organizational technique rather than the sign of a spontaneous tribal homogeneity, may as well be labelled "uniformity." Of course, if one man is particularly keen on sausages and willing to renounce his "share" of fruit, while another prefers to live mainly on dumplings, the resultant danger to equality is trivial and may safely be neglected. It is not so with diversities *per se* implying a note of quasi-essential distinction. A "free" farmer or merchant does not fit into a "society of workers"; still less does an individual endowed with a "liberal education." Such eccentricities, then, as "private profit" or "liberal education," must go.

At this point, however, a capital objection is sure to be raised. Equalitarianism, it will be contended, is hostile neither to the division of labour nor to personal genius, talents or accomplishments, but merely to the social hierarchy of artificial group privileges which perverts the division of labour and stifles rather than brings to fruition, personal prowess or merit. Social equality bids fair to set everybody to the task he is fit for,

his respective fitness being henceforth unobscured by antecedents of birth and fortune. Likewise, it aspires to liberate genius from the shackles of poverty and the handicap of a humble origin. This is an undertaking entirely consonant with the destruction of that fake culture which is merely an appurtenance of "conspicuous leisure." "Acquisitive" talents, it is true, will no longer be appreciated, but "creative" talents will be honoured all the more. Michelangelo to be relegated to the turning-lathe? A vile calumny! He shall in future create much *greater* works of art for working henceforth for the whole people and no longer for popes and princelets. In the world of Equality, creative genius is no longer condemned to manufacture all sorts of sham and trash for the amusement of the idle rich, nor to observe conventions destined to prevent the exposure of a social system based on class exploitation. *True* art, *true* science, *true* individuality will flourish—so much the more as, released from the bondage of irrational privilege and particular interest, they will be devoted to the service of Humanity, or in other words, to the welfare of the toiling Masses.

The Common Man, then, is a very mysterious, not to say a mystical fellow, who according to need is admirably fitted even to ascend the highest peaks, inaccessible to a privilege-ridden mankind, of Uncommonness. In the context of art, genius, culture and other such gadgets enjoying too much prestige to allow any verbal slighting of them, we are offered the "moderate" equalitarianism of "fair competition." Yet the chief fallacy of the argument consists in the puerile assumption that the qualitative equality of men, not merely as an accidental fact but as the *leitmotiv* of a comprehensive social system, is compatible with a wide and rich qualitative variation of "*services*": of "functions," capacities, achievements, sensibilities, "creations"—in a word, *disposable* values. The same "Common Man" needs, in fact, many different kinds of things. Therefore, while remaining the same Common Man, indeed the more completely he remains so the better, he may at will

"differentiate" himself into this or that kind of "specialist," including any "needed" sort of "genius," through the instrumentality of training, "education," "selection of talents" by psychologists' boards, and similar procedures of functional organization. Until the last moment, as it were, I am exactly the same thing as the next man in the street—as good as the other fellow, nor any whit better—, but at the last moment, I suddenly undergo a course of special training and switch off into producing those fruits of "genius" which the community, as is mostly admitted, notwithstanding that clumsy and treacherous Common Man *naturlaut*, "*La République n'a pas besoin de savants*," "also needs." Thus a blossoming out of personal, mental, and artistic manifoldness appears to be expected on the barren soil of institutions and ruling ideologies altogether dedicated to the cult of equality and to the suppression of whatever category of social inequality might survive or threaten to arise. Because society is enriched by a manifoldness of qualities and achievements, the theorists of Progress imagine that the graceful butterfly of personal dissimilarity can alight directly on the drab fabric of social homogeneity with its division of labour comparable to the presence of many different-numbered departments in one huge bureau—without needing the congenial framework of social hierarchy and the "fields of tension" implicit therein. Yet, it will be suggested, human manifoldness is not the same thing as social hierarchy. Personal excellence does not in general correspond with titles, wealth, and social classing. Man's response to challenge, adversity and humiliation may be a more fertile source of genius and a more effective spur to high achievement than a position of established mastery or leisured security. True; but what follows is only this—that in a hierarchic society (in the widest sense of the term) there will be much disproportion between men's personal values and outward positions. Why should there not be? "The labourer is worthy of his hire," by all means, but that is not to say that wages or social "success" ought to be an adequate measure of one's "inner worth."

There will be many talents rising from the ranks and a constant necessity of revising and refilling the "cadres of élites." It does not follow, however, that in a social system based on the destruction of all hierarchy there will be a free unfolding of "natural inequality" or indeed any possibility for talents to rise or for personal distinction to develop. Social nobility is not and never was—except in the imagination of imbecile snobs—an equivalent of human and personal, of moral or intellectual nobility; nevertheless, its *existence* is indispensable for the *existence* such nobility, indispensable as a stimulus and a gross, *provisional* measure of value. It becomes a pattern of orientation for society's groping attempts towards experiencing, appreciating and fostering intrinsic distinction. Nobility of diversity remains a symbol for the recognition of dignity and a rampart, inevitably sheltering, it is true, many bad things along with the good—as does civilization or life itself. It is the organic structural link between social unity and individual manifoldness. The equalitarians who enjoy paying lip-service to "individuality," "personality," "culture," "art," "creative minds" and what-not are, indeed, much like the immoralists afflicted with "sublime" moods who believe that "true Christianity" consists simply in despising Pharisees and dining and wining with publicans and adulteresses; who trifle with fancies concerning the salvation of the soul, the beauty of the ritual and the uplift of mystical experiences while confidently skipping the unpleasant intermediary stratum of Decalogue morality.

5. THE FALLACY OF THE "MIDDLE LEVEL."

A certain brand of equalitarians, resigned rather than enthusiastic, take delight or at least comfort in the "mathematical" fancy that if on the one hand levelling breaks down the high peaks of human worth—in respect of genius and character, as well as of luxury and refinement—, on the other hand it raises the low levels of human existence to an acceptable average standard and thus ensures justice without diminishing the sum total of human excellence and happiness. We may readily

dispense with the fine connoisseurship of delicious dukes if in compensation we are relieved from the presence in our midst of illiterates, uncared-for consumptives, and persons ignorant of the use of soap. The crude fallacy on which this argument rests is the assumption of a constant "sum total" of "goods," in the all-embracing sense of the term, which can be "distributed" in more unequal or more equal ways, or to use a synonym, with less or greater justice. The trouble is, of course, that the "realization," "production" or "growth" of all values whatever implies the process of "imitating" and also of comparing, criticizing, sifting and correcting *exemplars*, or in other words, a response to their "radiation." Although in a sense we may indeed be more preoccupied with a "good average" than with "high peaks," the latter are necessary for the "good average" to form. Even the "distribution" of the material wealth of the rich—according to the famous scheme of the Rothschild of Paris who offered his whole fortune to the nation, to the tune of one franc for each citizen—is far likelier to damage than to benefit the material welfare of "the people." With "goods" more qualitative and less measurable, levelling cannot but be much more unequivocally destructive. To put it briefly and with no pretension to treat the matter exhaustively, by taking away their "nobility" from "the nobles" we cannot "ennoble" the "people" but merely annihilate a large part of the "nobleness" present in the "people" themselves. We may imagine that by so acting we respond to the well-known phenomena of the village cobbler whose shabby smock-frock hides the heart of a true gentleman and the opulent Baron with a pageant of ancestors who is at bottom nothing but a vulgar rake. What we really do is to dry up the founts and to stifle the stimuli of "gentlemanliness," so far as it depends on a social background and frame of reference, in the hearts of village cobblers as elsewhere. Moreover, we eliminate at least one powerful leverage of moral and spiritual obligation hitherto weighing upon the strong and fortunate notwithstanding the cases of its apparent ineffectiveness. What

"levelling" brings about is not to raise the "people" to the level of the wealthy and the highly "educated," nor even to lower the "ruling classes" to the level of the people, but to depress *everything* to a new "common" level which in the most important respects will be decisively *inferior* to the old level of the "people."

Not, however, explicitly or "formally" would this be so. On the contrary, the "progressive" enthusiasts of Equality would by no means content themselves with "levelling" proper—with equalization directed to an average middle level. The mastery of the Common Man is destined to surpass infinitely the possessions and attributes of the "privileged" masters of the dark pre-proletarian, pre-historic past. And so much is actually true that the Common Man is not a static and statistical reality of to-day (or yesterday) but a goal of revolutionary "becoming." The emancipation of the "common people" from the fetters of social hierarchy is at the same time to be the *creation* of the Common Man of to-morrow. Thus do we gain a first answer to the riddle of the sovereignty of the Common Man: not only is that sovereignty possible but it is inherent in the Common Man's very concept. He cannot even exist unless he is sovereign; for the empirical common man vegetating or struggling in the time prior to the integral triumph of the Revolution is not yet "He" but the mere "material" preparatory, the mere "subject" ordained to His self-realization.

6. AN ANALYSIS OF "ODIOUS" INEQUALITY.

Let us, now, approach the problem of Equality from a new angle, delicate though that aspect may seem to be. How does equalitarianism relate to the elements of a "new inequality" superseding, and compensating for, the old hierarchical one? For inequality is without doubt technically necessary for keeping the social machine in function, and doubly so for enforcing and securing a postulate of equality.

Are we really witnessing, as the emotional appeal of equalitarianism to our sense of "justice" would suggest, a displace-

ment of "artificial" inequality by "natural" inequality purified and emancipated? Such a statement is by no means borne out by a study of the main facts or tendencies in question and of their inward logic. What, after all, is most distasteful to the equalitarian temper? True, it is not sheer physical or mental dissimilarity as such, nor even the fact of natural gradations concerning physical strength, intellectual capacities and moral character. But surely it is not, either, sheer wealth or power as such. Democracy in its liberal phase largely tolerates, and in a way, even favours and exaggerates, a "plutocratic" order of society. The Communist system itself, though incompatible with the existency of a wealthy class, seems well to accommodate itself, on grounds of expediency, with a very considerable inequality of income levels. Again, the power of State officialdom—that is, "artificial" power *par excellence*—has been steadily rising along with the march of Equality, to attain a degree next to omnipotence in the socialist paradises of Totalitarianism. The central target of the equalitarian attack is what has rightly been described, not as wealth nor even as private property, much less, power, but as *privilege* and what might even more adequately be designated as *nobility*—precisely that of which the Common Man is meant to embody a grandiose and superior antithesis.

The essential idea of nobility is not unconnected but still less identical with the historic fact of nobility in a "titled" or technical sense. The hereditary principle itself is only a secondary, though important, symbolic aspect of it. The idea means primarily, as in so many cases, what is signified by the word: "*knowability*." Ideally speaking, the "noble" is a "known," a "noted" and "notable," an "intelligible" and "identifiable" primary "factor" of society. Its opposite is the "anonymous" individual, the mere statistical unit. In other words, he is an intrinsically *autonomous* unit on the social scene, the words "autonomy" and "privilege" conveying, again, a very much kindred meaning. There is supposed to be an indissoluble—or rather, a most intimate—*bond be-*

tween the qualitative "suchness" of the "noble" and the place he occupies in society: a conception familiar to Aristotle and St. Thomas (who were also well aware of the existence of "natural slaves" among the class of "masters," and *vice versa*) though not to all of their latter-day disciples. "Hereditary" transmission of "nobility"—which, for all its biological foundation, is largely only a word for the unique formative action of early education and coining influence of the family atmosphere—is a most natural corollary but not the inmost core of the conception. His lineage constitutes "the noble" as little as does his title, or great wealth, or again, on the other hand, acumen or wisdom and courage or probity or integrity as such. A social reference, a social "resonance" as it were, is originally inherent in the concept of nobility. Now "nobility" is neither "natural" as the colour of the eyes or certain mental dispositions nor "artificial" as an office or rank conferred by government or the brute fact of "possession" taken in itself. Nor is it, as is, generally speaking, "self-earned" rank or wealth, an "artificial" advantage or distinction owed to certain natural attributes specifically equipping their bearer to acquire that advantage or distinction. What, then, does nobility stand for? It represents value intrinsic, distinctively "qualitative," pervading the essence of its bearer as it were, and as such directly underlying a claim to social prerogative or leadership. To recognize the ascendancy of the "noble" means, *not* to "pay" for this or that definite "service" or certify behaviour in conformity with this or that "rule" by an official stamp, but to submit to one's "better" precisely in so far as it is the matter of a quasi-natural "betterness" *in view* of social superiority and subordination.

To prevent gross misconceptions, it may be well to emphasize that the excellence embodied by "nobility," as we here use the term in the perspective of social philosophy, by no means connotes supreme value or an optimum condition from a supernatural point of view. The "true noble" might, but need not, be a saint, and even less a priest. Even from a

comprehensive natural point of view, morality as such is not identical with and is more important for man than nobility as such. Moreover, intellectual height and proficiency is not identical with nobility, and it, too, may be preferred. On the other hand, the concept of nobility should not be narrowed down to that of mediaeval feudality or modern-age rural squirearchy. The urban patriciate, not seldom endowed with a "landed" background to be sure, is also true nobility, and there are other concrete manifestations of the phenomenon as well. The modern capitalist "higher middle class"—the *Bildung und Besitz* represented by "right-wing" liberalism in the German Reich of Bismarck and William II—does duty, in a more or less diluted way, for a kind of "nobility."

A note of "nobility" is inherent in certain military, academic and even trade-union milieux; the Church by its very essence carries a connotation of social nobility, although it as essentially cannot be *the nobility par excellence*.

We might define "nobility" as a quasi-natural, quasi-essential superiority that is necessarily not only *in* society but also *of* society and so far inseparable from an aspect of artificiality, not, however, *by* or *from* society. In other words, "nobility" means the reception—if the term be permissible, the "intus-susception"—by society of a structural principle of order that is not of its own making or positing but originates in supra-social, quasi "entitative" human value. It is *as though* the "noble" were of a higher natural species—which, strictly and metaphysically speaking, is what he most certainly and unequivocally *is not*, being (essentially) just as liable to sin, sickness and ignorance as any proletarian. Thus nobility expresses the submission of Society, *on the natural plane*—in its vital organization and government, that is to say, by contrast to its recognition of the Moral Law with its Divine sanction, as well as of Church authority formally presupposing the supernatural—a recognition of what is higher and better than its own "thesis," "volition" or "appointment" may be. It is not the noble himself that is thus "better and higher" than

the plain man, nor does the stress lie upon the latter's "submission" to the former as such. What matters is the humility displayed by society as a whole in accepting and elaborating a manifold pattern of "distinctions between higher and lower," as part of its own vital constitution. Society thus bows to the directive claim of superior value, not determined by man even in the sense of "applying" a recognizezd supra-human principle of conduct to single cases, but supposed to appear in the differentiation of the social tissue itself as a "semi-natural" growth.

Even according to the liberal ideology with its comic Cartesian perversity of idiom, the Prince is merely a constable charged with "executing" the laws enacted by the "legislative" organ; but things are entirely different in reality. Not only does a directing and ordaining function *sui generis*, irreducible to either legislation and execution, reside in State authority, whether it is monarchical or republican, parliamentary or not, but State authority itself is never, except in the limiting case of absolute totalitarian democracy, the only decisive and directive social authority even in the purely natural context, abstracting, that is, from the social *locus* of the Church. Equalitarianism—in accordance with the formula of the French revolutionists, "Il n'y a que l'Etat et l'individu"—is intent on superseding all "intermediary bodies," *i. e.* the "corporations," and all autonomous authorities in society, *i. e.* élites, nobilities, aristocracies, masters and owners, all privilege, all private factors of public relevancy and influence, by a pure and immediate juxtaposition of the "natural" raw material of individuals (outfitted by nature with blue or brown eyes, greater and less capacity for work, greater talents in one or in another direction, etc.) with the artificial collective Reason in which the sovereignty of all is incarnate, and which again imposes on Society a purely artificial scale of inequalities in the sense of higher and lower civil and military posts. The central object of its hatred is neither inequality as a mere "given" of nature nor artificial inequality as such but the idea of a concrete

natural order of Society's life; of an artificial texture of social relationships and appreciations reposing on a receptive incorporation of "natural" data of value rather than on the opinion and will of an omnipotent collective Subject which merely "administers" the human material as furnished by nature.

It is most characteristic, we may note in passing, that equalitarianism, with the public constitution of the body politic, the sphere of government and class relations, as its primary habitat, should also have invaded such fields, more remote from the political, the relationships of the sexes and the domain of parental authority. Its main theme with regard to the emancipation of women is really the superimposition of artificial similarity upon natural dissimilarity in the place of "artificial" *mores* shaped in reverent awareness of the natural order and the elemental differences between the sexes which it implies. The destruction of parental authority, linked with the odd idea of the emancipation of youth (which, unlike the status of woman or the "depressed classes," is a necessarily transitory stage in human life) is obviously inherent in the drive for totalitarian State regimentation. Although this idea is situated on a very different plane than the extirpation of nobility, it strikes even more fundamentally at the root of the concept of a social order pervaded with natural bases of authority. Of course these cursory side-glances at highly important subjects outside the range of our inquiry are only meant to complete the proof that the equalitarian attack is by no mean really aimed at an "artificial falsification" of the natural constitution of man.

To sum up—the "noble," together with his feeblar substitutes like the bourgeois, the owner, the gentleman, even the petty bourgeois and the kulak or independent farmer, as well as his collateral and rival the priest and monk, and such other figures as the unsocial thinker or artist, aesthete or "crank," must disappear for reasons which at their deepest transcend the scope of relationships within society and the plane of such psychological motives as justice interpreted in terms of mathe-

matical symmetry or envy masquerading as justice. The natural revolt of the slave or servant against the master, a phenomenon which is often quite justified in its immediate limits, is *not* the spiritual core of the equalitarian movement in its secular grandeur, albeit grafted in various ways upon that movement in its changing phases. Nor is the Common Man simply a narrow-minded yokel or an inferiority-haunted wretch who grudges the "aristocrat" his distinctions, capacities or possessions. The "noble" with his tentative and analogical pretension to typify a "higher mankind" or to adumbrate an unfolding of man's qualitative and intrinsic possibilities of "height" is merely a pawn in the game. He stands for the idea of Man's participation in values higher than those universally and actually obtainable for Man, and with it, for Man's *bondage* to an objective order of natural being which essentially and metaphysically surpasses his power and outranges his sovereignty. Equality is merely a function and facet of "Emancipation." The war against nobility, that ostensibly righteous social rebellion, sometimes made out to be aimed at a restatement of the essential equality of men as a species, long obscured and blurred by "unnatural" pretensions to group superiority, is in truth an essential and metaphysical rebellion levelled at something that towers infinitely above kings, dukes, barons, squires, factory owners, generals and admirals, fops or usurers.

7. THE EQUIVOCATION ABOUT THE "PLAIN MAN" AND THE "COMMON MAN."

In a sense, the "Common Man" may be defined as a modernized, diluted and Westernized, a "stream-lined" edition of the Marxian proletarian; subservient, of course, to the ultimate universal triumph of the authentic Easternized version of that Hero of modern history as incarnate in a unique and exclusive system of Power. The "people," as contrasted with the "aristocrats," the proletarian, the "common man"—they are all supposed to represent *Man* in his legitimate and

universal but curtailed essence, *versus* a "tiny band" of wicked and freakish "tyrants," "exploiters," "spoliators," "profiteers," "two hundred families" and so forth. The ideological conception as such must not be judged simply on its merits alone. It makes use of an appeal to our "loyalty towards our own kind." If we see a man wrestling desperately with a ferocious bear or gorilla, or some more fantastic monster, we do not stop to ponder whether it is the man or his opponent which has sounder views or more justifiable aims, nor whether the struggle might reasonably have been avoided. Rather we hasten to aid our kindred creature as best we can. In a somewhat analogous mood of "axiomatic evidence" must we take the side of "our like" in the "class struggle," a "social fact" equally independent of our own preference or contribution, whether it be interpreted according to the stricter Marxist or the looser "people's democratic" scheme of concepts. Not otherwise did the Nazis suggest to every "Aryan" German that in rejecting Nazism he would support, as against the seventy million Germans of whom he was one, the few hundred thousand Jews of whom he was not. Thus do happily coincide, in the Leftist cause, our direct and automatic subjective self-assertion with objective good—for our interest is identical with that of Man—and with the prospect of certain victory—for in the long run, numbers must tell.

While our righteous indignation is stirred up against the "selfishness" of "landlords and capitalists"—irrespective of their individual behaviour, and notwithstanding the fact that a wolf cannot live on thistles—in ourselves "selfishness" is made out to be not only permissible but actually a duty. It is the motive power behind the process of world redemption. The "divine discontent" that makes me crave for three rooms instead of two or two radios instead of one is a "revolutionary force" which deserves to be acknowledged not only but venerated. Inversely, whatever personal sacrifices I submit to in order to promote the Cause or whatever material and moral hardships I endure under Socialism I must cheerfully consider

as a service I do to "myself" or at any rate to "my children." Here "self-interest" and "idealism" are not just brought into an external and concrete mutual accord but, as it were, qualitatively fused into one. The underlying assumption is that there is a sort of substantial identity between my person as a Common Man and Humanity as a whole. The doctrine of the Common Man, with its connotation of a certain descriptive similarity of *kind* common to most men (but not to all: the reprobated "minority" of the "privileged," except for possible cases of "conversion," being set apart) is meant to provide this bold construction with an apparent *fundamentum in re*. A mere majority as such, as an arbitrarily stressed figure of statistics, is not necessarily a reality commanding a group loyalty. If the majority of men are dark-haired, they need not constitute a unit of solidary interest as against the fair-haired. If most people are frail and I am so myself, I may yet hesitate to feel myself one with all the frail and to swear enmity to those possessed with moral firmness. But we Common Men are all, essentially, decent men "like you and me," who recognize one another and belong to one another. We are not the products of an existence based on violence, theft, fraud, and parasitism. The white-collared workers who speak and write for us sometimes describe us as "the toiling millions" or even "the laboring masses," thus revealing that we are workers because we hate to be idle, whereas the frivolous lazybones and the good-for-nothing profligate, happily only a tiny minority, being loath to work, acquire wealth by inheritance or "racket," and live in abundance which they fatally turn to an ill use at our expense.

The reality of the Common Man seems to draw nurture from concepts, long in use without any specific subversive intent attaching to it, like that of the "average man," the "plain man," the "ordinary man," or "the man in the street"—beings which most of us, should we even have the misfortune of belonging to the "ruling classes," are inclined to be mildly fond of, though not perhaps to glorify or to

elevate to the plane of heroics. Just as opposing the demands made in the name of "the People" connotes or at least evokes the idea of being "against the people," indeed "against people," an enemy of the human race as it were, whoever is unwilling to espouse the cause of the Common Man lays himself open to the suspicion of "lacking the common touch," of despising "the ordinary run of men," of being out of accord with his fellow kind, and of callously, cruelly and crankily regarding the great bulk of men as mere instruments destined to serve the interests and whims of an allegedly "higher" species of beings, exiguous in numbers. A predisposition deeply rooted in the souls of sane men, legitimate and honourable in itself, and in fact conservative much rather than subversive, affection for the "plain man," is thus being made into a vehicle of utopian revolutionism and perverted into an ideological bias utterly alien to its proper nature. Whatever the "plain man," the "ordinary" or "average" man etc., regardless of the shades of difference in the meaning of these and similar terms, is, he is *not* identical with the "Common Man" whose champions work on the "advancement" of liberal democracy along the path that leads to totalitarian tyranny. In attempting to elaborate the distinction, it would be unfair to say, however, that while the "plain man" is a reality which constantly surrounds us, the "common man" is a mere construct of the subversive mind. For on the one hand, the "plain man" also denotes something of an *ens rationis*, rather than being a pure and simple collective noun made to designate *the Jones*, *the Brown* and *the Robinson* we know, and on the other hand, the "common man" is not a pure figment of imagination either. We must strenuously guard against the temptation to abase ourselves to the mental level of the subversive ideologists in applying the demagogic trickery of "class" interpretation they use against their adversaries. Subversion is a great, if evil, thing. It is by no means simply the "group bias" or "self-assertion" of a "tiny" sect of ambitious crackpots and gangsters eager for power. To be sure, these ideologists,

agitators, sophists and tyrants or would-be tyrants do not represent Man. Yet far from representing "only themselves," they do represent a perennial evil potentiality in Man, and more particularly, a prominent aspect of contemporary semi-Christian and post-Christian mankind. Accordingly, their "common man" possesses a sort of sociological reality just as does the "plain man" so often referred to in every kind of discourse. Notwithstanding the verbal similarity of the terms and a point of actual kinship between the two "types," however, the "plain man" and the "common man" are not the same reality.

The point of actual kinship is obviously that of an absence of particular distinctions. Actually, on closer examination, we might find that we are able to describe unequivocally as "plain men" much fewer people of our acquaintance than we should have supposed. In any one we know well we are likely to descry certain "unique" and "distinctive" traits. On the other hand, in all commonplace situations almost all of us behave in just the same commonplace way in which any drab and humdrum specimen of the race would behave. It is very much more difficult to make out what is really peculiar to a "plain man" than what is peculiar, say, to a typical district physician, a typical highlander, or a typical philosopher. But we may try to encompass him in a set of negations. First, he occupies no very conspicuous and distinctive position in society. He is "one of many," no "aristocrat" in any sense, not rich but reasonably poor, obliged to earn his bread by work, though not a downright pauper and not confronted with strong temptations to espouse anarchistic attitudes, banditry or other forms of criminality. Secondly, he is not set off against the mass of his fellows by outstanding intellectual and moral qualities either in a favourable or in an unfavourable sense. He is not obviously a saint, though he may certainly be God-fearing, not a genius, not a scientist nor an artist *par excellence*, though he need not lack intelligence or imagination. He is not a specialist wholly absorbed in his subject, nor a

fanatic or an eccentric, although he may adhere to a conviction with firm loyalty or pursue an aim stubbornly. He is not mentally ill or definitely weak-minded. Thirdly, we have to add two more negative characteristics related to each other, which are perhaps less evident at first sight but most significant in regard to the distinction we seek for between the "plain man" and the "common man."

Whatever the "plain man" is, he is not a mathematical average of all human individuals living on earth, not the abstract "man who is naught but man" that would result from rescinding all local, racial, cultural, professional or other particularizing and limiting data. He is not man taken in his absolute "nakedness," not a flavourless cosmopolitan "unit" of humanity interchangeable with any other such "unit." "Plain men" of different countries, different walks of life, different traditions may resemble one another in that they *are* "plain men," and perhaps, on occasion, even recognize one another as such with a measure of mutual sympathy. They are, however, most dissimilar and alien to one another in many important respects. Again, the "plain man" is not—certainly not permanently and predominantly—"group-conscious" *quâ* "plain man." His "group-consciousness" bears on more restricted and distinctive bonds. His loyalties—however typical of him *as* a plain man—have nothing to do with a solidarity among "plain men" as such. His traditions, which again it is natural for him to have, are not "plain man" traditions. In other words, the plain man evidently fails to cultivate and to assert himself, except in a secondary and accidental, a "corrective" fashion, in his quality or status as a "plain man." He does not pretend to be Man *in actu*, to incarnate the fulness of humanity, to dispense with whatever is outside the pale of "plain manhood." In other words, the "plain man" is not his own paramount theme. Although he may incline towards various ideologies, democratic or otherwise, he is not an ideologist of his own grandeur. In short, the "plain man" is not primarily a believer in the "plain

man." He may easily grow resentful at such "upper class" prerogatives or advantages as happen, in given cases, to impair his interests or wound his susceptibilities. He may not infrequently view this or that established authority with scepticism. He is prone to enjoy gibes at one-sided scholars or experts. Yet a traditionalist and even reverential attitude is no less firmly rooted in him. More often than not, he inclines towards snobbery. The last thing that would naturally occur to him is to abolish "his betters," in the broadest sense of the term, and to actually step into their place.

The reason why the "plain man" is legitimately regarded as one "representative" type of humanity lies in his semi-potential balance, sanity and universality. We say "semi-potential"—for obviously, on the one hand, the plain man is not a professor of "balanced doctrines" in an actually formulated, consistent, intellectually responsible sense and still less a possessor of universal wisdom or skill but neither is he a mere potential "reservoir" of human qualities whose superiority over this or that "élite" consists in the purely negative fact of its not being yet "committed," "loaded" or "signed" in one determined direction or with one limited concept of perfection. Just as, witness the Gospel, it is easier for the poor than for the rich to attain heaven, the "plain man" not seldom gives proof of a kind of actual superiority over the specialist, the refined and fully shaped intellect, the man enslaved to one definite pursuit or preoccupation. For it is true not of chattel alone that whatever distinctive good we possess threatens to possess us too much. Therefore, though it is nothing but vulgar obscurantist mysticism to believe that the "plain man" can "govern himself" better than a Prince and a State aristocracy can govern society, it is indubitably true that a system of government in which the "plain man" as such "has a say" is intrinsically better than government by an esoteric caste of public officials no matter how well bred, "cultured" and "public-spirited." This is what perennially validates Democracy in the sane sense of

the term, as contrasted to its erection into a false religion of secular messianism. Democracy, in that same sense, means the *participation*, at various levels, of the broad strata of the people in the shaping of public policy. For one thing, the "eminent" representative of Man, in his "actualized" perfection, whatever the specific nature and basis of his claim to spiritual, social or technical authority, "ultimately" originates in the "plain man," and "in the final analysis" acts on behalf and for the sake of the "plain man" rather than of any human "élite" as such. Humanly speaking, he is but a servant of the Common Good, which is shared by the multitude as a whole. But there is more. He also needs the *actual co-operation* of the "plain man" so as to be reminded of his limits and of his duty of subordination to the whole of which he is a part. He needs this co-operation to be restrained from indulging too freely his one-sided vagaries and predilections; to be supplied with information and with impulses such as he cannot derive except from the comments and suggestions of "plain men" with their relatively untutored and therefore obviously less precise and less well stocked, but again some sense "unwarped" and potentially richer minds. In a Christian society with manifoldly developed and balanced hierarchies, the "plain man" himself, although not formally established as such in the status of an eminent "order" (many "plain" men by nature form, of course, part of this or that definite social "order" or "corporation") would constitute an "élite" *sui generis*, of the highest importance if not explicitly of the highest dignity.

8. HOW THE "COMMON MAN" DIFFERS FROM THE "PLAIN MAN."

The "common man" for whom the "century" and the kingdom of the earth are claimed is in many ways a different kettle of fish. To be sure, the debased machine-serving and machine-made middle-class or proletarian "plain man" of the industrial society marks an automatic transition towards him.

But the authentic "common man," far from being a simple product of the conditions of life under industrialism—in which case he would actually form the overwhelming majority of men—is above all a function and an implication of the subversive equalitarian ideology itself. As the "class-conscious" proletariat has been made rather than discovered by Marxism, so also the true "common man" is generated and trained rather than merely "championed" by his heralds and interpreters. He may be defined as a "plain man" gone mad, who, by exaggerating and puffing up his plainness, aspires to embody the fulness of human perfection and to achieve self-sufficiency in the sense not of renunciation but of all-round abundance. Unlike the "plain man" whose centre of gravity lies in his practical concerns but who is attached by firm, if somewhat elastic, ties to things "higher than himself," the "common man" cares about nothing but his "welfare" in the strictest sense of the term and that of the universe in the most comprehensive. Indeed, for him the two coincide. He would "fight" for a rise in his salary or the acquisition of some more efficient gadget with the solemnity proper to the performance of a religious duty, but is also capable of much enthusiasm, in the spirit of *tua res agitur*, about "better and cheaper" grammar schools in some antipodean country. He not only is but consciously and doctrinairely expects to be influenced, as a voter in the election of public officers, by the crudest *ad hominem* argument and the basest "psychological" tricks. Yet at the same time he believes as a matter of course that he is better equipped than is "secret diplomacy" to decide about problems of foreign policy. He would subordinate his concrete "self," with incomparably greater "generosity" than the "plain man" is likely to display, to any imperative of "progressive idealism." He differs from the "plain man," however, in that he is entirely unable to appreciate, or even realize the meaning of, any "ideal" point of view not assimilable to the categories of "his welfare." Utterly irreverent towards anything that carries the pretension of being "above

him," he is boundlessly pliant to, and indeed craves to obey, any power that orders him about in his own name or in the name of any "progressive" purpose that reflects or flatters his aspiration to be everything. Averse to all constraint, tension and subordination, he is yet most willing to endure the heaviest chains that can plausibly be made appear of his own making. Experiencing all transcendent authority as tyranny, he at the same time itches to be "determined," and made to "will" the right thing, by what acts on behalf of "his needs." Revolted at the idea of censorship, he on the other hand accepts "figures of sale" as the standard by which to assess the value of a book. While clamouring for "more education" which he expects to inculcate the same attitude even more thoroughly into him and his like, he might easily be allured into welcoming State monopoly of the printing-press as a more "advanced" or more "efficiently organized" application of the selfsame principle. As contrasted with the "plain man," then, with his unsystematic but ingrained and in some measure palsying but in many ways healthy distrust of "the high and mighty," of the "fine gentlemen" of refined culture and intellectual subtleties, the "common man" is at the same time intolerant and covetous rather than distrustful of these elements of social reality. He desires not so much to avoid or to limit, to counterbalance or to correct them as to abolish them integrally in their proper essence, but also to re-create them or have them re-created in his own image, thus enhancing and amplifying rather than circumscribing their function.

The "plain man" *presupposes* Distinction, in the broadest sense of the term. He embodies a *complementary* relation to it. His secondary and indirect "superiority" over various specific embodiments of Distinction—a fact whose deep irony none but a Christian can savour to the full—expresses the relativity and transitoriness, the limitation and imperfection of all human scales of rank. Ultimately, as an oblique projection of metaphysical truth upon the social plane, it expresses the creaturely tenuity of Man as such, yet also in some manner his spiritual

ties—over and above the social hierarchies in which he is ordained to live and which are themselves not devoid of a spiritual meaning—with what transcends Man infinitely but is the Goal of his striving in a sense incomparably more proper and intimate than is true of other corporeal creatures. The Apostles, indeed, were “plain men” of limited education, and rather poor. He Whom they followed, also born of a work-class family though of “royal blood,” treated, indeed, the erudites of His people with some harshness, and asserted that it was hard for a rich man to enter the kingdom of Heaven. In the new perspective He introduced, the high, and mighty, the governors and tetrachs, the scholars and scribes, the noblemen and gentlemen of this world unquestionably suffered a certain diminution of stature. So did, incidentally, the “respectable” moral hypocrites, and even the legally “just” were in some sense secondary to converted sinners. “Christian democrats” of all colours, as well as “progressives” and revolutionists evincing or, for rhetorical reasons, feigning a sympathy with “early Christianity,” never tire of pointing out this aspect. Following in the wake of Danton who, on the eve of his execution at Robespierre’s behest (prefiguring, rather closely, the fate Democrats are foreordained to suffer at the hands of the Communists) referred to Our Lord as a “good *sans-culotte*,” they suggest that Christianity was “essentially” a movement of “common men” aimed at the emancipation of the Common Man. That, at a later stage, it unfortunately compromised with the ruling classes and degenerated into a system of powerful popes, wealthy bishops and dogmatizing theologians does not alter the fact. To the Liberal Idealist mind, a hybrid between Pantheist optimism and the Manichaean hatred of creation, there appears to obtain both a law of limitless Progress in regard to Humanity and a law of ineluctable decay in regard to all human “movements” and institutions, owing to their loss of “ideal” content and “purity” in the course of their adaptation to Reality. The truth is that Christianity was about as much a “Common

Man" movement of "social emancipation" as, for example, a book of high poetry which happens to help a liver patient bear his oppressive illness more cheerfully and indeed contributes to relieving his physical condition is therefore "essentially" a digestive remedy. More, if any relation can be established between the Apostles and the Common Man, it is that of an extreme antithesis. For, let alone the fact that the theme of "the Common Man versus Privilege" was, in any formulation or terminology, utterly alien from them, what they relied upon was not their "own forces," not the potential totality of human power and science the "common man" allegedly harbours in him, but the guidance and mediation of the most Uncommon of men by hypothesis. In other words, Light and Help descending "from above" *par excellence*, rather than the "aspiration" of "plain men like you and me" to expropriate the heights and annex the attributes of Divinity. Their attitude typified the principle of "participating in What is above us"—rather than of displacing what is above us and thus ascending even higher. Nor can the faintest trace be discovered in the Gospel, including the Sermon on the Mount, which so many champions of Progress and Equality are inclined to "endorse," of the hint that by "liquidating" or "taxing out" the rich the poor can and shall become rich themselves, and even achieve a degree of "plenty" for all which surpasseth the opulence of the richest among the hitherto privileged.

However, Christ the Man *is* a "Common Man" or, better, *the* Common Man in the sense of being the Head and Representative of all Mankind, uniquely related to Mankind "as a whole" and in its every member. In the sense of the term "common" in which we speak of the "common good" of the "multitude"; in the sense of a universal Cause and End—not of an "average" type or a predicate that recurs in all individuals; in a similar sense to that in which (proportions being maintained) a Prince, or again, in a very different fashion, a great genius is a more "common" man than the ordinary

"private individual," Christ is common to mankind. The subversive concept of the "common man" is based precisely on this equivocation between "commonness" as inherent in Distinction, the "universal Cause," the "*bonum diffusivum sui*" and "commonness" as a negation of distinction and inequality (the "common crow"; a "common trait"). In it, also, is rooted the further equivocation between the ordinary "plain man" as such and the "common man" as a hero of our age: the mere "bundle of urges" which at the same time is called to monopolize human existence and to assume absolute rulership; the plain man so planed down, so planified, so mechanized and indoctrinated as to emerge in the quality of a solipsistic Lord of the earth. In the bygone years of the Nazi peril, we never heard the hymnifiers of the Common Man refer to the Brown storm-troopers as a "mass of common men," though these rough diamonds were in fact almost without exception plain and poor men of lower-class origin, whose "commonness" left nothing to desire. Nor could the splendid peasants of the Vendée in the seventeen-nineties—starving, ragged, illiterate it is true, but fighting on the wrong side, for the Faith and for their King, against the "enlightened" killers and tyrannous prigs of Paris—lay any claim to the epithet of honour, "common men." It is not numbers, poverty, intellectual plainness alone—not the mere fact of being "exploited" and "cheated of education," "disinherited" and "underprivileged"—that makes the true Common Man. In order to become such a one, the simple "man of the masses" must be artificially hyper-simplified, cleansed from common sense, distinctive loyalties and traditions, chance limitations and possessions; he must be "born anew" of the "Cause," the "ideology," the "faith" in his own "mission," "rights" and "future" itself. In a word, he must be moulded and informed by the intelligentsia-made *concept* of the Common Man. Accordingly, the charge that we who view the "common man" with dismay and refuse to place any "faith" in him are *eo ipso* "haters of the People" and "incapable of sympathy for the plain man" is a wholly pointless accusation.

9. THE POSTULATE OF "IDENTITY": ANARCHISM THE SOUL OF TOTALITARIANISM.

The Common Man might be described, then—emphasizing the paradox implied in this concept—as a “plain man” pared, trimmed, and clipped into a generic representative of mankind. He is a robot sublimized into an angel, an offspring of poverty taking hold of limitless abundance. He is an *ιδιώτης*—that is “private”—and an absolute Citizen in whom all wisdom of the race is incarnate, rolled into one; a sovereign machine or a governable Superman. Although these formulations admittedly connote a touch of polemical irony, they are by no means meant to convey the idea that it is the dismal aspect which purely and simply expresses the reality of the matter, whereas the glorious aspect is nothing but clap-trap, a deceitful pretext of totalitarian tyranny exercised or aspired to by a sect of selfish, cunning and power-mad conspirators. Such a short cut to the solution of the paradox cannot but fatally miss the point and replace intelligent criticism by what is scarcely more than cheap vituperation. The Common Man is neither a mere dupe of unscrupulous demagogues nor the mere product of a debasement of humanity to the level of a mechanism. The sophists and tyrants who act in his name and use him as their instrument are not a specified, identifiable “group” or “race” bent upon enslaving the great bulk of mankind. Notwithstanding the prominent part played by secularized Jewish intellectuals in most phases of the subversive process, the contention of the Nazis and some other “Rightists” that the world revolution can be defined in terms of “the Jewish interest” is a piece of arbitrary fantasy. Again, it is not a herd of tractors or a pack of turbo-generators that have invaded the earth so as to turn man into a “servant of the machine.” Nor is it accurate to say, lastly, that what we face is simply the recrudescence of the age-old Pagan tendency towards State omnipotence, with the social “whole” as a religious absolute, and the individual as its mere worthless tool. It is not

that the wheel has swung full circle back to paganism, past the Christian and Liberal interlude of freedom and respect for the person. For all we know, such might be the historical outcome of the "world revolution" we are traversing, foreshadowed to a degree by the Fascist brands of Totalitarianism, though even to these, the formula is not applicable without reserve. Yet, so far as it goes, the kingdom of the Common Man means a very different thing from that.

"Communism" or the "Red peril" as such, to be sure, is preponderantly, to-day, a function and a stock-in-trade of the Soviet system of power. Once given the Communist party organization and the apparatus of power at its disposal, here is indeed a social reality in its own right, a definable and tangible human agency which is most certainly and irrevocably set on enslaving the remainder of the world and imposing Communism upon it by brute force. The great struggles of history are anything but pure battles of ideas, and much less, a reflexion of evolving economic necessities. Wherefore, the task of resisting Communist expansion is not primarily an affair of alleviating economic distress nor even of propagating a sound social doctrine. Rather the great struggles of history are, above all, contests between inimical units or coalitions of power, in whose constitution however an ideological element always enters to a greater or lesser degree. Our danger is not, then, that—in a period of economic crisis and social perturbation, for instance,—we may simply and directly succumb to the spell of the ideology broadcast from Moscow and its satrapies, but that our determination to resist the pressure of Soviet power may be fatally sapped by its emotional attraction. Although limited and in itself indecisive, that attraction is exercised upon us by the Communistic ideology because of its points of "democratic" affinity with our own. Yet the concrete historical entity labelled to-day as "Communism," and rightly regarded as the one all-important danger of the moment, is by no means our only problem. The great Subversion did not start with Lenin's seizure of power in

Russia, which would not have been possible or even conceivable without its well-known set of ideological sources and historical antecedents. The present-day Communist dictatorship, though a trifle more massive and "realistic," is far from being simply an "Asiatic despotism" of the traditional Pagan type. Would it were only that! In the happy event of a downfall of the Soviet power we shall continue to be faced, not only with the secular religion of the "Common Man" but also with its inherent tendency towards anti-constitutional, monistic, totalitarian types of power—idle as it would be to conjecture whether, in such a case, the great Tyranny of the future shall spring from the soil of American mass equalitarianism, at present stronger as a diffuse atmosphere than as a concentrated political force, of British "Fabianist" Socialism and "scientific" Statism, at present enacting its first experiment in grand style, or perhaps of the German Prussian tradition reviving after the Russian scourge has been disposed of. In spite, then, of the practical precedence due to all entities of power, of a markedly ideological and conspiratorial character at least, once constituted, we must not see the "Common Man" reduced to the stature of a mere emblem for the aspiration to power of any definite group of ambitious men. Rather we must meet him on the philosophical plane on which he is primarily situated. Nor can we see him in the right perspective there if we choose the facile polemical way of visualizing him in his character as a dupe, a tool, an impotent puppet only—as a mere cog in the mechanical apparatus of "industrial production" as such, or of an omnipotent "State" which "uses" the "individual" as its soulless, impersonal instrument. The concept of the Common Man certainly is "collectivistic," and supremely so, yet it is so in a specific sense of the term. At the same time, or rather, by the same token, it is also *par excellence* "individualistic."

The well-meaning Liberals and Conservatives who criticize Communism as a "barbarous collectivism: the polar opposite of individual freedom, which is the principle of civilization,"

as an "exaggerated collectivist reaction to the excessive individualism of the Liberal epoch," as a "top-heavy system of State omnipotence," as a system that "unqualifiedly subordinates the parts to the whole" and "regards the interests of the organized whole as an absolute, setting the rights of the individual at naught" etc., either know nothing about the Marxian doctrine which has inspired the action of Communism, or have to fall back on the primitive and pernicious expedient of charging the Communists with having "betrayed in practice" their own "lofty" aims and ideals. The label of excessive "Statism" or "Wholism," with the stress put on the subordination of the individual, applies in a fairly high measure to the Fascist and Nazi brands of Totalitarianism but very much less to the Communist one, although the latter is far more radically totalitarian. Still less, of course, does it apply to the "democratic" variety of mass equalitarianism. Although we certainly cannot gain an adequate knowledge of what the Common Man means from the letter of the phrases put forth in his glorification, he certainly does not mean a man completely owned, and unscrupulously used for its own purposes, or designed to be so owned and so used, by "State-power" as such.

The Common Man, moreover, is Man Divine as "mere man," as man taken in his "privation," not to say, "privateness,"—Man above whom is set no Order, no Power, no Being essentially different from him, impervious to his reason, independent of his will; no social authority, therefore, either, which symbolizes, expresses, and fructifies, illuminating its various aspects and corollaries, this fact and this sense of metaphysical subordination. An all-powerful State is thus postulated, to be sure, for all pretension to unlimited power on the part of the empirical single "ego" is stultified from the outset by the plurality of "egos." Yet again, that all-powerful State must reflect and bear in itself—and behave exclusively in terms of—the actual consciousness of all the single, empirical, "naked" egos that compose it. Otherwise it would embody the all-

powerfulness of this or that specified man or group of men rather than of Man pure and simple, thus introducing again the suspicion of something—some order, value, principle or essence—transcendent to man. Moreover, the all-powerful State would otherwise tolerate outside it an element of significant human reality, suppressed only in an outward sense and for the time being, and thus fall short of all-powerfulness. That is why the "absolute" State of the Future is no longer a "State" in the strict use of the term, something tending to "encroach upon" the liberty of the individuals and in need to be "vigorously checked" by them, but the ensemble of human consciousness moving and decreeing in complete unison throughout all individual minds. For this reason also the ultimately Anarchist vision of Marx, his prediction that after a period of stern proletarian dictatorship, ensuring the "socialization of the means of production," the State shall become objectless and "wither away," is by no means an empty phrase, tagged on for merely romantic or tactical reasons to the main body of solid "authoritarian" collectivism. On the contrary, it is the master key to the understanding of Communism as the consummate embodiment of the spirit of Subversion. And this is why many "individualists" and "personalists," "Liberals" and even "Christian democrats" find it easy to submit to the Communist yoke or at least imperative to make allowances and to forge excuses for the Tyranny that magically attracts even though it frightens them. In other words, the Common Man is not just a slave deluded into spineless obedience and ovine docility by captious promises of absolute liberty, sovereignty and "plenty." He is a man prepared and trained for slavery to *that* Power which is *constituted* upon the principle of his claim to sovereignty and in terms of his consciousness of unchecked selfhood. If the Common Man is a human freak made to order, so as to fit the strait-jacket of an all-pervasive tyranny, the latter again is not any tyranny of no matter what gang of insolent masters, but in its turn a garb so designated as to fit the misshapen anatomy of the Common Man. The

two things postulate and define each the other. The central will of the "State" must tangibly represent the General Will in which all individual wills fuse into actual identity. It is not an arithmetical mean of divergent individual wills, nor the will of a "majority," although it may be "discovered" by the taking of votes. Rather, every individual will must be so fashioned as to represent, in itself, the General Will by virtue of its essential identity with the rest. Similarly, the common good is neither raised above the private goods nor simply the sum thereof but actually the same as every one's private good. To put it with the utmost brevity, Man *as individual is* the community. His relation to the *res publica* is that of immediate "identity," not, of course, in the strictly natural but in the intentional and "ideal" sense of the term. Society is conceived as "one man," of which however the "individuals" are no mere subordinate particles or tools but so many reflexions and *alter egos*, merged as it were in a tensionless common subjectivity. Nothing but this is the meaning of the Marxian aim concerning the destruction of the "objectivizations," *Verdinglichungen*: religious, philosophical, juridical, institutional "idols" which claim service and self-surrender on the part of men, and unite them in a "transsubjective" way. In the world of true "freedom," beginning with the establishment of Socialism, men will act in immediate perception of their identical concrete aims—the only ones—, casting aside the "objective" apparatus of impersonal "constants," laws and "taboos" not defined in terms of the actual living will of "you and me," a mere function of society's division into classes and its productive imperfection. By the same token, our consciousness pooled into one will be able to bend the contingency of facts and circumstances under the yoke of a comprehensive scientific knowledge of necessity, no longer limited to "universals" and "essences" (a projection of social partitions and stratifications regarded as "eternal") but attaining reality at its core. Thus it would fulfill what was formerly a mere impotent dream of idealistic philosophers, and thanks to the crea-

tion of the Greater Self of Socialized Man make human freedom valid in relation with the surrounding universe.

10. THE POSTULATE OF "IDENTITY": THE INDIVIDUALISTIC AND THE COLLECTIVIST ASPECT OF THE "COMMON MAN"

In a more diffuse and less highly strung form, displaying the "individualistic" aspect more conspicuously and the "collectivistic" one somewhat more indirectly, the "democratic" concept of the Common Man equally implies the basic motif of Identity. The difference lies not so much between stressing "the collective" on the one hand and "the individual" on the other as between a greater emphasis on utopian perfection in the one case, on present fruition in the other. Our own "common man" is possessed in a less measure by the idolatry of the central Power supposed to incarnate his "self," and more particular about the postulate that the social reality of which he forms part should be administered and fashioned in concrete accord with the motions, desires and opinions of his own empirical self. His experience of an absolute and exclusive sovereignty is weaker, his experience of being the direct and personal bearer of sovereignty is stronger. He is less convinced of there existing nothing outside the human divinity which he feels to be one with his own relevant will and consciousness, but more assured of the immediate correspondence between all relevant social reality and his own will or consciousness such as it is. If everything is not yet strictly ordained to make him identical with the totality of human selfhood, in concrete detail he is already reaping more ample fruits of that same promise of perfection. Under the Communist system, the Common Man is enthroned *uno ictu*, and whatever falls outside him is from the outset integrally proscribed. Under the Democratic system, with its constitutional and liberal traditions—in part wholly alien, in part but remotely akin to the cult of the Common Man—he is still struggling for an ever greater self-realization and fuller supremacy, but

his triumphs and progresses in this sense may carry a stronger flavour of experimental reality. "The People" is more uniquely existent, more absolutely sovereign in a Communist regime (even with, but better without, a constitutional façade) than in any possible democracy. Where and when, however, democratic "rights" and political plurality are retained, "people." may more easily realize, imagine, be aware of and rejoice in the fact that "they" as such are identical with "The People."

The "Common man" under Democracy must be continually persuaded, not only that he is ruled with a view to promoting his own good and with regard being taken to his own desires and preferences, which indeed pertains to the principle of good government, if for the "common man" we substitute here the "plain men" who make up most of the population, but that the acts of his rulers are exactly, promptly and exclusively determined by the types of aims and viewpoints immediately evident and attractive to him and his like—conceived in terms, that is, of the "common man" consciousness as such. He must be made aware that he is himself the one who "rules," although he does so through the instrumentality of technically trained public "servants," appointed by his General Will as ascertained by the ritual of voting. Hence the unquestioned dominance of the theme of "prosperity," for which Marxism is by no means primarily and centrally responsible. The "plain man," however, is not really such an abstract unit of greed and voracity as refined aesthetes, reductionist scientists, and candid vote-hunters imagine him to be. Nor have economic values the greatest unitive power, for two people can only share a loaf by cutting it in two, not by eating both the same morsel of bread, while they can hold the same tenet or contemplate the same beauty without having to halve it. But the evidence of the fact that two loaves are more than one, that two hours' work is more tiring than one, or that a more efficient gadget increases one's range of power, is the kind of evidence that most directly and identically appeals to any one taken in his capacity as just "any one," and the "common man" is

Man defined in terms of, and artificially reduced to, "any-oneness." Hence, again, the stupendous popularity of culture, education and science in the current sense of these terms, of schools, books, and the printing-press, and even art (thus the Nazis' abolition of unemployment helped them little in view of their crime of being "book-burners," that is, "enemies of the spirit"): the "common man" is not supposed to be particularly "intellectual," "deep," "high-brow" or "arty"; but he is credited with and is incited to develop an "enthusiasm" about intellectual and cultural values because "knowledge is power" and in some sense is "learnable" and can be "appropriated" by any one as well as by any number of people. This provides the Common Man, conceptually at least, with a decisive means to outstrip the "privileged." The admirably tense and succinct formula enounced, not long ago, by a reputed director of orchestra, "I want to secure the best music for most people at the lowest price," stamps its author at least as great an artist of ideological expression as he may be in his own field. Yet had he omitted "the *best* music," he would have proved a mere bungler in social philosophy. Generally speaking, all governmental activity must be aimed at the securing of an immediately tangible "progress" in all material and cultural domains, as measured by standards necessarily evident to "all," in the sense of "any one" without the implication of either mature personal judgment or a particular creed or tradition which most members of a given community happen to share. It is precisely this foundation of an empty humanistic "universality" in the sense of "any-oneness" upon which *this* "creed," the cult of the Common Man and the mentality bred by that cult, is erected. It must be "progress," of course, seeing that the Common Man is not yet rich and not yet educated, and above all, not yet in possession of a full monopoly of existence, which is tantamount to the fulness of perfection. Also, since all good things, by supposition, are manifestly "good" in the sight of every one concerned, they can all be had together, one evoking and conducing to the other, knowl-

edge making for prosperity, prosperity bringing in its trail high culture and guaranteeing morality—except in the prosperous few, who must first be dispossessed.

On the other hand, all points of view not carrying an immediate emotional appeal to "any one" in his indistinct privateness must be discarded, and the necessity of facing unpleasant tasks and accepting grim realities veiled by illusive perspectives of progress or laid over with sweetened and sublimized interpretations. In this respect, the Common Man enjoying the benefits of democratic government is far more exacting and more true to type than the one subject, in return for his global omnipotence, to the iron discipline of Communism. Thus the two great wars which the Western democracies had to wage in order to restore the equilibrium of power endangered by German prepotence—to preserve their independence and their institutions—could not be presented to their "home opinion" in these sober terms. The war must be "fought for" inane and deceptive dreams of "collective security," universal peace and prosperity, freedom for all mankind to adopt the Western scheme of government (which, since junkers are everywhere a minority, they could not but wish to do), "a world fit for heroes to live in," a world revolution for the apotheosis of the Common Man, perhaps a world without taxes and cancer and I know not what else. The "Soviet people," more intelligently, "fought for" the defence of their invaded soil. Under Communism, the Common Man thinks with the Dictator's head only, but again, let us warn: this is not brought about by the mere violence and cunning of an armed band but depends on essential and specific prerequisites. Under Democracy, where the Common Man is perpetually nascent and advancing rather than "all in all," the leadership must adapt its own thinking on every concrete point, with a more varied and improvised system of expedients and fictions, to the thought, real and supposed, of the Common Man.

The high conception of Pantheist Idealism, human society as One Subject, ruler of Itself and the universe, and actually

apparent and incarnate in every individual subjectivity: the kingdom, paradise and lunatic asylum of the Common Man, is not, in a superficially complete sense, realizable or proposed at all. There must always remain the bodily dividedness of men, with the trivial psychic multiplicity and isolation it entails, as well as the technical need for specialists, experts and "artists." However, even in a more essential sense the conception is not realized as yet either under the Communist regime—where society is not yet "communist" but merely "socialist," confronted with dangers arising from the survival, so far, of non-Communist foreign regimes, and still needs the cement of outward discipline, censorship, harsh sanctions etc.—or under Democracy—where the Common Man's claim to Totality is recognized only as the trend of Progress, the transcendent aim of government as it were, but not as the constitutive principle of the State. It is in this light that the "individualistic" tendencies, so manifoldly linked—in the milieu of Democracy and of militant, though much less of established Communism—to the worship of the Common Man should be considered. These affirmations of "self-expression," "*Sich-Ausleben*," "emancipation" and the "freedom to explore untrodden paths"—as present, for instance, in the cult of "progressive education," of a studied "spontaneity" in manners and language, of "decadent" or "abstract" art and ungrammatical or plainly meaningless writing, of sexual promiscuity and perversions, including the vindication of "rights" for the so-called Third Sex, an "oppressed minority," down to the rehabilitation of suicide as "*Freitod*"—would, at first sight, seem to ill accord with the "common man" conception, which after all is directed to the utopia of a gigantic realm of self-contained Philistinism, excluding all individual caprice, unpredictability and non-conformity. Yet, apart from their obvious subversive function in a society still debarring the Common Man from his exclusive right to existence, still tainted with the evil of "Privilege," these anarchistic tendencies are calculated to symbolize *both* the absolute sovereignty of man

over the universe—the negation of his creatureliness of the limits and laws imposed on him by the concrete order of a Nature he has not made—and the joyous descent of man to the level of “blind urges” and physical “forces” or “pressures,” of one material element of “nature” in the sense of “Science” by whose quantitative and mechanical “control” he dreams of achieving integral Rationality, Freedom and Happiness. Loose-jointed and unintelligible “literature,” to take one example, has its place, notwithstanding the justified repugnance it inspires in the plain man as such, in the complicated ritual performed by the priesthood of the Common Man, for two reasons: First, it stresses the *coincidentia oppositorum*, the identity of the Highest and the Lowest in man, the mystagogic solemnity to be conjured out of the witless play of “spontaneous associations” and of man’s status as a puppet of his “subconscious impulses,” the “depths of intuition,” infinitely transcending mere logic and sense, to be reached through the medium of irrational glossolalia, itself “rationally” interpretable, “scientifically” explicable at the complementary level of reductionist naturalism. Secondly, unintelligible literature gives warrant for its own existence inasmuch as the well-trained “common man,” when confronted with such specimens of higher nonsense which he venerates yet (through no fault of his) fails to understand as he venerates yet keeps aloof from Einstein, will intensify his righteous indignation against the privilege-ridden society that has deprived him of the measure of education requisite for an enjoyment *in naturâ* of wisdom and beauty at their highest. In some such way do many other extravagant and scurrilous antics of subversion for its own sake fall into place as feats performed “in the service of The People.”

An objection to our stressing the element of Identity in the concept of the “common man” is likely to be made by those who notice above all the materialistic and “possessive” character of the ideology centered in that concept. The obsession of an infinite and insatiable “need-fulfilment,” the determina-

tion of man's value in terms of what he "has" rather than of what he "is," the interpretation of all meaningful human endeavour—all activity aimed at "reforms," that is—as some sort of "struggle" devoted to some "conquest," be it "the conquest of bread," "the conquest of culture," or "the conquest of" any disease or imperfection, would seem to suggest a cult of boundless egoism and greed, ready to be made valid at the expense of "others," rather than a disposition on the part of the ego to feel "one" with the "collective ego" of humanity. But this objection would repose on an error allied to the error of those who mix up "dialectical materialism" with vulgar materialism, or view the Marxian concept of the "class struggle" in the light of the idea of a meaningless and purely relativistic "struggle of groups" as elaborated by bourgeois semi-Marxists or "tough" naturalists like Michels, Pareto, Sorel or Lasswell. It is precisely the glorification and apotheosis of "the individual's needs" that bears witness to their being referred to One identical Subject—not, to be sure, one human subject elevated above the others, and claiming to represent as it were the common good, but one collective Subject identical with the subjectivity of all. The solid, cunning, callous, ruthless egoism of any individual, or for that matter of any "group," as such can be stated, accepted as a fact or even appreciated, reckoned with or winked at; it cannot be divinized or made into an absolute. The "common man" whose needs and appetites constitute an object of worship is not simply "any man" whatsoever—he is not a "privileged" one, of course, but neither is he a "working-man" who would personally become one of the "privileged": for this reason, envy is not the inmost soul of the "movement"—but the man who recognizes "any human need," experienced through and typified by his own, as an object of worship, and allows his "needs" to be defined and fashioned accordingly. Most certainly, the subversive humanism which underlies the concept of the "common man" *does* view the good as a function of the appetite, instead of viewing the appetite as that

which is directed towards the good. Hence arise the possessive and aggressive implications, the reduction of all goods to what is material or measurable, patterned on a material scheme of goods, the hegemony of the quantitative, the tendency to dissolve everything in qualitatively indifferent units, all *directions* of appetite being by supposition equivalent. But it is no mere accident that it should have been Spinoza, the "sublime" and "pious" rationalist, monist and pantheist, not some unruly voluptuary, not an empirical or materialist epicurean, who first codified with classical rigour the great modern principle of the good defined in terms of the appetite. The *identity* of all essential, admissible and operative human appetite is the necessary complement, the implicit counterpart to that principle. The General Will is only sovereign because it represents mine, but correspondingly my will is an absolute, an ultimately valid measure—instead of being a mere factor of "friction," a wayward resistance to be "eliminated"—inasmuch as it mirrors and embodies, translates into actual experience, and ensures the immediate "givenness" of, the General Will.

In strict alignment with Hobbes' absolute and amoral "individual" in the "state of nature" who by one turn of the handle "surrenders his sovereignty" to the equally absolute and amoral State yet remains essentially what he was before, with Rousseau's avatar, by dint of an even more pervasive stroke of magic, of the purely anarchical and idyllic "good savage" in the shape of the total "citizen" from whose every pore the General Will is oozing, with Kant's "autonomous" moral will identically equated to a "universal law," with Fichte's universal "Great Ego" and Hegel's "Absolute Spirit" becoming wholly "Itself" after its lengthy course of dialectical peregrinations, with Marx's proletarian class interest and consciousness made to represent the "objective" interest and "true" consciousness of mankind, with the redemption of the "Unconscious," the basic though inarticulate "reality" by the "conscious-making" torch of "Analysis" in the Freudian mythology: so many variations, among others, of the

central motif of Prime Matter identified with God—in strict alignment, we say, with these and like intellectual antecedents, the Common Man, far from standing either for the primacy of the Common Good or for its formal negation and the intangible validity of any private good “as it is,” incarnates the Common Good *quâ* Private and the private *identical*, as such, with the common good. Thus, on the one hand, he is “sovereign” not as “man” pure and simple, in his “unregenerated” suchness, but only *as* Common Man. On the other hand, he is not an abstract unit of servility towards any tyrant that may claim his obedience but only a fit subject for tyrants furnished with the proper credentials about their being nothing but the formative and volitive agent of his own “enlarged” subjectivity. In part, these credentials are historical, since the subversive origins of the tyrant, his record of continuity with the revolutionary movement, must bear witness to the purity of his intentions. In part, they are ideological, meaning a cadre of references and aims in which the Common Man feels entirely “at home,” with which he is conversant as if on a level of his own and which altogether “conspire” with his pet ideas and predilections. Again, they are negative in character inasmuch as they must reflect the absence of any *other* essential pretension to value: thus, let alone any claim based on “distinction” or on a “legal” right to assume power, qualities like sagacity or probity must not either count by themselves, though they may be stressed as implications of the tyrant’s claim to formulate and to enforce the will of the Common Man. But among these credentials will aptly figure, moreover, the *excessive* and *increasing* tyranny of the ruling personnel in question.

11. CONCLUSION: THE SUBVERSION OF HUMAN NATURE AND THE SELF-ENSLAVEMENT OF MAN.

“My” will—speaking as a “common man”—cannot be “absolute,” cannot “rule supreme” or be invested with unlimited sovereignty unless there is *only one* efficacious will,

and indeed only one essential state of consciousness in Society. To be sure, it must be one which I recognize, which I am bred and trained to recognize, which I am cudgelled and coaxed into recognizing, as *mine*. Immediately I have "rights" or indeed any "reserved sphere" of my own, others inevitably come by such attributes and "privileges" also, so that my power is no longer unique and unbroken but must bend itself, adjust itself and take regard to an autonomous principle outside it. I should then be obliged to find my bearings in a world of "alterity." This entails, speaking psychologically from the "sovereign common man's" point of view, a palsying sense of lack of freedom. In Totalitarian parlance, the People's liberty and therewith my liberty would no longer be untrammelled. More, because state-power would then be not the only effective social power—identical with mine, and with Man's—but merely one social power, however strong and prepotent, among others, it would lose the credential of being an embodiment of the one and indivisible revolutionary "mass will," and come to appear as an oppressive and partial state-power in the old and hated sense of the term. Whatever "factual" inequalities of social condition it would have to tolerate or see fit to foster would thus assume the character of "privileges," with state-power "on the side of" these "privileges" as in the *ancient régime*. Severe terror, then, exercised virtually upon *everybody—including* the "ruling set" which is, *therefore*, not a "ruling class" proper—, and raging with undestrained ferocity against the various "elements" that fail to fit in with the system of Identity and thus set themselves outside the subject-unity of "human society," is not so much an *instrumental* as an *intrinsic*, not to say a logical requirement of Totalitarianism. In other words, Terror is not the *means* but the *meaning* of the "direct" and "actual" rule of "The People." Again, it is not so much the bulwark as the definition of that rule: a guarantee, not of its mere safety but of its structural form. But if Totalitarian tyranny must be excessive, it must also be ever-increasing. For after the "liquidation" first of the

formerly "privileged," the prosperous and cultured classes, then of the more obvious groups both of small owners and of "deviating" ideologists of the Left, new targets of *actualized* terror must be found, lest the regime should lose the credentials of revolutionary impetus and of a vigilant readiness to annihilate any divergent will. In addition to that, the substantial "re-creation" of man—the metaphysical remoulding of his nature, and by no means merely the politico-economic "re-education" of his character—must visibly and infinitely advance precisely with a view to the "final phase" of accomplished Identity, the "withering away" of the State, the elimination of the division of labour, the performance of work out of man's "pure spontaneity." Hence, state-power must again and again extend and intensify its tyranny. Otherwise, it would lapse from the position of Permanent Subversion into that of a "New Conservatism," the defence of an existing "state of things," even though based on the antecedent of a petty and transitory, if violent and prolonged, social upheaval—not to use the insulting phrase, "social reform." The Marxian rebellion against the order of nature is itself a slave of that "dialectical" law which it uses to putatively "interpret" the reality of "Capitalist society." Just as capitalism is supposed to bring about a "growing misery" of the more and more vastly proletarianized "masses" out of which the redeeming catastrophe of the Social Revolution is to spring, Totalitarian tyranny must not only ruthlessly be maintained but also grow more and more excessive *because* it is "ultimately" to "vanish," together with all statehood and social constraint, and cannot do so before the aim it is expected to secure has been "completely" achieved.

The Marxian war against the "contradictions," "self-alienations" and "objectivizations" implicit in the fabric of civilized society thus culminates in the blind-alley of the one supreme "contradiction" between the Terror State which must push its tyranny further and deeper and the Luciferian vision of pure Anarchy which underlies its drive and provides its principle

of being. It is the contradiction between the giant self-enslavement of man setting up and, respectively, submitting to Communist tyranny in a mood which combines—not seldom in an actual unity, as in certain pathological cases of personal “bondage”—an infernal awareness of abject slavery and desperate impotence with a rapturous if morbid experience of “total” freedom. This one last and integral “objectivization,” which consists in positing that every state of consciousness, as it were, shall be “state-consciousness” and a consciousness provided by the State cannot be overcome except by bursting the joints of the system, that is, by counter-revolution. It must, on the other hand, swell infinitely to more monstrous proportions while the system endures. The “Common Man’s sovereignty,” then, means neither an historical self-realization of Man at the cost of certain grim but transitory hardships or certain painful sacrifices in terms of amenities and culture, nor an ordinary enslavement of common men by a predatory tribe or criminals’ association drugging their victims with a specious promise of freedom. It means a “self-enslavement” *sui generis*, “self-enslavement” in the truest possible sense of the term: the consummate type, universal in scope, of that “self-enslavement” of man which, in some form or other, a form not always but often projected on the level of social relations, we know to proceed from his every act of rebellion against God. What is comparatively new here, although manifoldly foreshadowed and prepared throughout history, is the universality of the scale: the totality of the pretension to step into the place of God. New, also, is the attempt to establish in permanence the subversion of the order of Nature, to inflate the revolutionary moment into a parody of Eternity, to decree and to impose a new law of Being instead of merely trying to ignore and to elude or even to defy or in places to “improve on” the real ones. But, as surely as these *are* the real ones and as Man, however devil-ridden, can no more create a world than can a moth or a grain of dust, the crazy undertaking is doomed from the outset. There is no such thing as a Totalitarian order, only a self-perpetuation of sub-

version. Self-enslaved man will not disembody in an angelic aeon of undreamed-of liberty but only entangle himself in an ever-darkening maze of tyranny until that in mankind which is not he will meet and stop, shatter and rescue him. This heaven, which is hell, cannot be fulfilled but only destroyed. And destroyed it will be, for the permanence of Subversion is only a mock eternity. But after how great an extension in space and time the monstrous growth will be exploded no one can yet foretell. Nor is there any telling whether a notable part of Christian and Liberal civilization, which is also a perishable thing, though the Church of God is not, will survive the downfall of its lethal foe which at the same time is its nursing and the concentrated and rigidified replica of its own nether self. That the evil power is bound to fail—*because Man*, on behalf of the order of Nature, is sure to react against it: *et pugnabit orbis terrarum contra insensatos*—is no reason whatsoever for us not to combat it, combat it with all appropriate means and on all planes, spiritual and corporeal, not only in our midst but in our own souls, too; combat not only the miasmata it sends out but with even greater assiduity all that is receptive and congenial to them in our own mental complexion, and which is by no means all of its making or a result of its impact.

According to its prevalent interpretation, stressing Equality, "the People's Will," and the concrete though still unaccomplished human type of the "Common Man," Democracy represents a more pleasant provisional alternative to Totalitarianism—with a fabric of inane fictions and deceits, a great deal of dangerous inertia, a tendency towards vital and cultural sterility as a most acceptable ransom paid to keep out Tyranny. But over and above this precarious compromise towers, in the phantom-like yet by no means altogether unreal shape of the Common Man, the promise of an ultimate reunion with the Totalitarian system: a virtual pledge of its advent. Democracy, thus conceived and "run," must ever move "forward"; that is to say, away from what it still actually is, and towards what

it "should be" in the sense of its cult as a "religion," human Totality actualized, Tyranny based on the self-enslavement of man. Every "social reform," whatever its intrinsic merits or drawbacks in the given case, being regarded but as a stepping-stone for the next one, a phase in the "forward" march of Utopia—a "Progress" of "self-evident" necessity, and obliging in conscience—we have travelled a long way already from Liberal abstractions and juridical formalism to Socialist "substance" and mass regimentation, from "rights" to "claims" and from "liberty" to "security," from one's right to do what one likes to one's right to get what one likes, from 'the pursuit of happiness' to a claim to happiness rationed out by the State, a guarantor of "social justice," from an official indifference to quality to its latent persecution, from the principle of a moral "equivalence" of any human "needs" whatsoever to the program of ensured "need-gratification." This program involves a naturalist philosophy as well as a "collective" *determination* of needs, in other words a comprehensive "planning" of men's conduct, a wholesale "conditioning" of their character or "psychology," their thoughts and desires and moods—economic and administrative, educational and propagandistic, biotechnical and psychotechnical. The "conditioning" agency—that is, state-power monistic and centralistic in spirit, though not actually totalitarian in structure—proceeds, not in view of objective values and standard rules recognized as a measure rather than a function of "actual" human volitions, but simply on behalf of what it is supposed to "condition": men's psychic "urges" as such. This is precisely what confers on its operation a tint of virtual totalitarian tyranny. It expresses or announces the uprooting of man's moral substance, the sacrificing of man's intrinsic freedom to the fetish of his unlimited power, the sweeping aside of all "privileged" moral and spiritual value along with social "privileges," the dissolution of society's common goods in the private ones of its members and the absorption of the private in a pseudo-common good, the primacy of the Moment over the secular wisdom of mankind,

the divinization of a congealed mass subjectivity in the place of object-references as supreme unifying constants, the logic of "I must get what I covet and covet what I am told to"—in brief: the sovereignty of the "Common Man" over Man, or more briefly still, the self-enslavement of man.

It might still be argued that the compromise can be so cleverly managed as to endure indefinitely, and that in the circumstances Democracy as it is and works, including its service on the altar of the "Common Man," constitutes a tolerable state of things. In fact, it can hardly "slip imperceptibly" into tyranny proper: the true actualization of Totality would always imply a more or less abrupt and express abolition of the framework of constitutional society, a revolution, that is, *against* Democracy. This, it is true, might come about easily, here or there, given a sufficient period of maturation and an adequate amount of preparation by an autochthonous "common man" movement of "advanced democrats." However, once a system of actual Totalitarian power has formed on a considerable scale,—and, in fact, it exists as a World Power,—its relationship with that rival, enemy and tempter becomes the *one* paramount theme of Democracy. All its intrinsic vices and immanent dangers pale into insignificance beside the one supreme peril lest it should prove unable to resist the onslaught of the Power which is relentlessly plotting its annihilation but which the most zealous of its own high priests—the idolatrists of the "Common Man"—cannot but love and venerate, though their state of fascination is not always unmixed with fear and reserves, as a truer or more emphatic fulfilment of its own meaning.

AUREL KOLNAI

*Laval University,
Quebec, Canada.*

DR. NORTHROP, TECHNOLOGY AND RELIGION

I

HIROSHIMA terrified the world with its evidence that man had a machine potent enough to annihilate himself, his works, terrestrial life and possibly the earth itself. Wherever the significance of the atom bomb (and bacteriological warfare should not be forgotten) was appreciated, many men's thoughts turned, as the forlorn soldier's in the fox holes of Battan, to the divinity, and the sole hope of saving, not so much one's immortal soul, as the mortal things of time. This is Dr. Northrop's approach to religion and morality.

As any reflecting person must be, Dr. Northrop is impressed by man's prodigious harnessing of nature to produce instruments of destruction. Of course, these products need not be engines of war; with control they can be guided into ways of peace. But how control them? What forces can shackle atomic bombs? The answer is, that controls must be sought outside of the physical. Only religion and morality, Dr. Northrop submits,¹ can furnish the absolutely essential control. He insists that the world, since technology is a world problem, must have a religion and a morality capable of exercising enough control to save man from his handiwork. Since man needs religion and morality to survive, religion and morality are necessary.

¹ *The Logic of the Sciences and the Humanities* (New York: Macmillan, 1947), p. 364. Hereafter this work is referred to as *Logic*. It is a collection of treatises, originating between 1935 and 1947, when they were published as arranged and amended by the author. Since this work benefits from the author's previous publications, it is largely the basis of this critique. Dr. Northrop's "The Complementary Emphases of Eastern Intuitive and Western Scientific Philosophy," though published in *Philosophy—East and West*, in 1944, really goes back to the East-West Philosophers' Conference held in Hawaii, 1939. *The Meeting of East and West*, Dr. Northrop's probably best known work, appeared in 1946 and has had four printings. This is referred to as *East and West* (New York; Macmillan, 1947).

This argument has similarities with Lindbergh's plea in his recent book, *Of Flight and Life*,² which, obviously, does not make it more valid. It only shows that Dr. Northrop's approach is not an isolated instance of putting the cart before the horse. Right order gives God first place, and then men. Whether Dr. Northrop would agree to this is doubtful. For, as will appear, it is difficult to say just what is Dr. Northrop's belief in God. But from the point of view of reason, it is evident that, granting God's existence, man's obligation of religion follows not from man's need of God to keep himself safe in this world but from the relationship which issues from God's transcendence and man's dependence.³ This criticism is valid, of course, chiefly for those who accept the existence of a sovereign God distinct from the world and its manifold beings. Religion is not just a life-preserver for drowning men. Yet it may be doubted that such considerations carry much weight against Dr. Northrop on his own premises or postulates, since it is not clear that he grants in any real sense the existence of a transcendent supreme being.

To begin with, he stresses the need of religion if man is to survive. Precisely what he means by religion is never stated. Apparently it stands in general for man's thinking about God and his relations with Him. But of what sort must man's religion be in order to control, as Dr. Northrop says it must, man's technological achievements? Two qualities, at least, are essential: religion must be intimately associated with science and it must be capable of unifying man the world over. Dr. Northrop is not in the least uncertain about whether or not such a religion actually exists. He is sure it does not.⁴ On the

² New York: Scribner, 1948.

³ Cf. Thomas Aquinas, *Summa Theologica*, II-II, 81, 1: . . . religio proprie importat ordinem ad Deum. Ipse enim est cui principaliter alligari debemus tanquam indeficienti principio: ad quem etiam nostra electio assidue dirigi debet sicut in ultimum finem. Also, I-II, 60, 3, where Aquinas shows that religion along with the other moral virtues pertains to justice, and II-II, 81, 3; Ad religionem autem pertinet exhibere reverentiam uni Deo secundum unam rationem, in quantum scilicet est primum principium creationis et gubernationis rerum.

⁴ *Logic*, pp. 364-365, 373, 378.

score of religion's scientific connections it may be conceded that Oriental religions do not, and never did, have the required alliance with science and scientific method.⁵ This will appear clearly when its intuitive character is dealt with. As for Western Christianity, in Dr. Northrop's opinion, neither Roman Catholicism nor Protestantism meets the test.

Roman Catholic ethics and theology, the author concedes, were essentially connected with Greek and mediaeval science. When this gave way before Galilei, Newton, Einstein and Planck, Roman Catholicism was set adrift and has never recaptured its hold on science. As a consequence, the ethical and religious humanism as well as the Roman Catholic conception of the good society, became such that they cannot any longer fully comprehend, relate themselves to, or control the contemporary scientific technology.⁶ While Roman Catholicism fails in Dr. Northrop's eyes because of its effete science, Protestantism likewise fails to qualify because it has connected itself with no science at all. Traditional and modern Protestantism, the author emphasizes, conceive moral philosophy and religion as autonomous subjects, standing on their own feet and justified independently of natural science, with which they simply have nothing to do. This explains, in his mind, why, in Protestantism, theism gave way to deism, which, in turn, under the attrition of Hume's criticism of Bishop Berkeley and John Locke, ended in the denial of God and the soul's immortality.⁷

Kant, revolting against Hume had, of course, a philosophy of natural science. But Dr. Northrop dismisses it as being no help at all; it simply enfeebled morality and religion. Kant himself, Dr. Northrop suggests, saw the chasm between his

⁵ Cf. Dr. Northrop's essay, Chapter VIII, in *Philosophy—East and West*, edited by C. A. Moore (Princeton: University Press, 1946). Also *East and West*, pp. 410-411, 434. Also *The Great Religions of the Modern World*, edited by E. J. Jurji (Princeton: University Press, 1947), "Confucianism," "Taoism," "Hinduism," "Buddhism," "Shintoism." Also W. E. Hocking, in *Philosophy—East and West*, p. 2.

⁶ *Logic*, p. 365-366. Also *The Meeting of East and West*, pp. 264-275.

⁷ *Logic*, pp. 366-372.

science on the one hand and religion and morality on the other, and proceeded to separate morality and religion from science and make them autonomous. The immediate result was freedom for man to believe anything about morality and religion suggested by the demands of the moral will. But the lamentable end-effect was to make ethics and religion vacuous verbalisms. "Ethics and religion were robbed of one of their previously most important functions in life, the function, namely, of pulling together every phase of man's knowledge and experience into a single moving triumphant whole." Yet, Dr. Northrop says, the notion persists in Protestantism of keeping ethics and religion separate from science. This explains why Protestantism cannot meet technology's challenge, which is, after all, a crisis born of man's frightful success with science.⁸

Dr. Northrop's evaluation of Protestantism's insistence upon the disjointed autonomy of religion and ethics in the main is well taken. From Luther to Niebuhr and Barth the emphasis has been so heavy upon the partial truth of God's kingdom within man, that the more complete truth of God's existence and kingdom outside man has been almost obliterated. Furthermore, Protestantism was not only a revolt against the papacy and traditional Christian orthodoxy. It was a rebellion against reason, culminating in Kant's attack on man's intelligence in favor of his voluntary and emotional nature. It was all very well, indeed rather too simple, to infer God's existence and the immortality of the soul and freedom and virtue from the categorical imperative, and to insist that this imperative is as clear within a man as Königsberg's starry sky is above him. But the outcome was lamentable; it made life's most vital truths dependent upon the alleged imperative, with the consequence that if a man looked within and failed to find the imperative he could reasonably reject the ethical and religious convictions based upon it. For since these truths had been divorced from reason, there was no arguing about them. Reason and scientific inference could not be used in a court where they had been officially disqualified.

⁸ *Logic*, p. 371, and 372 and cf. pp. 364-367.

While this may be granted in Dr. Northrop's criticism of Protestantism, it leaves untouched the author's assumption that religion must be intimately tied up with science. Protestantism has not been tied up with science; that is true. Likewise it has made religious and ethical truth autonomous, with grave injury to religion and morality. And finally it may be conceded with Dr. Northrop, that Protestantism cannot unite the world to control man's technological successes. But none of this, singly or collectively, justifies his contention that religion is a coefficient of natural science.

When his conclusions about Roman Catholicism are examined, it is to his credit that he appreciates so well the work of Thomas Aquinas, who did produce a marvelous synthesis of science, philosophy, ethics, and theology. Probably no thinker before or since has succeeded as he did in blending human with divine wisdom. It is likewise true that thirteenth century science in the West was largely inherited from the Greeks. But it is startling to find Dr. Northrop asserting an essential dependence of Aquinas' philosophy, religion, and ethics upon his Greek science, and even more bewildering still to have him rejecting Roman Catholicism because of its alleged dependence upon the mediaeval Saint Thomas and his obsolete science.⁹

Dr. Northrop may have his own meaning for Roman Catholicism, which is the term he commonly uses—although, if he has, he fails to make it clear. But if Roman Catholicism has its usual meaning, it is difficult to justify this particular criticism of it by Dr. Northrop. Catholicism existed before Thomas Aquinas and the thirteenth century. Eight hundred years separated him from Augustine of Hippo; yet Saint Thomas not only had the highest esteem for Saint Augustine but made liberal use of his teaching. This is not to deny there were differences between them. The point is that with all their dissimilarities they professed essentially the same religion. In addition, it must be remembered that for some nine centuries Augustinism prevailed, indeed to such an extent that when

⁹ *Logic*, pp. 28, 365; also *East and West*, pp. 263-290.

Aristotle became popular in the thirteenth century, some of his champions were hailed as heretics.¹⁰ In the light of such facts, how can one equate Roman Catholicism with Aristotelico-Thomistic philosophy—whatever value such philosophy may, or may not, be thought to have!

This, however, is not the main issue of the present critique of Dr. Northrop. Likewise may be dismissed rather quickly his statement that there is not a major concept in Aristotle's metaphysics which does not appear in his physics, and that since modern physics has displaced ancient Greek physics, so is required the rejection of the Aristotelian philosophy and its attendant mediaeval Thomistic theology.¹¹ Dr. Northrop makes no effort to justify these statements. They are offered, presumably, as self-evident, undebatable. But if language means anything, his interpretation of Aristotle, Aquinas and the dependence of Roman Catholicism upon them conflicts with facts and misses the spirit of Aquinas as well as the import of his synthesis of Christian truth, mediaeval science and Aristotelian metaphysics. Moreover, one can very properly question Dr. Northrop's unsupported view about Aristotle, which so confounds his philosophy and his science, that the rejection of his physics necessitates rejecting his metaphysics.

II

At any rate, for reasons which the author holds to be unquestionably valid, he rejects twentieth century Western Christianity as being eligible for the universal religion which he thinks absolutely essential for civilization. The possibility even

¹⁰ Facts with which Dr. Northrop is acquainted, cf. *East and West*, pp. 263-266. On this complicated subject cf. M. De Wulf, *History of Mediaeval Philosophy* (New York, 1938), 3rd English ed., ii. 24-26; E. Gilson, *Spirit of Mediaeval Philosophy* (New York, 1936), pp. 15 ff.; J. B. McAllister, *The "De Occultis Operibus Naturae" of St. Thomas Aquinas* (Washington, 1939), pp. 31-53; Mandonnet, *Siger de Brabant et l'Averroïsme latin au XIII^e siècle* (Fribourg, 1899), I. lxx; Rashdall, *The Universities of Europe in the Middle Ages* (new edition, Oxford, 1936), i. 356 ff.; R. Simeterre, "Sur les condamnations d'Aristote et de St. Thomas xiii^e S." in *Revue pratique d'Apologétique*, v. (1908), pp. 502-515.

¹¹ *Logic*, pp. 27-28.

of converting the Orient to Christianity is peremptorily dismissed.¹² Indeed, granting the possibility, Dr. Northrop could not logically accept it as a solution. For if contemporary Christianity is rejected as the solution of technological problems, it would only make matters worse to convert the whole world to it. So much, then, on the negative side of Dr. Northrop's thinking about religion and the world's crisis. It is not the chief element of this study, which is directed rather to Dr. Northrop's proposed solution of the problem and to investigating how religion fares in the process. A summary of his position will be followed by its criticism.

Dr. Northrop advises that the only way religion can meet the challenge of the times is for the religions of the West, East, and Far East to combine into a world religion. The theology and morality will be determined on the basis of their harmony with modern science and approved scientific method. With its validity thus assured, this religion will be man's best and only chance of mastering forces which show signs of becoming Frankensteins. The author does not minimize the radical differences between the East and West.¹³ None of the four major religions of Far Eastern origin (Confucianism, Taoism, Buddhism, and Hinduism) is theistic. None has a religious prophet essential to salvation. Their religious writing tends to be poetic, intuitive, and aesthetic. On the contrary, the major religions of Western and Middle Eastern origin (Judaism, Christianity, and Mohammedanism) are theistic and have a divinely inspired prophet essential to salvation.

These differences between the philosophy and religion of the Far East and those of the Middle East and the West are explained by Dr. Northrop in terms of his theory of knowledge. "All that anyone," he says, "can possibly know in any field of experience or knowledge whatever must be of one of two kinds or a combination of both: One can know what one immediately apprehends without any theoretical acts of faith or logi-

¹² *Logic*, p. 378.

¹³ *Logic*, pp. 373-377. For much fuller treatment, see his *East and West*, pp. 312-374.

cal inference taking one beyond the immediately apprehended. Or one can know that which, by an act of the mind, one infers from the immediately apprehended.”¹⁴ Calling the immediately apprehended factor in knowledge and reality the aesthetic component, and the unseen inferred factor, the theoretic component gives Dr. Northrop his distinction between Oriental and Occidental religion. Oriental religion identifies the divine with the timeless factor in the aesthetic component; Western religion identifies the divine with the timeless or invariant factor in the theoretic component.¹⁵ The Oriental restricts scientific knowledge, philosophical reality, moral goodness, and religious divinity to the directly apprehended portion of human knowledge alone. He concedes the practical value of scientific method and logical inference, but rejects them as worthless in the pursuit of philosophical or religious truth. For him the only ways are intuition and contemplation, which are functions of direct, immediate apprehension.

Of themselves and apart from inference, what knowledge does intuition or immediate apprehension give? According to Dr. Northrop it reveals a continuum differentiated by the colors, sounds, odors, pains, and pleasures which the senses convey.¹⁶ This continuum he calls the “differentiated aesthetic continuum,” and goes on to explain that it has two directly apprehended factors. One of them is the aggregate of differentiations, in other words the specific immediately sensed colors, sounds, odors, pains and pleasures limited in time and space. The other factor is the immediately apprehended continuum apart from these differentiations, which he terms “the undifferentiated aesthetic continuum.”¹⁷

One is not astonished when Dr. Northrop finds that the appellations Nirvana, Tao, Jen, and Brahman evidently and necessarily refer to “the indeterminate aesthetic continuum.” For the proper object of contemplation is the unchanging, the

¹⁴ *Logic*, p. 375.

¹⁵ *Logic*, pp. 374-377.

¹⁶ *Logic*, pp. 375-376. Cf. *East and West*, pp. 315-320.

¹⁷ *Logic*, pp. 375-376. Cf. *East and West*, pp. 315-322, 403 ff.

immortal. But the unchanging and the immortal are indeterminate, since determinate things as a matter of daily experience come to be, change, and pass away. Consequently the Oriental rejects immortality in the sense of the immortality of a determinate personality and, for the same reason, the existence of a supreme being of determinate characteristics. Likewise Eastern religions do not need a prophet while the Western ones do. All that religious sages in the Orient have to do is to direct one's attention to the factor given with immediacy with which the divine is identified. But when the divine is conceived of as being beyond experience and intuition, then, if God is to be known with the directness of the aesthetic intuition, it must be through a divinely inspired being who represents God coming into the world of immediacy.

In great contrast, the West tended to identify the scientifically true, the philosophically real, the morally good, and the religiously divine with the inferred unseen factor in the nature of things.¹⁸ Its approach is by way not of intuition but of inference. It believes in an unseen God the Father, beyond the grasp of sense experience or intuition. In the West personal immortality is a basic belief. But, Dr. Northrop adds, this immortality is not claimed for the self known directly in the aesthetic intuition. Indeed "if a religion is going to affirm the doctrine of the immortality of the determinate personality the real in knowledge must be identified not with the self given with immediacy in the aesthetic intuition but with a self inferred from the immediately apprehended self."¹⁹

This analysis of the striking differences, however, between East and West, does not prevent Dr. Northrop from insisting that religion for the contemporary world must relate the intuitive emotional type of religion of the aesthetic component of reality with the inferred, more doctrinal, theistic type of religion of the theoretic component of reality.²⁰ He opines that

¹⁸ *Logic*, pp. 367-377. Cf. *East and West*, pp. 294-300.

¹⁹ *Logic*, pp. 376-377. Cf. *East and West*, pp. 270-277.

²⁰ *Logic*, pp. 377-378. Cf. *East and West*, pp. 454-471.

such a combination of the moral and religious thought of East and West has a chance of winning the whole world, since the various religious groups will keep their integrity and self-respect and contribute something to the totality rather than be forced into some foreign religion. Before this union can be actually achieved, Dr. Northrop warns, there will have to be a religion of the truly Western type, since, according to him, none as yet exists. He wants a Western religion which will be authentically an inferred religion, one in which valid, unseen orthodox factors will be distinguished from falsehood and heresy, and in which the fantasies of the moron or obsessions of the crank will be sifted from true doctrines about the unseen divinity.²¹

The way to do this is by means of the logical and scientific methods developed by the West for making trustworthy inferences to the unseen. Such doctrines as God the Father or the immortality of the soul can be winnowed from illusory inferred objects "only by the empirical and logical scientific methods which science and philosophy and mediaeval theology developed. . . . It is not the business of the theologian to determine whether such an unseen inferred theoretically known component of reality exists or not, or what its character is. This is the business of the scientist."²²

The integrity of Western religion must be restored, first, by pursuing the emphasis upon intuition of the Oriental type and, secondly, by developing on the part of contemporary man a confidence in the existence of inferred unseen factors in knowledge. For this purpose natural science, especially mathematical physics, is the most effective instrument in Western knowledge. For the world "of man and nature which it reveals to us has characteristics differing radically from what we immediately apprehend. Yet these objects and space-time structures of mathematical physics constitute the most trustworthy knowledge which the Western man possesses at the present time."²³

Granted, then, that an adequate religion of the Western type

²¹ *Logic*, pp. 378-379.

²² *Logic*, p. 381. Cf. pp. 381-382.

²³ *Logic*, p. 380. Cf. *East and West*, pp. 294-296.

arises, a solution to the problem of a religion universally acceptable is in sight. The scientifically grounded, theoretically known, theism of the West must be combined with the Oriental aesthetic component known by direct intuition. The principle of union is the epistemic correlation of the aesthetic components of reality with the theoretic. In this way "our world will possess a moral and religious knowledge which, because of its essential connection with the theory and philosophy of science, should have the means necessary to control the otherwise ethically neutral technological instruments of science. And, because of its roots in the traditional culture of the East as well as the West, this humanism should possess the truly international character necessary to call forth the support of men the world over."²⁴

III

No one is likely to dispute Dr. Northrup's insistence upon the crisis of civilization. Though some may dissent from his thesis that religion and morality are man's solitary hope, surely on this score he is perfectly correct. Likewise, his emphasis upon the need for bringing men into a united religious front is not going to be disputed by any one who realizes the weakness which comes from the world's disunited and warring religious sects. The recent Assembly in Amsterdam of the World Council of Churches evidenced the consciousness in some non-Catholics of the need for a stronger alliance. While the Catholic Church could not take part in the meeting, she has not failed down the centuries, and never more than at the present time, to echo, and work towards the fulfilment of, Christ's prayer, that "... they all may be one, as we also are." The need of bringing East and West closer together has been succinctly stated by J. H. Van Der Hoop in his "Freedom in the Philosophy of East and West."²⁵ But probably no writer in Eng-

²⁴ *Logic*, p. 384. Notice the shift from religion to "humanism." It is extremely significant.

²⁵ *Philosophy and Phenomenological Research*, June, 1948, pp. 571-572 (Vol. viii, no. 4).

lish has given more thought to, and argued with greater insight, earnestness, and conclusiveness for, a cultural and religious meeting of East and West than Dr. Northrop himself. The necessity, then, of the world's religious unity may be granted—as indeed it must; but this leaves the problem of achieving it still an open question.

Dr. Northrop's solution, presented with sincere scholarship and no little charm, offers serious difficulties, whether it be considered in his suggestion for a union of Oriental and Occidental religions or in his criticism of Christianity with the recommendation for what he calls a truly Western type of religion. The net result seems nothing short of a rejection of truth and a relegation of the verities of religion, and morality, to the residue of postulates or "truths" justified by his norms of scientific method. At best religion turns out to be simply scientific humanism. In this instance, the "cure" appears worse than the disease!

Dr. Northrop's position would be more definite and certainly more comprehensible and manageable if it were simply reducible to the logical positivism which it somewhat suggests. But Dr. Northrop cannot be so neatly labelled. Far from agreeing that only those statements have meaning which are based on observable facts and which connect the facts logically, he advances a system of postulates and theorems, as he calls them, which do not and cannot fall under directly verifiable sense experience. Indeed his views on "naked facts" and the fetish of their worship amounts almost to an excoriation.²⁶ Undoubtedly Dr. Northrop holds to the validity of religious truths and would maintain that statements about morality and God do

²⁶ Cf. *Logic*, pp. 39-57; 317-318. For example, "... if what one wants is pure fact, then it is neither to the beliefs of common sense nor to physics that one should go, but to impressionistic art, which presents only the sense impressions and omits the external material object." (p. 44.) And again (p. 317) "The only way to get pure facts, independent of all concepts and theory, is merely to look at them and forthwith to remain perpetually dumb, never uttering a word or describing what one sees, after the manner of a calf looking at the moon. For the moment one reports what one observes . . . at that moment one has not pure facts but facts brought under concepts, and hence theory."

have meaning. Nevertheless the author's proposal for combining the religions of the East and West apparently implies the compatibility of opposites.

In his contrast of Eastern and Western religions, which necessarily had to overlook significant details, the author does not minimize differences. Thus he allows that the West clings to a belief in a personal determinate God, in the immortality of the determinate individual human being, in a prophet considered divine and essential to salvation. The East, on these items, shows not merely differences but holds firmly to the very opposites. The Oriental rejects a personal, determinate God in favor of the Indeterminate. Western determinate immortality is converted by the Oriental into the loss of the personal determinate being and the individual's disappearance. At the same time he does not look upon prophets as necessary for salvation. In logical terms, the Oriental and Occidental positions are simply contrary. And whatever criticism Dr. Northrop makes of Western religious truths, he never suggests rejecting these particular ones. All that he says seems to argue for some combination of East and West.

This union, granted its desirability, would have to be one of the following: (a) East and West come together but each keeps its respective and opposed religious doctrine. (b) In fusing, one defers entirely to the other; religious truth then would be completely either of the East or of the West. (c) A compromise of doctrine is worked out, which would be a patchwork of Eastern and Western beliefs. (d) Finally, the systems of East and West are wholly discarded and a new religion is produced. Of these possibilities only (a) and (c) need be retained. For Dr. Northrop explicitly rejects (b), of converting one group to the other; and there is no evidence that he would jettison the religions of East and West in favor of an entirely new religion foreign to both (d).

It is then a matter of facing the proposal to bring East and West together in either the way of (a), each keeping its respective beliefs, or of (c), blending their characteristic doctrines. Either of these alternatives involves combining religious con-

victions which are contraries. But contraries cannot be true together—though they may be simultaneously false. Now Dr. Northrop nowhere hints that the Eastern beliefs are false. And while he does think that a religion of the truly Western type nowhere as yet exists, he does not reject as false the particular Western tenets which are here being opposed to the Oriental's as contraries.

In arguing, then, for the religious consolidation of East and West, on his own premises, Dr. Northrop seems to be asking for the rationally impossible. It is either this or Dr. Northrop accepts the compatibility of contraries—which would imply rejecting the logical doctrine of opposition and, equivalently, of truth itself. For if contraries can be true together, then truth ceases to mean anything and the rational approach to any problem becomes chimerical. This conclusion seems inescapable even in the presence of the author's strenuous efforts to salvage human knowledge through what he calls "epistemic correlations"—to be considered shortly.

Dr. Northrop's argument reveals another weakness in that it makes religion a *Deus ex machina*. To survive man needs religion; so he must produce a religion to insure his survival. This appears without a doubt to be Dr. Northrop's position. Whether there exists a personal God or not; whether He has given man a revelation or not; whether He has sent official representatives to speak in His name or not; whether there is an institution of His founding or not—are questions which, apparently, are to be answered with reference not to the actuality of the event but to the contribution they might make toward saving man from himself. This is not to imply that Dr. Northrop is proposing a religion tailored to every man's caprice. Quite the contrary. He wants religion to be true and valid and orthodox, freed of heresy and falsehood, isolated from the fantasies of the moron and the obsessions of the crank.²⁷ This is the standard he sets up for religion in general but most especially for the authentic Western religion which he insists

²⁷ *Logic*, pp. 378-379.

must exist before any union with Eastern religions is possible. This raises the most salient point of Dr. Northrop's position: his doctrine of truth and criteria for its verification.

IV

Dr. Northrop's distinction between knowledge by intuition and by postulation has been touched upon in his proposal for uniting Oriental and Occidental religions. The East, he says, cultivated intuition while the West has favored the ways of inference. In this sweeping generalization Dr. Northrop is merely applying a very basic theory of his about concepts by intuition and concepts by postulation.

Concepts by intuition, called also concepts by inspection or induction, are concepts whose complete meaning is given by something immediately apprehended and observable.²⁸ In these concepts the empirical immediately observable fact first provides the meaning. Upon it is constructed a scientific concept by merely giving some determinate sign to the empirically given meaning. But what is this something which is immediately apprehended and observable? "... all that one knows as pure fact," Dr. Northrop explains, "is what one's senses convey, and the senses convey neither material common-sense and scientific objects nor persisting selves, but intermittent aesthetic qualities different from person to person and hence not giving either substance, causality in the sense of mathematical physics, or a public world."²⁹ This might suggest that Dr. Northrop is rather sceptical about the existence of these common-sense, public objects, as he calls them. But he actually is not. It seems, he allows, that "sense objects do point beyond themselves to postulated factors such as tables, chairs, persons, electrons, electro-magnetic propagations, and a space-time manifold which is public. . . ."³⁰ But one's conviction about any of these objects does not spring from experience directly;

²⁸ Cf. *Logic*, pp. 82, 104, 136, 170-171, 191, 258. Cf. *East and West*, pp. 447-450.

²⁹ *Logic*, p. 44.

³⁰ *Logic*, pp. 241-242.

they are theoretically inferred.³¹ In other words, anything beyond the barest data of the various senses is the product of illation rather than of external or internal sensation, taken singly or jointly.

Concepts by postulation, on the contrary, are not empirical. "A concept by postulation is one . . . designating some factor in man or nature which, in whole or in part, is not directly observed, the meaning of which may be proposed for it postulational in some specific deductively formulated theory."³² The significance of these concepts, completely or partially, is set or determined by the postulates of the specific deductively formulated theory or system in which they occur. By deductive theory Dr. Northrop intends a set of propositions, which fall into two groups—postulates and theorems. Granted the postulates, the theorems can be proved. Postulates themselves are those propositions of a theory which are taken as unproved and used to prove the theorems. They are not verifiable directly through experience and have no meaning apart from a specific deductively formulated theory. They are general propositions referring to all instances, independently of time. Most of the concepts of Western philosophical systems, Dr. Northrop avers, are concepts by postulation. This is what makes them so important.

However vague some may find Dr. Northrop's explanation of how concepts by postulation arise, it is perfectly clear, that they "are not caused by denotatively apprehended, previous historical or social events or economic conditions. Instead of being the effects of the latter factors, the primitive concepts by postulation in a deductively formulated theory are, precisely because they are primitive and elementary, the causal factors which determine the empirically given phenomena for which they were introduced to account."³³ On the positive side, to justify the origin of concepts by postulation, Dr. Northrop is

³¹ *Logic*, p. 41.

³² *East and West*, p. 447. Cf. *Logic*, pp. 62-63, 67, 83-84, 139, 170-171, and especially pp. 191-192.

³³ *Logic*, pp. 69-70.

at pains to explain that they gain their meaning from the postulates of the scientific theory in which they occur. "Apart from these postulates and the deduced theorems they are meaningless marks. Thus, the meaning of these concepts, instead of being presented to the empirical scientist by what is immediately inspected or observed, is proposed by the theoretical scientist drawing upon the full play of his material imagination and upon the investigations by pure mathematicians into the formal possibilities. Afterwards . . . the empirical scientist determines whether the entities and relations designated by the system of meanings thus prescribed by the theoretical scientist's postulates are verified as existing. . . ." ³⁴

Concepts by intuition, i. e., the empirical factor in knowledge, are related to concepts by postulation, i. e., the theoretic factor, by what Dr. Northrop calls *epistemic correlations*.³⁵ They associate a thing known empirically in its aesthetic component with what is in some sense that same thing known postulationally in its theoretic component. In short, they join the empirical component of any complete object of knowledge to its theoretic component. In this way the relation between the immediately sensed factors in knowledge and the postulationally prescribed, deductively formulated, theoretical factors is 'unambiguously and unspeculatively prescribed by the nature of scientific method itself. . . .' ³⁶

Dr. Northrop submits, and this is a dominant theme in *The Logic of the Sciences and the Humanities* as well as in *The Meeting of East and West*, that the solution of contemporary ideological issues (which certainly include religion) must be found in the two-fold relation of epistemic correlations, whereby the aesthetic, intuitive, purely empirically given component in man and nature is related to the theoretically designated and indirectly verified component.³⁷ Epistemic correlations are so extremely pivotal to this study, because it is by them that the

³⁴ *Logic*, p. 104.

³⁵ *Logic*, p. 172. Cf. also pp. 119, 144, 171, 193-194. *East and West*, pp. 442-443.

³⁶ *East and West*, p. 443.

³⁷ *Idem*.

existence of the unobservable scientific objects is verified. The procedure is this: the unobserved scientific objects are first postulated. Then one sets up "epistemic correlates ahead of time between them and the factors which one can directly inspect. If the directly inspected data are in accord with what the postulated or deduced theorems plus the epistemic correlations specify with respect to the continuum of immediately apprehended fact, then the unobservable scientific objects are said to exist."³⁸

Dr. Northrop is arguing for an authentic religion of the Western type, which means a religion which holds to the unseen, unexperienced existence of God and the truth of personal immortality on the basis of inference. In other words these religious truths are concepts by postulation. For this reason, in that they are the result not of experience but of indirect knowledge through inference, they must be checked. Otherwise there would be a hopeless mixture of orthodoxy and heterodoxy, against which Dr. Northrop launches his test of valid truth. More concretely this signifies that the concepts by postulation of the much desired and vitally needed religion of the Western type must be tested out by reference to empirical fact. "Trustworthy unseen factors can be distinguished from erroneously inferred ones only by means of the logical and scientific methods developed by the West for making trustworthy inferences to the unseen."³⁹ This is why Dr. Northrop consistently, if a bit astonishingly, adds, referring to religious truths, "These and all other inferred unseen objects, such as God the Father or the immortal soul of theistic religions, can be known and distinguished from illusory inferred objects only by the empirical and logical scientific methods which science and philosophy and medieval theology developed. Moreover, it is not the business of the theologian to determine whether such an unseen inferred theoretically known component of reality exists or not, or what its character is. This is the business of the scientist."⁴⁰ Damaging as this may appear to any-

³⁸ *Logic*, p. 121.

³⁹ *Logic*, pp. 378-379.

⁴⁰ *Logic*, p. 381.

body holding to religious truths as immutable and eternal and simply transcendent to the scientist's field and as the subjective counterpart of objectively existing, extra-mental reality, the situation is actually much worse than it appears.

First, where do these religious truths, these postulated unobserved scientific objects, these concepts by postulation come from? Apparently they get their meaning and worth from the specific deductively formulated theory of which they are a part.⁴¹ But where does the theory come from? From what Dr. Northrop has written, it seems one must say that these theories are largely, if not entirely, the products of man's free and fertile imagination and intellect. "There is no limit whatever," he explains, "to the sources of meaning upon which one may draw for the construction of deductively formulated theory in science. The mind of the deductive scientist is absolutely free and open in this respect, getting meanings from any source whatever. The only prescription is that these meanings must be rigorously and precisely designated by being unambiguously prescribed in the postulates of the deductive theory, and that the theory must be verified by way of epistemic correlations with directly inspectable data before what its postulates designate may be said to exist."⁴² It is difficult to see how such a theory can possibly avoid solipsism.

It may be objected, that in this passage Dr. Northrop is writing of concepts by postulation in natural science and not of religious beliefs. This is hardly a defense, since Dr. Northrop contends that religious beliefs in a religion of the Western type are purely concepts by postulation and must be treated as similar concepts in any other field of scientific knowledge. They are to be referred to the scientists and submitted to the appropriate empirical methods for ratification. This brings the criticism of Dr. Northrop's plan for an authentic Western religion to its second big stumbling block.

Granted that Western man possesses a body of concepts by postulation, or religious truths, which he obtained in some way

⁴¹ *Logic*, pp. 62-69, 139.

⁴² *Logic*, p. 123.

or other but certainly not from experience and which are not verifiable as such by observation nor are in any way immediately apprehended, the true will be winnowed from the false by Dr. Northrop's scientific method.⁴³ Whatever else his theory of method may or may not imply, it involves ultimately an appeal to empirical knowledge, recourse to what can be known directly, to immediately apprehended fact.⁴⁴ But what does Dr. Northrop think can be known in this way? In other words, what is the "stuff" of these concepts by intuition?

One directly apprehends, Dr. Northrop replies, colors and sounds and the other specific data of the particular senses "... one does not immediately apprehend even common-sense, public objects, to say nothing about the scientific objects of physics such as electrons and electro-magnetic propagations. What one immediately apprehends are colors and sounds." Man does not have a direct, immediate apprehension even of such common-sense objects as tables, chairs, persons—though Dr. Northrop concedes that "It seems to be the case that sense objects do point beyond themselves to postulated factors such as tables, chairs, persons, electrons, electro-magnetic propagations. . . ." ⁴⁵ Still what they point to are postulated factors, the objects not of concepts by intuition but of concepts by postulation or inference. Consequently when religious beliefs are submitted to the scientists for verification, as Dr. Northrop insists they must be, the limit of their empirical verification in the last analysis is the hopelessly lean pickings of directly apprehensible sense data, which is nothing more than ineffable deliverances of the several senses. How can God the Father or the immortality of the soul or any other religious truth or, for that matter, truth of any sort whatsoever, if idealism is to be avoided, emerge from such emaciated data! The conclusion

⁴³ For Dr. Northrop's view on method cf. *Logic*, pp. viii-x, 1-76, 133-167, 256-257, 274.

⁴⁴ Cf. *Logic*, pp. 36, 41, 63-70, 120, 177.

⁴⁵ *Logic*, pp. 241-242. Notice how Dr. Northrop here cites George Berkeley with approval. It is certainly a sign of the drift of the author's own epistemological position.

seems inevitable, that Dr. Northrop's prescription for a true religion of the Western type shrinks truth to nothing beyond the pattern of man's hopeful thinking.

When Dr. Northrop's plan, then, for a religion of the truly Western and scientific type is examined on the basis of his theory of knowledge, of which it essentially partakes, it seems to lead down blind alleys. The religion will be constituted of concepts by postulation of no better origin than man's wishful thinking to complete a deductively formulated theory or, more practically, be inspired by his critical need for something to save him from himself and his works. Neither explanation rescues religious truth from idealism or some sort of opportunistic utilitarianism. On the other hand, if the postulates are tested against experience, one is confronted with an empirical reality pared down to nothing but the denuded, ineffable data of the individual senses. All else is inference, and pertains to concepts by postulation.

This brings the inquiry back to where it started and suggests what looks like an astonishing vicious circle. In the process religious truth has been not merely attenuated. In any sense of implying a reality existing apart from, and independently of, man, which man comes to know and which creates certain obligations, religious truth has vanished. Consequently, while acknowledging Dr. Northrop's sincerity and erudition, the alternative seems inevitable—either Dr. Northrop's doctrine, by reason of its disregard of contraries and its theory of knowledge, is destructive of religion in any real sense, or one must reject the notion that truth involves mental conformity to an extra-mental reality which it discovers, and accept an epistemology which not only undermines religion but leads to scepticism.

Dr. Northrop's religion is nothing more than an impressive humanism, disguised by a brilliant analysis and an intricate logical apparatus, but for all that a man-made product. It is a relationship not between creator and creature, between the infinite and the finite, between a necessary, self-existent supreme being, the ultimate goal of man's knowing and loving, and the

contingent, dependent creature who is bound to know and love and serve God simply because he owes Him everything. Dr. Northrop's religion, from man, by man, and for man, binds man to the effusions of his own desperate thinking. What is offered as religious truths are only man's own brain children, whose legitimacy he judges by his own standards.

Dr. Northrop proposes his humanism with a necessity as critical and absolute as claimed by any prophet. Man must produce a valid universal religion or perish. That is Dr. Northrop's solemn judgment. The only thing wrong with it is that the threatened perdition has nothing of eternity about it; salvation has traded a timeless heaven for a brief span of happiness between birth and death. Worst of all, this poor human who dangles on the brink of being destroyed by forces of his own making has lost his resemblance to God and forgotten that he is God's creature.

V

But aside from the regrettable epistemological consequences of Dr. Northrop's plea for religion and apart from the validity of the criticism which has been offered, there is another aspect of his doctrine, challenging and indisputably clear. In it religion becomes nothing more than a *Deus ex machina*. Men desperately need religion, so they make one.

It has been pointed out that Dr. Northrop's views of God, natural knowledge and religious truth, even when most favorably interpreted, threaten religion. But his insistence upon man's need for religion is unequivocal and dramatic; either man produces a universally acceptable religion or he perishes. Dr. Northrop does not begin with God—nor even with man in the sense that man discovers God and thereby contracts religious obligations. Dr. Northrop begins with man and with man's discovery of his weakness in the midst of his strength. Unless man can dominate the deadly engines of his own invention, they will grind him to death. His only hope is a universal religion.

If the ideological criticism of Dr. Northrop has been just and valid, religious truth as well as all other truth evaporates, at least in any sense of truth involving correspondence with an extra-mental reality and of being controlled by, as well as controlling, the laws of logical opposition and inference. A natural theology is impossible on the basis of Dr. Northrop's theory of ideas and epistemic relations. That should be clear from what has been said. Yet even on the supposition that a valid religion could be contrived to satisfy the requirements of Dr. Northrop's scientific method, there is this objection, that it is a religion of man, by man, and for man, with nothing of God in it except what man puts into it. It is simply the product of his desperate need.

Before this most evident implication of Dr. Northrop's position is treated, his attitude towards the Bible ought to be considered, because it too is involved in Dr. Northrop's concept of religion. He recommends the Bible ⁴⁶ or at least those parts of it which stand the test, as he says, of modern biblical criticism. He wants men to turn to it, but insists that the Bible must first be pruned of what he calls additions. Apparently Dr. Northrop does not appreciate the problems which his proposal creates. Presumably the Bible is supposed to be universally accepted, at least with regard to "the statements of Christ" which survive the prescription of Dr. Northrop's "whittling down." But on what basis are these "statements" to be accepted? Because they come from the Son of God become man? Because Christ is just an exceptionally good man, speaking with the authority of God and bringing truth endowed with divine errorlessness? Because the message represents merely supremely noble human wisdom? Or because these "statements" in some way or other provide a pragmatically acceptable solution to man's pressing need?

If Dr. Northrop is consistent with his general proposal about knowledge and religion he will have to insist that the Bible, along with all other religious truths, be submitted to the veri-

⁴⁶ *Logic*, pp. 382-383.

fication of the scientific method he has elaborated. This raises a serious difficulty. It makes Dr. Northrop either dismiss the "Bible" as the word of God and as having any more worth than its operational value for saving man from himself or he must grant its divine origin as tested by its utility for solving man's desperate plight. The problem can be resolved into the logical statement: If the Bible is divine or simply human but true, it will furnish man a solution to his problems. Suppose Dr. Northrop's scientific methods "prove" its utility for life, does it follow either that the Bible is true human or divine wisdom? It does not. Such reasoning only exemplifies the fallacy of affirming the consequent and illustrates a mode of inference which Dr. Northrop himself terms as "logically inconclusive."⁴⁷ If it be granted that the Bible is God's word or in some other way true, then it follows that it will assist man in living. The consequence of the Bible's utility for life must be granted if the hypothesis be granted that it comes from God. It is valid to argue from the truth of the antecedent in a hypothetical syllogism to the truth of the consequent.

The reverse procedure is, as Dr. Northrop himself says, logically inconclusive. True, he wrote this some 200 pages ahead of his treatment of "The Methods and Grounds of Religious Knowledge." But this earlier statement, which conforms to the ordinary laws of formal logic, must not be forgotten when the author takes up the vital question of religious truth and the way to discover and verify it. You can reason that what comes from God or what is humanly true is for man's welfare. But you cannot argue that because something proves useful for life, a remedy to man's difficulties, an antidote for his self-inflicted poison, a panacea of his woes, or because in some way it rescues him from the trap of his own setting, that the proposal is true.

There is not the slightest suggestion that Dr. Northrop considers the Bible, even in its reduction to his self-defined dimensions of Christ's statements, as coming from God and therefore bringing man truth which is obligatory not because it works

⁴⁷ *Logic*, p. 146.

but because it is divine. Neither does he show nor attempt to show that the statements of Christ are true on the human level and therefore give man some promise of helping him meet the challenge of his situation. Indeed Dr. Northrop could not very well take such a position, without raising the question of how those statements of Christ are known to be true. Its answer brings the discussion right back to the only reply which appears consistent with Dr. Northrop's theory of knowledge: inferred unseen objects and the truths of theistic religions "can be known and distinguished from illusory inferred objects only by the empirical and logical scientific methods which science and philosophy and mediaeval theology developed. Moreover it is not the business of the theologian to determine whether such an unseen inferred theoretically known component of reality exists or not, or what its character is. This is the business of the scientist."⁴⁸

Whether Dr. Northrop's plea for religion, then, be considered either as based on the Bible, as he wants it defined, or upon "truths" otherwise arrived at, the conclusion is inescapable that he thinks scientists, not theologians, must verify religious truth through their empirical scientific methods. How can they deal with the problem without falling into the logical inconsistency of affirming the consequent—rejected, as has been mentioned, by Dr. Northrop himself? Apart from the logical weakness which the procedure involves, is the existence of the Holy Ghost or the divinity of Christ or the doctrine of the Blessed Trinity or of grace, or any one of them or all of them (and they are traditional Christian truths—or concepts by intuition, as Dr. Northrop would call them) to be accepted as true or rejected as illusory simply on the basis of what they can do to save man from the technological monsters he has invented? Furthermore, what validity will these doctrines have for men who think them unnecessary or who have found some other solution to their problems (and Dr. Northrop is arguing for a universal religion to unite the world). They would seem

⁴⁸ *Logic*, p. 381.

to have no value, and so not be true, for those who either have no need for them or who have found they failed to solve their difficulties. If this is so, Dr. Northrop has still to meet the challenge of his own problem of devising a world religion to embrace all man.

We might suppose, what is actually impossible to grant consistently with Dr. Northrop's theory of knowledge, that man could determine the religious dogmas which "work" and the ones which do not, in other words, which doctrines prove themselves "true" by their effectiveness, as weighed by the scientists, for bringing man temporal salvation. We might suppose that Dr. Northrop's methods of religious knowledge are above criticism and will indeed produce that absolutely necessary means for saving man and his world. The conclusion would still be objectionable: man is concerned not with a Supreme Being, to whom he owes everything but with concepts of his own fashioning, which he originated, amplified, and, because they prove valuable in his eyes, he comes to respect and love them. As much as the machines which man fears, religious truths are his invention. Their reality is nothing more than the pattern of his own thinking, with nothing to correspond to them outside of man and beyond the good which they apparently help man to produce and enjoy.

If this is all religion and religious truths amount to, beneficial as they might prove for living, then it should be emphasized that man is dealing not with a transcendent Being but only with himself, with his troubles and his thoughts, with his own works and his own remedies for life's pain and its threats. Man has not gone beyond his own frightening world—a world which Dr. Northrop's theory of knowledge construes as nothing beyond a vast fabrication of human thought, if it can be certainly known even as that! But religion has always meant something more than man's love of self or of his earthly happiness or his affection for, and loyalty to, the products of his own fervent thinking. Religion has generally in some way signified a relationship binding man to the Deity. To make religion

anything else is to make it something which it has not been and which it cannot be and still deserve the name and respect due religion. What Dr. Northrop is arguing for should be called by some other name. *Humanism* might do. That at least describes the periphery and the heart and all in between of Dr. Northrop's "religion."

There is a God or there is not a God. Man's thinking will not alter the objective reality, granted (as Dr. Northrop probably could not consistently grant) that there is some extra-mental, some extra-subjective reality. But if God does exist and if He created the world and all things in it, then man is His creature and by that relationship contracts profound obligations. Man may be ignorant of them or he may refuse to live up to them. They may actually make his life happier or seem at times to be unmitigated hindrances. But there they are, distinct, separable, absolute, and by origin independent of man. Man's part is to come to know them and fulfil them. This is the traditional view of religion. It is something essentially unconditioned by man's earthly needs or by his self-inflicted threat of annihilation.

The question, then, of critical importance is whether or not God exists, the Creator and Ruler of the universe, and whether or not He has spoken to man. The answer cannot possibly come from any wishful thinking or from man's appreciation of his situation, appalling as that may be. Man can produce machines; he cannot produce God, any more than a thirst unto death can create a single drop of water. The doomed wanderer may "see" an oasis and drag himself towards it. But its cooling waters exist only in his imagination as he will surely find out when he tries to drink and tastes only sand.

JOSEPH B. MCALLISTER

*Catholic University of America,
Washington, D. C.*

BOOK REVIEWS

Principes de Morale: Tome I—Exposé Systématique; Tome II—Compléments de Doctrine et d'Histoire. By DOM ODON LOTTIN. Louvain: Editions de l'Abbaye du Mont César, 1947. Pp. 341 & 277, with Indexes.

For many years the scholarly articles of Dom Odon Lottin on the historical background of St. Thomas' moral theology have been appearing in a number of scientific reviews. The fruits of this research have been and are being published in a three volume work, entitled: *Psychologie et Morale aux XII^e et XIII^e siècles*. The present work is, in a sense, more personal; it contains Dom Lottin's exposition of morality as he thinks it should be presented. Following the precedent established by some of his colleagues at Louvain, he has divided his work into two volumes, the first of which is a systematic presentation of general moral theology, while the second contains what might be called a series of extended footnotes to the text of the first. As the author remarks in his foreword, the understanding of moral principles is facilitated by placing them in their doctrinal and historical contexts. The first volume is concerned exclusively with the doctrinal context; the second volume, though not exclusively, presents the historical context. There are numerous helpful cross-references scattered through both volumes. There are also very excellent short bibliographies on many controverted questions of the recent past. There is an obvious, though understandable, lack of reference to many contributions made to these questions by scholars in the United States and Canada during the war years.

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Dom Lottin has written a rather lengthy introduction to his first volume on the nature of moral science, both philosophical and theological. To this we shall return. The main body of this volume is divided according to what the author is pleased to call the theory and the practice of the moral life. The theory of moral life is exposed in four chapters dealing with: The Human Act from a psychological point of view; The Imputability of the Human Act; The Norms of Morality; The Morality of the Human Act. The practice of the moral life is treated also in four chapters: The Life of the Conscience, or the formation of the judgment of conscience; The Life of Virtue, or the formation of the judgment of prudence; The Life of Sin; The Life of Merit, or the Supernatural Life.

The order of the second volume follows loosely that of the first, though the studies are independent of each other. Some are merely historical,

tracing the doctrinal development of certain moral ideas in the writings of twelfth and thirteenth century authors. Such are the notes on liberty (II), indeliberate motions of the sense appetites (III), synderesis (IV), eternal law (IX), the Thomistic definition of law (X), conscience (XI), intrinsic morality (XV), the indifference of human acts (XVI) the obligation imposed by conscience (XVII), tutorism in the thirteenth century (XX), "*Ignorantia juris*" (XXI), the beginnings of the treatise on prudence (XXII), the connection of the virtues (XXIII). Some of these notes are devoted to a study of the development of a certain doctrine in the thought of St. Thomas: the relations of the common good and the private good (VII); the norm of morality (XIV). Other notes are accompanied by doctrinal considerations. Almost wholly doctrinal are the notes: the elements of a human act (I); the relation between natural right and natural law (V), the first and second precepts of the natural law (VI, 1), and so forth. Finally certain studies are concerned with controverted questions of the present: moral obligation (VIII), norms of morality (XIII), the influence of charity on the other virtues (XXIV), the infused moral virtues (XXV), moral imperfection (XXVIII), and others.

At the close of his foreword to the first volume, Dom Lottin expresses his adherence to the moral teachings of St. Thomas and also his independence as to the details of that system. It will be of interest to a Thomist to note where this independence has been manifested and discuss the worth of the reasons given.

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Dom Lottin starts his introduction with a discussion of the nature of moral science. Almost at once he chides St. Thomas for not clarifying the terms he uses in regard to the distinction between speculative and practical science and for not having applied the principles to moral science (p. 16). As a matter of fact St. Thomas quite clearly justifies the terminology he uses. A science is wholly and simply speculative when its matter is speculative, its way of viewing the matter is speculative, and the end of the knower is speculative. In fact, when the matter is speculative, i. e., is something that the knower cannot produce or do, the other two aspects must also be speculative. As an example of this type of knowledge, St. Thomas cites theology and natural philosophy, theology in its consideration of God, natural philosophy in its consideration of the things God made. At the other extreme, there is a science that is wholly and simply practical; its matter is practical, something that the knower can produce or do; its mode of knowing the object is practical, it knows how to produce or do; and the knower intends here and now to produce or do something. This is the practical knowledge of prudence or of the artist in the act of producing. There are two other kinds of knowledge that St. Thomas dis-

tinguishes; they are partly speculative and partly practical. The first, approaching very close to purely speculative knowledge, has as its object something that the knower can produce or do, an operable, says St. Thomas, but he does not consider it as operable, nor does he intend to produce or do it. This is the case, for example, of an architect who makes a purely theoretical study of houses or forms of architecture; in this he is proceeding, not as an architect, but as a philosopher. The other type approaches the purely practical; it considers an object that is operable and it considers the ways of producing or doing it; the only thing lacking is the intention of here and now operating.

Forced by the facts, then, St. Thomas admits that a science that is not wholly practical, i. e., here and now ordained to operation, is somewhat speculative, and may be so called; just as a purely speculative consideration of something that can in fact be produced by an agent, is somewhat practical. He was also aware that in teaching medicine the professors of his day were accustomed to make a distinction between the theoretical part and the practical part of this science. This distinction was founded on the remoteness or proximity of the principles to the actual practice of medicine. While St. Thomas finds justification for this usage (and thereby incurs the displeasure of Dom Lottin), he does not change the division of speculative and practical science. In fact, he concludes his answer to the objection taken from medicine by these words: "It does not follow that if some part of an active science be called theoretical, that that part should be listed under speculative science." (*De Trin.*, a. 5, a. 1, ad 4um). Therefore, no matter how remote from practice the matter under discussion in a science may seem to be, it belongs to practical science, if it is considered in relation to operation.

Dom Lottin also expresses regret that St. Thomas did not apply these distinctions to moral science. Yet in his first pages, he cites both Aristotle and St. Thomas as most explicitly insisting that moral science is *practical*. The virtues, for example, are studied, not merely to know what they are theoretically, but to practice them and become good. (*II Eth.*, lect. 1)

To solve the problem of the nature of moral science, Dom Lottin cites John of St. Thomas, Maritain's development of the former's theory and the controversy that was aroused by its appearance. He then presents his own solution, which, in fact, is an attempt at compromise. "Why," says the author, "cannot I set up a course of moral with the end in view of helping my students understand the principles, or if you wish, the theory of the moral order?" The answer is: "You can, of course, but you would not be teaching moral science and in fact you would be wasting good time." For, as St. Thomas says: "If the investigations of this science were only for the sake of the truth, it would be of little use. It is not of great import

nor of great value to the human intellect to know the variable truth of the contingent operables that are the objects of virtue." (*Ibid.*)

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The author next turns his attention to the relation between moral philosophy and moral theology. He gives an excellent rapid summary of a recent controversy on the subject and concludes in the following words: "The consequence is clear. Since in the practical order, the ultimate ends fulfill the role that first principles play in the speculative order, the first principle of moral science, which is a practical science, can be only the ultimate end. Now this end is, in fact, supernatural and knowledge of it belongs to theological science. Hence, the moral science that is deduced from this first principle is a moral theology. All the conclusions acquired by moral philosophy, while conserving their own truth, are, therefore, taken over by moral theology, which becomes the only science that leads human nature to its end. There remains, then, no place outside of moral theology for a moral philosophy that would be purely philosophical" (p. 31).

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Passing on to a consideration of the way in which moral theology should be organized, Dom Lottin points out that it differs from dogmatic theology since it is concerned with the supernatural end that God has proposed and promised to men and with the means He has given men to attain it. We might note that one of his brief characterizations of the distinction between dogmatic and moral theology is not very happy. Dogmatic theology, he states, presents us with God's part in our sanctification, moral theology organizes man's part. Such a division hardly coincides with St. Thomas, who includes the tract on law, grace, the infused virtues and the gifts in the second part of the *Summa*.

More particularly, should moral theology be organized according to the commandments, as has been the custom since St. Alphonsus, or according to the virtues, as St. Thomas organized it? The author gives good reasons for choosing the virtues. However, he does not like the way St. Thomas set up his tract on the individual virtues. The reader will recall that St. Thomas treats all the virtues under the three theological and the four cardinal virtues. Dom Lottin indirectly asserts that this arrangement of St. Thomas is not specifically Christian (p. 35). Why? He thinks that the four cardinal virtues have been taken over from Aristotle, although St. Augustine finds them in Sacred Scripture (*Wisdom*, viii, 7). Forcing all the virtues under the cardinal virtues, St. Thomas must place religion and obedience under justice, humility under temperance.

What would be, according to the author, a specifically Christian ordering of the virtues? In the first rank would be the three theological virtues;

under these, the more important moral virtues of the Christian life, religion, humility and obedience; finally, the moral virtues that regulate our conduct towards ourselves and others. But is not this precisely the ordering of St. Thomas? Not of treatment, but of rank. In this matter we can sympathize with Dom Lottin. A student of St. Thomas is rather surprised and even a bit annoyed, when, having finished the questions on the virtue of justice, he turns to study the tract on the virtue of religion and learns that it is the highest of the moral virtues. "Why didn't we study it first if it is so important?" But as he continues his study and reaches the other tracts, he is brought to realize that St. Thomas himself was perfectly aware that the physical order (or the logical order) of treating the virtues does not correspond with their dignity. Why, then, did he organize the treatise on the virtues as he did? Because of the authority of Aristotle? Or of St. Augustine and Sacred Scripture? Not entirely. Had he followed Dom Lottin's plan and put, for example, religion right after charity (Dom Lottin is particularly blind to the commanding position of the virtue of charity in the *Summa*) he would have had to discuss much of the matter of justice anyway, for the precise notion of religion is best had by an analysis of it as a potential part of justice. The wisdom of St. Thomas' procedure is also brought out by the defects found in many treatises on humility because of the hazy notion of the virtue taken out of its context. We do not deny that for purposes other than moral science a treatment of the virtues such as Dom Lottin suggests would be helpful.

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The Introduction concludes with a section on the method of moral philosophy and theology. While the previous section on organization was really concerned with special moral, this is a discussion of the organization of general moral, philosophical and theological. Now when we speak of "method," we can mean either the way to *acquire* moral science, the method of "invention," or the way to *impart* it, the method of "exposition." The author is chiefly concerned with the former, adding a few words about the method of exposition when presenting the outline of his book.

Speaking of the method of investigation, we must distinguish between moral philosophy and moral theology and also between induction and deduction. The method of moral theology is deductive; its principles are revealed by God and are the causes of its conclusions.

But what of the method of moral philosophy? Should it proceed deductively, from causes to effects. According to the author: "The deductive or synthetic method would start from God and explain through God the fundamental problems of moral philosophy" (p. 43). But, says the author, the philosophical notion of God, the concept of the eternal law, the vagueness of natural sanction would throw little light on our

moral problems. Moral philosophy would be a simple corollary of theodicy and would risk losing its autonomy as a science.

It would seem, then, that the inductive method is indicated. Certainly not the method of physical induction proper to the natural sciences that has been unsuccessfully applied to moral problems by Durkheim, Levy-Bruhl and others. Rather the method of psychological induction from the sentiments and judgments in the moral order that spontaneously arise from the human person. Dom Lottin cites approvingly the work of Du Rous-saux, who starts from the consciousness of moral obligation, of Soloviev, who took as his point of departure the three sentiments of shame, pity or sympathy for others, and religious reverence, and of De Bryne, who analyses the feeling of remorse. From these objective facts the authors mentioned proceed to establish the fundamental principles of the moral order.

Now, as presented by the author, all this seems quite inescapable. However, we are forced to ask ourselves, for instance, why is not the objective fact that man seeks happiness a better basis for an *inductive* study of moral philosophy than the ones chosen by the authors cited? This was the point of departure used by Aristotle and St. Thomas in their moral philosophy. Do they make moral philosophy a corollary of metaphysics? And are the *Ethics* and *Politics* inductive or deductive? Do they not, rather, in the way proper to moral science follow the norms for all science set down in the *Posterior Analytics*? A science has a proper subject and proper principles. The establishment of these, which cannot be proved, is the work of induction. Once established they regulate the whole science; not in the sense that a flock of conclusions are airily deduced from them, but that the truth of conclusions and the solutions of problems, most of which have been suggested by experience, are manifested through relating them to the principles. This is the way followed by Aristotle in his *Ethics* and *Politics*; even St. Thomas, in his theological treatment of the final end (*Summa Theologiae*, I-II, qq. 1-5) marvelously combined the inductive and deductive methods to manifest the truth of the revealed finality of human life. We see no good reason to adopt a different approach to the establishment of a solid moral science; in fact, we doubt that moral science can be established in any other way.

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In his brief introduction to the second volume, Dom Lottin characterizes the seventh appendix, on the relations of the common good and the private good, as an historical note dealing exclusively with the doctrine of St. Thomas. In the note itself, he recalls the recent and still-flourishing controversy on this question and gives a bibliography. There are some, he explains, who, insisting on the dignity of the human person, look upon

society merely as a means for perfecting the person; others, on the contrary, because of man's essentially social nature, look on the individual as part of a collective whole to which the individual must subordinate himself. Both sides claim the authority of St. Thomas for their views. The author then asks: "Exactly what was the position of St. Thomas?" (p. 56) To answer this question he follows St. Thomas' teaching on the subject according to the chronological order of his writings.

In the *Scriptum super Libros Sententiarum*, St. Thomas is satisfied to link the common good with legal justice and law. It is in the *Summa contra Gentiles* that we find the first important exposition of his thought, Book III, cc. 112-117. The author gives a very careful outline of this doctrine. The subject is divine providence and divine law. Providence extends to all creatures, but especially to men. Why especially to men? Because men act for themselves, are masters of themselves, because they are free. Now in every regime, the legislator, legislating for free men, has their proper good in view, legislating for slaves, has their master's good in view. So too divine providence directs irrational creatures, the slaves of men, in view of the rational creatures, men, who are governed for their own sake. Moreover, the parts are for the good of the whole. Now, more than irrational creatures, men have the quality of being "wholes," because by their intelligence they grasp the whole of being. It is natural, then, that irrational creatures be governed for the good of men, but that men be governed for their own sakes. Also if man is governed for his own perfection, divine government extends to the actions of man, that is to say, not only to the good of the species, but also to the good of the individual.

From these considerations on providence, continues the author, St. Thomas concludes to the existence and purpose of law. By law God directs men's actions to the end, which is Himself. The principal end of the law is to make men love God. Since men are also social and need the help of others for their perfection, law directs them to mutual charity.

"Such," concludes Dom Lottin, "is St. Thomas' exposition. In his eyes, the law has an individual import, leads man to his personal end, conformable to his dignity as a being who is created and governed in view of a strictly personal destiny" (p. 59). And later: "It is obvious that in the *Summa contra Gentiles* St. Thomas does not dream of the social character of law. The law is established for the personal good of each man, that is to say, to lead him to God, who is, of course, a common good for all, a good who is the same for all men. This view of St. Thomas will be modified by a more intimate contact with the texts of Aristotle" (p. 60).

Despite his care, Dom Lottin has arrived at exactly the opposite conclusion from St. Thomas, who says: "By saying that intellectual substances are ordered by divine providence for themselves (*propter se*), we do not mean that they are not *further* ordered to God and to the *perfection*

of the universe. They are said to be provided for for their own sake and others for them, because the goods they receive from divine providence are not given to make them useful to others, while what is given to other creatures is given to make them useful to men" (c. 112). These words of St. Thomas should be given careful consideration by all who approach the problem of the common good and the individual person. The common good of the universe (the greatest created good) is an indispensable middle term in the argument. And in regard to that common good, men are parts—principal parts, certainly, but parts. St. Thomas does not say, as Dom Lottin has him say: "man himself is already a whole." Rather he says: "Intellectual natures have a greater affinity for the whole than other natures; for each intellectual substance is in a certain way a whole, inasmuch as by its intellect it is capable of comprehending the whole" (*ibid.*). Nor is the "whole" here to be understood of God; for the argument begins: "It is clear that all the parts are ordered to the perfection of the whole." In this context, it is clear that the "personal" reference of the divine law is to be understood as it directs the perfection of the *principal parts of the whole*. It is essentially a social law, for the lawgiver is primarily directing all, principal and secondary parts, to the common good of the universe, but in any way that is conformable to the nature of each.

We could continue to examine Dom Lottin's exposition of the thought of St. Thomas on this problem in his other works up to the section headed: The Personal and Definitive Thought of St. Thomas. However, from what we have just seen, we may justifiably doubt that he is the one to disclose this. We must, however, mention another conclusion that he deduces from what he understands to be the doctrine of St. Thomas. "First of all, it must be firmly maintained that man is a being *sui juris*, that is to say, he is not, like an animal, made for another created being. He is, of course, made for God, his final cause, he is not made for any creature. [According to St. Thomas, man is made for God and the perfection of the universe, a created good.] His end is, not to serve another, but to perfect himself. So also, *in strict justice and independently of any contract*, which would create a right in another, *he owes nothing to anyone*, no more than any other man independently of such a contract owes anything at all to him in strict justice. In that consists the dignity of the human personality, completely equal and independent in every man" (pp. 70-71. *Italics added*). This incredible conclusion should of itself be sufficient evidence of the dangers inherent in the exaltation of the human person.

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There is another point on which Dom Lottin chooses to differ from St. Thomas. Having explained the Saint's doctrine on the infused moral virtues as distinct from the acquired moral virtues, he asks: "Does this

creation of St. Thomas translate reality?" The Thomistic doctrine has not been defined by the Church, the author points out; the fact that it is left free seems to be an argument against it in the author's mind. At least, he prefers to follow Scotus and other theologians on this point; the theological virtues are sufficient to supernaturalize all man's activity and to elevate the acts of the acquired moral virtues to the supernatural level. It is true, says the author, that all human activities must be supernaturalized and they must be supernaturalized by stable principles. The theological virtues are stable principles and are capable of penetrating all our activities and supernaturalizing them. But what of the difference of specification? Dom Lottin does not wish to follow the lead of those who deny a difference in specification. No, it is necessary to maintain the difference in specification, but this need not involve the distinction between acquired and infused moral virtues. "Now, what is needed that two acts be specifically distinct? It is necessary that their norms, their motives be distinct. We can assure these distinct norms without recourse to two species of moral virtues, for these norms are on the one hand reason and on the other hand the theological virtue of faith. An act is good with a natural morality when it conforms to natural reason, it is supernaturally good when it conforms to reason enlightened by faith. . . ." (pp. 222-223) Apparently, Dom Lottin does not realize that in this passage he has also destroyed the distinction of the acquired moral virtues. Temperance and fortitude, for example, are both virtues, that is, sources of good moral acts, because they conform to the norm of right reason. But what is the reason for their distinction? Analogically the same argument is valid in the supernatural order and is used by St. Thomas in the *Summa Theologiae*. St. Thomas taught the existence of infused moral virtues distinct from the acquired moral virtues and maintained this teaching unchanged. There is no basis for Dom Lottin's suggestion that in an obscure way the *Summa Theologiae* teaches a different doctrine and even less for the very ungracious remark that if St. Thomas were free from the tradition of the schools, he would have spoken his mind more explicitly.

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There is no need to try to hide the fact that the criticisms we have made of this work are fundamental and affect our entire judgment of these two volumes. We are still most grateful to the author for his prodigious labors in the field of historical research. The fruit of his work there must be taken into account in every discussion of moral science. History has proven itself an indispensable aid to theology. But when historical considerations become a norm of doctrinal judgment, the result is often most unhappy.

JAMES M. EGAN, O.P.

*Collegio Angelicum,
Rome, Italy*

The Administration of the Catholic Secondary School. Ed. by M. J. McKEOUGH. Washington: Catholic University Press, 1948. Pp. 180. \$3.00.

The Philosophy of Catholic Higher Education. Ed. by R. J. DEFERRARI. Washington: Catholic University Press, 1948. Pp. 202. \$3.25.

The task of reviewing the two volumes of proceedings of the Catholic University of America workshops on *The Administration of the Catholic Secondary School* and *The Philosophy of Catholic Higher Education* is indeed formidable. To evaluate the many authoritative articles adequately would require a panel of reviewers as large and as well qualified as are the original authors. Since this procedure is not feasible, a detailed review of every article will not be attempted. Rather a selection of certain key contributions will be made and these will be accorded a more or less extensive analysis and criticism.

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The volume dealing with the manifold problems of Catholic secondary schools is marked by a high degree of practicality and deserves the attention of all who are concerned with the apostolate of teaching in the high schools. In an article on *Staff Participation in Administration*, Reverend Leonard McFee, S. M., describes and analyzes a regrettably common fault in Catholic secondary schools. That fault is the tendency of school administrators so to regulate the policies and practices of the school that the faculty is left without knowledge of or voice in the formulation and implementation of such policies and practices. While this fault is understandable, it remains inexcusable, because of the deleterious effects wrought in the faculty and ultimately visited upon the school as a whole. Several practical and forthright suggestions are made in the interest of solving the problem, and they are worthy of the attention of every school administrator. In addition to the solutions offered another is worthy of attention. Much of the failure to grant the faculty a real share in the responsibility of school administration could be avoided if more schools were run according to a precise set of regulations formulated by a joint faculty and administration committee and ratified by the entire staff. This device has the beneficial effect of delegating real authority to faculty members, departmental heads, etc. and at the same time leaving the direction of over-all policies in the hands of administrators where it rightfully belongs.

Most arresting is the article on *The Catholic Secondary School and The Community*, written in characteristically vigorous style by Reverend William E. McManus, Assistant Director of the Department of Education of the National Catholic Welfare Conference. Here the reader will discover a complete listing of contemporary endeavors to make the Catholic school

a vital and dynamic force in the community where it is located. Over and above these eminently practical devices for furthering Catholic influence, Father McManus' article contains many observations on the nature and function of the secondary school in terms of its existence and responsibility as a moral person. He clearly states, "The real test of the essential Catholicism of a school is to be found in its curriculum. A school deserves to be called Catholic if the subject matter and school activities are organized for the purpose of inducing Christian understandings, attitudes and habits." (p. 12) He continues to explain that he would not judge the Catholicism of a school by the numbers at Communion before football games or examinations, nor by the membership of the Sodality or any other specifically religious projects. His standard of judgment would be the attitude of the students towards the FEPC, housing segregation and the Jim Crow Laws. "The hardest test of Catholicism today is the application of Christian charity to the Negro issue." (p. 13)

Father McManus would test the student attitudes towards labor unions, price control, the moral principles involved in the decisions of the United Nations. He would seek to learn if the students had acquired a Catholic attitude towards history, literature and the sciences. If this eminently practical and valid evaluative criterion of the Catholicity of our schools is to be understood aright, it is necessary to recall certain basic facts about the nature of Catholic education and the position of the school in the total process of perfecting the individual through the application of the pedagogical arts which are essentially cooperative.

Education must be conceived as a potential or potestative whole which has several potential parts, each of which perfectly participates the nature of education without, however, exercising the entirety of its functions. Education, then, is related to the home, Church, state, and school in the same manner that the human soul is related to its threefold function of vegetation, sensation, and intelligence. It is the *same* human soul and the *entire* soul that performs the functions of vegetation, sensation, and intelligence, yet the entire power of the soul is not involved in any of these functions taken separately. Similarly, the home, school, and Church are all truly educational agencies, but each has formally distinct ends which specify and regulate their particular and distinctive means, all of which cooperate in perfecting the individual who is the subject of education. It follows that each agency has a distinctive function to perform, and that no agency is perfectly competent to discharge the responsibilities of any other agency. Thus it becomes clear that Father McManus is not to be interpreted as placing upon the school burdens which are properly the concern of either the home or the Church.

The school was originally instituted to train "the younger generations

in the arts and sciences for the advantage and prosperity of civil society.”¹ In other words, the unique function of the school in the totality of the educational process is to train youth in the intellectual virtues in an atmosphere of Christian piety. Consequently, the educator may rightfully examine the attitudes of high school students towards those problems about which the Church has definite teachings as a reliable test of the Catholicism of the school they attend. Attitudes are, or should be, the results of intellectual conviction or virtue, and the intellectual virtues are the immediate object of classroom instruction.

As a matter of fact, the curriculum of the vast majority of Catholic high schools, which should be a positive and dynamic force in forming the Catholic attitude in the students, is at best a negative instrument and at worst a positive detriment to such formation. A curriculum should present an orderly progression of mental development according to the order of science and the order of learning. It is safe to say that it would be an extremely rare teacher in the Catholic high schools who could explain, let alone defend, the order of the curriculum as it now stands. Almost every speculative error of history, distilled and refined in the German schools of the 19th Century and further modified while passing through the centers of materialistic educational thought in our own country, has had some influence in shaping the curriculum of the modern American high school. This same curriculum has been adopted (but never successfully adapted) for use in Catholic high schools. There is no intellectual center of gravity, no progression in the arts and sciences, no truly adequate standard of judgment. Intellectually, the secondary curriculum is a veritable Tower of Babel. Spiritually, it is no help in attaining the goal of natural and supernatural development so loudly proclaimed as the purpose of Catholic scholastic endeavor in the sanguine pages of school catalogues.

A certain amount of moral rectitude is needed for progress in the intellectual disciplines, and a certain minimum of intellectual perfection is required for moral living. Progress in the intellectual virtues not only begets order in the mind, but aids the rectification of the whole man through the moral virtues. Today, the good effects of the well-ordered curriculum are generally unobtainable in Catholic secondary schools because the well-ordered curriculum is not present. The curriculum is only *extrinsically* Christian. That is to say that it has a veneer of Christianity imparted more or less successfully by teachers most of whom, as the result of their own inculpably faulty education, are not even prepared to recognize the true nature of the issues at stake. The curriculum of the public schools, which is largely the product of the disordered thought of naturalists and liberalists, differs from that of the Catholic schools only in respect of a course in

¹ Pius XI; On the Christian Education of Youth (N. C. W. C. trans., p. 29).

"religion" found in the latter. These "religion" courses are almost universally devoid of intelligent and intelligible order and are thus robbed of the effects they might otherwise produce in the area of intellectual formation according to the pattern of Faith.

Serious errors deriving from a misunderstanding of the true nature of education and the role of the school in the total educational endeavor have caused many educators to place impossible tasks upon the "religion" courses of the schools. The very nature of the scholastic environment, which is essentially artificial and constructed according to the demands of intellectual rather than moral education, and the whole technique of teaching in classrooms give ample evidence to those who study these elements carefully that the goal of the "religion" course, like that of other courses, is the formation of intellectual habits. Those who expect any academic presentation of divine truth to produce moral betterment as an essential effect are entertaining hopes that are impossible of fulfillment in the order of creation as presently constituted. The moral betterment of men is *aided* by good instruction, but it is *caused* by the movements of the free will under the influence of divine grace. And no book or method of teaching is vested with a true Sacramental nature.

The "religion" course must stand or fall on its worth as an instrument for aiding the student to gain an insight into the truths of faith through human endeavor according to the order of learning and teaching. To expect the "religion" course to discharge the task of moral formation and spiritual motivation so necessary in the totality of Catholic education is to deny the efficacy of the most potent instrumentalities in the entire process which are the home and the Church. The school is an extension of the home regulated according to the discipline, wisdom, and spirit of the Church in conformity with the needs and advantages of the state. It must aid and further the aims of these various societies, but its unique contributions to the development of the individual must be sought primarily in the domain of the intellect. The school is not a substitute for any of the educational agencies it aids and in virtue of the authority of which it operates. Consequently, the curriculum, which is the distinctive instrument of the school must be constructed according to the laws of metaphysics and psychology. The course in sacred doctrine must hold the place of preeminence in Catholic schools, but it must rest upon the firm foundations of intellectual integrity and psychological possibility. When these essential factors are properly ordered and disposed it will be much easier to permeate the entire school with the true spirit of Christian piety, for then the good offices of nature will have been placed at the service of divine grace.

Thus the full force of Father McManus' statement becomes evident: "The unique function of the Catholic school, one which it alone may per-

form, is the guidance of students towards a Catholic way of life through the correlation and integration of religion with the school's subject matter and activities." (p. 19) Those portions of Father McManus' article which are conclusions from and applications of the doctrine previously analyzed need no comment except praise. His views are eminently reasonable and are presented in a most readable style. This article richly deserves to be read by everyone concerned with the apostolate of Catholic education. The National Catholic Welfare Conference could do a signal service to the cause of education by distributing reprints of this article to every Catholic educator in the country.

* * *

In the symposium, *The Philosophy of Catholic Higher Education*, there is a great deal of mature thought on a wide variety of subjects. The roster of authors and the relevance of their articles to contemporary problems will earn this excellent volume a place on the desk—rather than the book-shelf—of all who have any concern with the problems of Catholic education at the college and university levels. So great is the diversity of subjects discussed that it is not possible to do justice to every article in a limited review. There is one problem, however, that looms large in many of the articles and is expressly considered in two of the contributions. That is the problem of the position of theology as a subject of instruction in the curriculum of the Catholic college.

It seems most fitting that this symposium should be begun by a challenging article on *Philistinism and Education* by Father H. A. Reinhold, the well-known contributor to *Orate Fratres*. The searching analysis into the causes of the superficial Christianity of many Catholic graduates will almost certainly meet with some disagreement, but it will undoubtedly force an examination of the academic conscience upon many educators. And that is a very good result, for it will make many more receptive to the suggestions contained in the later articles.

In the article on *The Content and Methodology of the College Religion Program*, Father Eugene M. Burke, C. S. P., offers a logical statement of some of the reasons in favor of introducing courses of Theology into the curriculum of the Catholic college. The article is not intended to be exhaustive of the many elements of this considerable problem, but it will serve to introduce college administrators to a matter that demands attention. The problems relevant to theological courses in the undergraduate curriculum may be grouped under three headings: first, theology in relation to the curriculum; second, theology in relation to the students and, third, theology in relation to pedagogy. Father Burke's brief treatment deals chiefly with the first two classes of problems. Similar considerations are offered in an article on *Education for Life as a Member of the Mystical*

Body of Christ by Father Shawn G. Sheehan (pp. 68-72). An appreciation of the problems involved in introducing theology into the undergraduate curriculum clearly manifests that these authors have intended rather to stimulate thinking than to present ultimate solutions.

Much of the thinking opposed to theology for undergraduates focuses upon the problems of pedagogy. These may be grouped into questions relating to the content, method, and order of presentation. These problems are susceptible of solution in the light of certain principles which it may be well to set forth with a view to continuing the thought begun in the two articles under consideration. Out of the vast deposit of theological wisdom, which truths are to be selected for presentation to undergraduates with a view to the limits of time necessarily imposed by the modern curriculum? To arrive at an answer to this question, some fundamental truths must be borne in mind. The proper and immediate goal of courses in theology is the scientific and sapiential knowledge of the truths of divine revelation. Consequently, whatever is truly essential to this science and wisdom must be treated in undergraduate courses. Secondly, the ultimate use of this theological knowledge is the personal sanctification of the student. Consequently, those truths that are especially conducive to this end must receive special emphasis within the framework of theology. Finally, the proper function of the laity which is the common vocation of all laymen is to mediate between the spiritual and temporal orders, either through Catholic Action or Catholic activity. Therefore, whatever is conducive to this end must receive special emphasis within the framework of theology.

The validity of the first principle regulating the content of theology for undergraduates can be established by an appeal to the science of medicine. The absolutely fundamental perfection of the science of medicine demands a knowledge of anatomy and diagnosis. If these elements are lacking, one could not be said to possess the science of medicine, but only some kind of disposition toward the science. Likewise, anyone whose knowledge does not comprise the essential truths of revelation does not possess the habit of theology, not even in a rudimentary form. Concretely, the essentials of theology are contained in the basic tracts of St. Thomas' *Summa*, whose intention it was to present a complete synthesis of theological wisdom. Within the framework of this basic content, other truths may receive special emphasis in view of the particular end to which the science is to be employed. This is precisely what is done in seminaries, where theology is presented with a view to its use in the service of the *magisterium* of the Church as exercised by her priests. So closely has this principle of emphasis guided the authors of seminary manuals that these books could only be used as works of reference, but never as texts, in courses for the laity. The truths that must be emphasized for the laity are those which are specially conducive to their sanctification, not only in

relation to the general destiny of the Christian soul, but with particular care to include those truths that have peculiar relevance to the contemporary milieu. Thus the second principle regulating content will demand variations in emphasis and in non-essential content to insure the continuing value of the theology course for laymen.

The essential conclusions of theology will receive varying degrees of emphasis in courses for the laity according to the exigencies of personal sanctification, which is the individual general vocation of each layman, and of the general social vocation which is to mediate between the spiritual and temporal spheres in this world. Among the non-essential conclusions of theology, those which are perennially relevant to the individual or social vocation of the laity must receive special emphasis. Such non-essential conclusions that are only temporarily relevant to the lay vocations will receive emphasis only as long as circumstances warrant their inclusion in the course. For example, there are many who truly possess the habit of theology, the permanent ability to think logically in the light of divine revelation, but who are not well versed in some special and non-essential branch of theology such as the subject of industrial justice. Similarly, there are many good doctors who truly have the habit of medical science but who are not versed in all the conclusions of ophthalmology which are not essential to medicine. In the same way, the courses for the laity could be designed to prepare men to think theologically according to the needs of their vocation without pretending to acquaint them fully with the whole extent of the science. As special needs arise certain tracts would receive more thorough treatment. In our own day, many special conclusions from the principles of justice that should guide Catholic thought on international problems would receive special emphasis. Another generation might well study these conclusions in a less detailed fashion and more in their principles in order to give greater consideration to other and more relevant non-essential conclusions. But both groups of students would be educated in the beginnings of the habit of theology.

It can easily be seen that a text suitable for the instruction of undergraduates would necessarily differ greatly from the manuals of theology used in seminaries. The specialized purpose of such manuals makes them unsuitable for instructing the laity except as source books and works of reference. The *Summa Theologica* offers greater possibilities as a text than do the manuals. For one thing, the scope of the *Summa* is wider than that of the manuals. In his Prologue, St. Thomas states that he proposes "... to treat of the things that pertain to the Christian religion in such a way as befits the instruction of beginners." In line with this purpose he intends to avoid the "... multiplication of useless questions, articles and arguments ... (and the) frequent repetition ... (that begets) weariness and confusion in the minds of the readers." The *Summa*

is not limited by a specific and specialized purpose as the manuals are. Consequently, if the above principles regulating the content of theology for undergraduates were applied to the *Summa*, the result would resemble the original much more than if the same principles were applied to a manual designed for the instruction of seminarians. The method of presenting theology to undergraduates may be worked out according to principles that are based upon the nature of theology on the one hand, and the nature of the learning process and the capacities of undergraduates on the other. The conclusions of such an inquiry should establish a speculative basis for the practical implementation of theological courses for undergraduates according to the norms of pedagogy.

In the problem of the proper order in which to teach theology to the laity one encounters many difficulties. An element of this problem is the fact that many experts unfold the science in different ways. The problem or order is more concerned with the facility with which the habit of theology can be grasped by the student than with the question of whether such a habit pertains to his perfection in the realm of education. It is a problem of perfection rather than of essence. Here, as in other matters, the example of St. Thomas offers profound instruction as well as safe guidance. In establishing the order of the *Summa* he was guided by the exigencies of divine truth considered in itself as well as in relation to the needs of the student. A glance at the Prologue of the *Summa* shows that he wrote in the face of problems similar to those encountered today. The "multiplication of useless questions, articles and arguments and the frequent repetition" which burden the student are charges made against many kinds of instruction in sacred doctrine in our own times. The logical unfolding of doctrine, the harmonious interrelation of dogmatic and moral truths which characterize the *Summa* more than any theological work would certainly be a blessing if they were introduced into collegiate courses.

It is most encouraging to those interested in theology to notice the shift in emphasis in articles relating to theology for the laity. Recently the question of whether theology should be presented to undergraduates seems to have given way to the problems of how theology should be taught to them. This attitude is reflected in the symposium on *The Philosophy of Catholic Higher Education*. Many of the articles in this volume deal with problems that are essentially theological. All the contributions have theological overtones. On the whole, the book gives evidence that Catholic educators are coming to realize the profound truths expressed by Cardinal Stritch in his opening remarks to the members of the Catholic Theological Society of America meeting last June in Chicago: "Many problems confronting us today are not only philosophical but also theological. For example, the whole idea of education is a theological problem. . . . In-

sidious error in this field must be attacked not only from the viewpoint of the educator, but also from the viewpoint of the theologian."²

THOMAS C. DONLON, O. P.

*Fenwick High School,
Oak Park, Ill.*

Kierkegaard's Philosophy of Religion. By REIDAR THOMTE. Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1948. Pp. 230, with index. \$3.50.

This is a straightforward, synoptic account of Søren Kierkegaard's views, with special stress upon his religious thought. Now that Kierkegaard's personal life is fairly well known and his works made accessible in English, the main need is for a series of analytic studies which will advance our understanding of his mind. There are many literary, esthetic, philosophical, and theological aspects which are yet to be uncovered and assessed. But Kierkegaard himself was most concerned about what it means to become a Christian in a world that is Christian in name alone. Thomte's book is orientated to this major preoccupation of his life's work and hence provides an introduction to the very heart of his outlook.

In his arrangement of materials, the author follows a pattern which has become by now almost traditional with scholars in this field. The early chapters explain the various stages of life; a central group of chapters consider the transition from natural religion to Christianity; the latter part of the book is devoted to some specifically Christian concepts. One of the later chapters—an explanation of "Socratic midwifery" or the method employed by Kierkegaard in his literary productions—might well have been placed earlier in the discussion. The reader needs advance preparation for the puzzling use of pseudonyms in almost all of Kierkegaard's early books. But whereas most Kierkegaardian students are content with paraphrasing the original text, Thomte supplies the reader with generous quotations at every phase of the exposition. As he rightly observes (pp. 17; 73, n. 69), direct samplings are essential to an appreciation of the moods and nuances embodied in the various pseudonyms. Moreover, Thomte employs his knowledge of the Danish language to make direct translations from previously inaccessible portions of the copious *Journals* and from important secondary studies. Occasionally, he corrects the accepted English version of Kierkegaard's books in regard to key passages.

At the outset, it is admitted that Kierkegaard cannot be called a philosopher in the usual sense. Thomte refers to his stand as a *Lebens-*

² *Proceedings of the Third Annual Meeting of the Catholic Theological Society of America*, New York, Paulist Press: 1949, p. 8.

anschauung (p. vii). This designation is exact enough, provided that the point of contrast between a life-view and an absolutist system is set forth. When Kierkegaard rejected the literary conventions and standpoint of philosophy, he was reacting against Hegelianism with the aid of the Romantic reverence for "life" and individual destiny. Similarly, in maintaining that metaphysics does not constitute a distinctive stage of life, he was underlining the radical inability of an idealistic systematism to treat of the contingent act of existing. Yet this does not preclude the presence of some implicit metaphysics of a non-absolutist sort. This is admitted at least twice by Thomte himself, when he refers in passing to the "metaphysical" background of Kierkegaard's conception of the human self and subjectivity (pp. 211-12; 215). But the relation between this latent metaphysics and the formal religious teaching is left undetermined.

Because of this omission, there are some shortcomings in the present treatment. What is lacking is a fundamental discussion of the meaning of existence in relation to time, history, and eternity. Unavoidably, such a consideration would penetrate deeper into philosophical and theological issues than Thomte has deemed it advisable to go. Thus, in mentioning Kierkegaard's attitude towards the proofs for God's existence (pp. 111-12), he does not bring out clearly enough that Kierkegaard reserves the term "existence" for Christ alone and usually speaks of the "eternity" of God rather than of His existence. From the philosophical standpoint, we would like to know whether Kierkegaard would grant that human reason can ascertain the eternal being of God, even when the term "existence" is restricted to temporal realities. For an answer, the close dependence of Kierkegaard upon Kant's criticism of the ideal of human reason would have to be weighed. On the theological side, there arise some unanswered difficulties concerning the manner in which temporal existence is predicated of Christ. Thomte states in one place (p. 88) that eternity and temporal existence are contraries, and later on (p. 112) that the task of existing is to bring the eternal into the sphere of the temporal. These passages can be reconciled if one avers to Kierkegaard's conviction about the different modes of existence. There is a way of existing which does attempt to exclude the influence of God and eternity, but his judgment about this attitude is that it is also self-contradictory and destructive of human values. The authentic synthesis of time and eternity is achieved in Christ, Who is also our pattern. Thomte calls the incarnate presence of God in time "unhistorical" (p. 216), but this does not accurately reflect Kierkegaard's conception. According to the Kierkegaardian notion of history, the incarnation and earthly life of Christ constitute the highest and most paradoxical form of historical existence. Here again, it should not be concluded from Kierkegaard's opposition to a purely relativist view of history that he simply withdrew the existence of Christ from history. He

repudiated the "higher critical" method because it proposed a substitute for faith and because it ignored the different modes of historical existence.

In his concluding chapter, Thomte seeks to justify the absence of an independent estimate of the great Danish thinker with the remark that no one who truly appreciates Kierkegaard's labors "could desire to furnish a critical estimate of his philosophy, for he finds himself standing under judgment" (p. 204). This sentiment is of a piece with an attempt to rest faith exclusively upon the ineffable experience of the believing individual (p. 217). In both cases, the dialectical element in Kierkegaard is played down to the point of surrendering critical conscience and objective truth. No principles for evaluating Kierkegaard's religious thought are supplied in this study. On the other hand, it does allow Kierkegaard to speak for himself on many important questions. Especially welcome are the sections allotted to Kierkegaard's religious and edifying discourses, which are usually overlooked by scholars.

JAMES COLLINS

*St. Louis University,
St. Louis, Mo.*

The Philosophy of Anaxagoras. By FELIX M. CLEVE. New York: King's Crown Press, 1949. Pp. 180. \$3.00.

The appearance of a work on the earlier Greek philosophers, and especially one on Anaxagoras, should certainly interest the modern philosopher. The very fact that today we have in many instances repeated the errors of these earlier thinkers, should make us anxious to see these minds in their development. Then, when the author in his foreword expresses his intention of revealing precisely this development, eschewing as he says, "our notions which have arisen from later periods of human thought . . .," the reader is prepared to give him full attention.

Mr. Cleve has accomplished a necessary piece of work. He has carefully considered the various fragments of Anaxagoras and given them all careful evaluation. His analysis is always painstaking. If he at times seems to press the text too far, he is able to point out equivalent lacks in other interpreters of the passage concerned. He has made a very thorough attempt to give us the systematic thought of his subject. As he says, he is rightly more concerned with the thought of Anaxagoras rather than any particular historical interest which it may have. Add to these facts the evident scholarship of the author, his ability to see in the other Greek writers their affinity to the thought of Anaxagoras, his easy style and the pleasing format of the book, and we have a work that will command interest.

Unfortunately the author's reach seems to exceed his grasp. Although he has condemned the anachronistic application of modern notions to the thought of earlier writers, Mr. Cleve begins (p. 13) to talk analogously of a "molecular union" with respect to the "elements" of Anaxagoras. In later references (pp. 17, 18, 21 ff.) the analogous term seems to become univocal. At all points in this reference the author has apparently a confusion between the dialectical analysis of nature which is the province of the experimental scientist and the scientific (demonstrative) analysis which belongs to the philosopher of nature. One could almost say that he reflects the confusion of his subject on this matter. This may be "objective" reporting, but it must necessarily hold difficulties for the student. Furthermore, there is a doubt in the reader's mind whether this confusion in the report of the writer is reflective or originative. This doubt is furthered when (p. 41) the author uncritically explains the Anaxagorean elements with the use of algebra.

It is also very confusing to find a critical analysis of one Greek writer coupled with a great enthusiasm for the same said writer. This is an especial difficulty when we find in the same work a quite unsympathetic appreciation of the works of at least two of the other Greek writers who have an acknowledged validity. When Mr. Cleve deals with Plato and Aristotle he exhibits none of his flair for reading into their words the thought that must have prompted their writings. One gets the feeling that a closer study of these men before attempting the analysis of Anaxagoras would have greatly enhanced the present treatment.

The editorial compression of a book review must necessarily do an injustice to the thought of the author. Any appreciation of the work tends to appear fulsome while criticism seems an accusation of sophistry or at least an implication that the author lacks intellectual integrity. In an attempt to obviate such an interpretation, I should like to consider in more detail Mr. Cleve's conception of the *Nous* of Anaxagoras.

The author is one of the few who have appreciated the distinction between the *Nous* of Anaxagoras and "the omnipotent God of the Bible, who creates the world out of nothingness to be subservient to His ends." Here he is very careful to define the two notions and show, in spite of other interpretations, their evident incompatibility. Also he is not content to describe *Nous* as an artist restricted to "mere moulding, mere building up but once. . . ." For Mr. Cleve *Nous* ". . . is a Hellenic artist, the architect of the world, a mathematical and physical intelligence of the highest rank, but of a might only relatively highest. A skilful mechanician, knowing all that can be made of the world, but performing as well all the conditions indispensable for accomplishing the chosen possibilities." As he says, ". . . moulding but once the various organisms and then abandoning them would not have sufficed." In some way *Nous* must be respon-

sible for the continued existence of its works. The analysis elaborates this theme with the full equipment of the author's scholarly impedimenta. It is lacking, if it is a lack and not a mere quibble of a perfectionist, in that it fails to correlate this notion with that of the *Demiurgos* of Plato or the Nature of Aristotle. Also a further insight into the operation of *Nous* might be gained by a fuller appreciation of the notion of prime matter as developed by Aristotle. This, I believe, would accord with the author's intention to present the mind of Anaxagoras rather than any historical figure of him. On the other hand, his brisk treatment of Aristotle's remarks about Anaxagoras seems to miss the context of these remarks. The label, *polyhistor*, which Mr. Cleve has used for Aristotle seems to be taken too inclusively. However, these faults, if they are faults, do not detract from the real contribution which Mr. Cleve makes. Lovers of Philosophy (since there are few if any Philosophers) will certainly not miss the opportunity to become acquainted with this latest addition.

R. A. KOCOUREK

College of St. Thomas,
St. Paul, Minnesota

Separation of Church and State in the United States. By ALVIN W. JOHNSON and FRANK H. YOST. Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 1948. Pp. 283, with index. \$4.50.

The same moderate usefulness possessed by Johnson's original work, *The Legal Status of Church-State Relationships in the United States*, published in 1934, may be claimed for its present revision and enlargement. Recent issues, and relevant court decisions, are briefly treated. There is "no claim made that this study is in any way a definitive treatise on the subject" (p. i). And indeed it is not. The opening chapter, on religious liberty in the colonies and the background of the First Amendment, is deplorably inadequate; the second chapter, on the religious element in America's first schools, is positively misleading in its account of the genesis of the public school system and the progressive secularization of public instruction. The remaining chapters are more useful in that they bring forward the leading cases on various controversial phases of the relation between religion and government, especially in the field of education. The two chapters on Bible reading in public schools illustrate the historical reluctance of Protestantism to admit that it should be separated from the state as educator. And the chapter on anti-evolution laws are illuminating in regard of the effect of the fundamentalist religious conscience on legislation. The discussion of citizenship and the bearing of arms throws

some light on the situation of pacifism in American life and law. And the whole book, rather contrary (I think) to the intentions of its authors, contributes to the impression that the famous wall of separation between church and state was not from the beginning the formidable piece of masonry that it is now represented as being. Similarly, one has the impression that the political philosophy embodied in the Declaration of Independence, with its definite religious overtones, is increasingly less controlling of legislation and court decisions; I take it that nothing could be more alien to this original American theory of state and society than contemporary secularistic and positivistic legal attitudes.

No part of the book has any profundity, even from a legal point of view; there is, for instance, only the most timid handling of the problem involved in the transmission of the Bill of Rights to the states *via* the Fourteenth Amendment. And the authors carefully avoid the jurisprudential chaos visible in recent Supreme Court decisions, in the Jehovah's Witnesses line of cases and in the *Everson* and *McCullum* cases. Moreover, there is no awareness of the altered situation of the problem of religious liberty in consequence of the profound sociological changes of the last half-century; one finds instead the old unconscious assumption that the only enemy of religious liberty is "government," and the somewhat new assumption that both religion and the state will flourish in direct proportion to the radicality of their separation.

The value of the book therefore is simply in its assembly of citations; it has no value as a piece of legal analysis. And the defects doubtless derive from the standpoint of its authors, which is quite visibly Seventh Day Adventistish; witness, for instance, the long treatment of Sunday laws. The objective character of Johnson's earlier work is fairly well preserved, but there is here and there a slant in the direction of Protestants and Other Americans United for Separation of Church and State (with which both authors seem to be associated). The authors' standards of judgment, insofar as they transpire at all, seem based on the anarchic concept of religious liberty characteristic of the Seventh Day Adventists.

JOHN COURTNEY MURRAY, S. J.

Woodstock College,
Woodstock, Md.

BRIEF NOTICES

La gnose Valentinienne et le temoignage de Saint Irénée. By FRANÇOIS-M.-M. SAGNARD, O. P. Paris: J. Vrin, 1947. Pp. 668.

The study of Gnosticism presents several interesting features. These sects, Christian or pagan or a mixture of both sets of ideas, form an important chapter in the history of religion, of philosophy, and of ideas. They have been quite influential in their times and have exercised a greater influence on later ages than is generally recognized. In particular, they have put forth one notion which has come to the fore again and again and which also plays a definite rôle in certain contemporary ideas on human nature. This is the conception of man as tripartite, as consisting of matter or body, soul or principle of life, and spirit or an element which pertains to an order different from that of sensible reality. Adumbrated in Plato's myth of the chariot (in *Phaedrus*) and also by Aristotle's notion of "*Nous* coming from without," the theory of the three constituents has perhaps never been worked out so consistently and given so much fundamental importance as in the systems of Gnosticism. Although the Gnostic doctrines soon ceased to be effective or to win followers, they lived on in a, so to speak, subterranean manner to reemerge during the Renaissance and at all times when the so-called Pythagorean mysteries or others of a similar nature attracted attention. It would seem feasible to divide all theories on human nature into three groups: monistic, dualistic, and trialistic. Even within orthodoxy one notices occasionally traces of the trialistic, if not doctrine, at least, expression. One need only recall the use of the term *mens* in St. Augustine and many of his medieval followers (e.g. St. Bernard). It was also a problem not devoid of interest, whether or not such traditions were alive in the "dialectics" of Hegel and still are alive in certain contemporary philosophies, as in that of L. Klages who conceives of "spirit" as the "antagonist of the soul."

A study, therefore, which widens and deepens our knowledge of Gnostic doctrines has more than a merely historical relevance. Sagnard's voluminous treatise deserves recommendation not only because of the interest of the topic but also because of the scholarly manner in which the author deals with his subject matter. What we know of Gnosticism we owe mostly to reports in the writings of the Christian Fathers directed against these heretical systems. Among these writings the *Adversus Haereses* by St. Irenaeus holds a prominent place. Text, literary tradition, reliability of this work are carefully analyzed by the learned Dominican. Equal care is given to the presentation of Gnostic ideas in the *Letter to Flora* by the Gnostic Ptolomee, to the fragments of Heracleon, the notes by Theodote,

and the reports by Hippolyte. The Gnostic system is discussed in all its details. One is thus appraised of the utterly fantastic ideas which make up a large part of this doctrine, which however, appears as much more intelligible than it did on the basis of previous treatises on the subject.

Although the author is concerned mainly with the ideas peculiar to Valentinian and his school—a long chapter deals with the teachings of Marcus the Mage and his “arithmology”—one learns many things about the general spirit of Gnosticism.

It is impossible to summarize the Gnostic ideas which the author presents in a clear manner, but for which he needs many pages, because of the many involved and difficult views which characterize these doctrines. Thus, it must suffice that this work be pointed out as one which no student either of the early battles of the Church for the preservation of orthodoxy or of the history of religion and philosophy will peruse without great profit. Particularly, the analysis of Valentinian Gnosis in regard to the Oriental, Greek, and Christian elements it contains is highly interesting, as is the proof of the reliability of the sources used by St. Irenaeus and his presentation of his antagonists. Many misunderstandings occurring in older works are corrected, and the understanding of the Gnostic systems is rendered easier by diagrams and tables. A useful bibliography, an index of names, and a glossary of Greek words, especially of the technical terms in Valentinian Gnosis, are added.

Aesthetics and History in the Visual Arts. By BERNARD BERENSON. New York: Pantheon, 1948. Pp. 260, with indexes. \$4.00.

Mr. Berenson has written a book—perhaps treatise is a more accurate word—that is difficult to read and more difficult to analyze. The reason for this difficulty in a tract on aesthetics is to be found in the fact that the author's arrangement of material is itself a violation of one of the canons of aesthetics, namely, that the diversity of elements in things beautiful should be harmonized in such a way that the beholder is struck with and delighted by their perceptible unity. The work is marked by a wide acquaintance with the landmarks of culture presented in agglomerate form. The book resembles a well-stocked pantry more than a carefully prepared and easily digestible banquet.

The reader would do well to remember throughout the book two passages that occur late in the rather lengthy introduction. The author states that “. . . art history is the history of art as an experience and is indifferent to questions of beauty.” (p. 39) Further on he confesses: “I am one of those lovers of sights and sounds of whom Plato in the Republic (476 B) speaks with pity, who ‘delight in beautiful tones and colors and shapes and in everything that art fashions out of these, but their thought is

incapable of apprehending and taking delight in the nature of the beautiful in itself.' He would call me a *philodoxos* and not a philosopher (*ibid.* 480 E) and I should not be angry, 'for to be angry with truth is not lawful.' " (pp. 39-40)

From this it seems the author's intention was not to write a speculative treatise, although the title would indicate otherwise. In point of fact, he does not succeed in avoiding incursions into the field of aesthetic philosophy, and his speculative essays are generally devoid of clarity of thought and precision of expression. The gross nature of many of his *obiter dicta*, especially in the fields of religion and ethics (cf. pp. 113 ff.) is in sharp contrast to the genuinely refined perceptions expressed elsewhere on topics germane to the subject of the book; e. g., the discussion of color in art (p. 79), or the description of aesthetic experience (p. 84). All of which gives emphasis to the adage about the shoemaker and his last; Mr. Berenson is widely acquainted with the field of art, but makes a remarkable poor showing outside its confines.

If read against the background of an acquaintance with Thomistic aesthetic, this book will have some limited value as a source of embellishment for some of the nearly cryptic principles of that theory. However, the author's preoccupation with the "City of Man" (with implied opposition to the "City of God") (p. 184), and his light treatment of things divine as in some Biblical references (p. 16, 37), together with many philosophical confusions and recrudescient errors serve to diminish the value of the work taken as a whole. Those interested in the historical aspects of art have a better choice among the more general works that leave greater opportunity for independent judgment and are not heavily encumbered by confused conception and repetitious expression.

White Magic. By C. GRANT LOOMIS. Cambridge, Mass.: Mediaeval Academy of America, 1948. Pp. 250, with index. \$5.00.

As an "Introduction to the Folklore of Christian Legend" under the heading of *White Magic*, this book classifies the miracles of Christian hagiography, not precisely as miracles but insofar as the miracles were accompanied by certain formularies or signs, used by the saints in their thaumaturgy. By reason of these formularies or signs, says the author, the miracles enter the realm of folklore and become a manifestation of human expression common to all peoples and all religions. Perhaps it would be quibbling to point out that the word "magic" signifies the production of unexpected effects through a skillful manipulation of occult but natural causes; whereas "miracle" by definition exceeds the powers of nature, having God as its cause, the saint as His instrument. Magic is praeternatural, the miracle, supernatural.

To achieve his purpose, Professor Loomis has certainly been thorough in his research; witness the fact that over half the book consists of source notes and analogues for the various miracle types outlined in the text. Yet it seems that his efforts are an example of an author's mind determined beforehand to prove his case, and not one of objective investigation. As an example of one of the signs or formularies for which he is searching, there is cited the following (p. 103): "In the legend of St. Clotilde, we learn how the blind and deaf were cured by Remi who wet his fingers with saliva and applied them to the eyes and ears of the afflicted persons, pronouncing the word *Hephta* (ouvrez-vous)." The source given for this, *Petites Bollandistes*, VI, p. 421, however reads thus: "It was fitting that Clovis approach the regenerative waters of Baptism first. The Bishop of Reims [St. Remi] led the illustrious catechumen to the entrance of the baptistery and, as Christ did when He cured the blind and the deaf, [Mark, VII, 34] touching the ears of the monarch with fingers moistened with saliva, he pronounced the word *Hephta* (be thou opened)." Evidently, then, there is no question of a miracle or miracle formula on the part of St. Remi here, but simply an account of the rites preceding the Baptism of Clovis, husband of St. Clotilde—rites still in fact employed by the Catholic Church [cfr. *Rituale Romanum*, p. 15].

In his eagerness to verify his aprioristic theories, the author has fallen into a blatant error in the use of his sources. These same preconceptions have resulted in a book which has reduced the miracle to the level of the Paul Bunyan feat; to the arbitrary classification of a manifestation of human expression. In approaching the subject of the miraculous, it is of paramount importance to realize what miracles are, that they are possible, that they have happened. A miracle in itself is an effect exceeding the powers of natural causes, either in itself, in the manner in which it is produced, or because of the subject in which it is effected. Sufficient guarantee of the possibility of miracles is God, the Author and Conserving Cause Who, since He freely created can also freely transcend the powers of nature. History and the testimony of the senses attest to the fact of miracles. Historical criticism also attests to the excrescences of exaggeration and superstition that have accumulated about the lives of the saints, with a too eager tendency to cry "Miracle." In spite of exaggeration and superstition, however, the basic actuality must not be ignored. There have been miracles not only in the superstitious days of the Middle Ages, but also in the super-critical days of modern times. Prof. Loomis' work tends to cast a shadow on this truth.

That he is able to classify miracles in such categories as Air, Earth, Fire, Water, etc. should not be surprising, since the miraculous is a suspension or a transcendence of the natural order and of natural causes. Nor is it surprising that miracles were performed with accompanying words,

signs, devices, or gestures. This proves, not that the miracles are a patterned expression of some tendency in man's nature, but that God, either acting Himself or through His saints, has acted in accord with man's nature. "Nothing is in the intellect unless it first be in the senses" has its application here. In order that men might fully understand that they were witnessing a miracle, sounds, signs, words were employed—sensible things which would engage their attention.

This book cannot be considered an attack on the miraculous; it is just not that violent. Rather it ignores any consideration of the objective truth of miracles, and goes on its merry, scholarly way to verify its preconceived, quite invalid conclusions. One may also resent the occasional grouping, by implication, of the Sacred Scriptures with folk legend, or of Christ's miracles with folklore. Ignoring the false premises indicated in the Introduction, it can be said that the book is an occasionally amusing, more often drily monotonous, recital of miracles, but quite harmless.

Sacramental Penance in the Twelfth and Thirteenth Centuries. By J. A. SPITZIG. Washington: The Catholic University of America Press, 1948. Pp. 207, with index. \$2.00.

This doctoral dissertation is a further effort to throw light upon the teachings of the theologians of the medieval period, and to show the overall uniformity of doctrine and the gradual clarification of ideas during that period. The Masters of those days, including St. Thomas Aquinas, benefited by and in some instances greatly depended upon the contributions of their predecessors.

The present study concentrates upon sacramental satisfaction in the 12th and 13th centuries,—which led later to the definition by the Council of Trent. It is divided into two parts. The first considers the theology of sacramental satisfaction, which is prefaced by two chapters on the nature and contemporary teaching on satisfaction in general. The theology of satisfaction has been very capably exposed by the author in this section, which emphasizes the need, possibility, and manner of both extra-sacramental and sacramental satisfaction. The reader gains a greater appreciation of these elements in the way of salvation.

The second half investigates this doctrine among the theologians of the 12th and 13th centuries, an important era in the history of theology. Admittedly, the list of Masters is not taxative; it is representative and sufficient to indicate the traditional teaching. The chapter on the 12th century includes eight names from Peter Abelard to Peter of Blois; that on the 13th century contains Alexander of Hales, St. Bonaventure, St. Albert, St. Thomas, and Duns Scotus.

The chronological inclusion of Scotus in the 13th century must not be taken too strictly. Moreover, doctrinally, throughout the whole question of satisfaction, he differed radically from his 12th and 13th century predecessors. Fr. Spitzig is forced to recognize the oppositions existing between the teaching of Scotus and St. Thomas (and the other theologians). On the fundamental point of the effects of sacramental satisfaction in the state of mortal sin, the *materia* of the sacrament of penance and the validity of absolution when confronted with the unwillingness of the penitent to accept the penance imposed the two theologians are irreconcilable. Fr. Spitzig, in the interest of all possible uniformity, tends to tone down and to minimize these differences.

The procedure of this dissertation follows a rigid pattern within each chapter and relative to the individual theologians: the nature, works, effects, necessity, possibility, and conditions of satisfaction, vicarious and sacramental satisfactions. Rather needlessly in some cases the material is thrust into this procrustean bed and the whole becomes monotonous for the reader. The bow to popular terminology (p. ix) does not seem to be sufficient reason for using the term sacramental penance in the title and sacramental satisfaction throughout the entire body of the dissertation. Very commendable work has been done on the revival of the sacramental satisfactory value of penance in the state of serious sin.

Fundamentals of Logic. By SYLVESTER J. HARTMAN. St. Louis: Herder, 1949. Pp. 271, with bibliography and index. \$3.50.

Here, at last, is a textbook that can justly claim to be Aristotelian. The author faithfully follows the order of the *Organon* and likewise carefully avoids inserting any extraneous material from psychology. This is an advancement over previous works, since most logic textbooks offend the Aristotelian mode by dividing their subject into formal and material logic and by treating of matters proper to psychology. Another advantage of Fr. Hartman's book is that it has a realistic point of view on how much a college student can learn in a semester's course of logic. *Fundamentals of Logic* is for the most part a sentence outline of logic, a series of definitions on the subject, all of which is made enjoyable to the student by means of copious examples.

The work is divided into six parts treating of concepts and terms (which corresponds to the "Categories"); judgments and propositions (which Aristotle treats in the "On Interpretation"); immediate and mediate inference, the syllogism (found in the "Prior Analytics"); the scientific method (corresponding roughly to the "Posterior Analytics" and the "Topics"); and finally of fallacies (called by Aristotle "On Sophistical

Refutations"). Actually the author is not explicit in the fact that he is following Aristotle so closely. The main point is that he does. The section on fallacies is particularly good. Occasionally the author is rather loose in his definitions. For example, he says: "Law in its primary sense may be briefly defined as the expressed will of the divine or a human law-giver." (p. 171) St. Thomas, of course, considered it as an ordination of reason. It is true that Fr. Hartman can probably reconcile his definition with that of the Angelic Doctor, but loose terminology is too often a source of confusion to the youthful philosophical mind. Nevertheless, in spite of some minor defects, this textbook will gain a generous welcome in any college classroom.

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